

# UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

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## CYBERSECURITY OF FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS (FRCS)



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**UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)**

**CYBERSECURITY OF FACILITY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS (FRCS)**

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U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING SYSTEMS COMMAND (Preparing Activity)

AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER

Record of Changes (changes are indicated by \1\ ... /1/)

Change No.	Date	Location

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## FOREWORD

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
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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1-1 BACKGROUND.

#### 1-1.1 Control System Definition

Control systems are a combination of special purpose controlling devices (controllers), control components (e.g. electrical, mechanical or pneumatic sensors and actuators), and generally (but not always) network infrastructure (which may contain standard IT components) that act together upon underlying mechanical and/or electrical equipment to achieve an objective. A control system (CS) typically consists of sensors and actuators connected to networked digital controllers, includes a user interface, and is used to control and monitor equipment.

Some control systems are “monitor only” (they do not exercise control) but are still considered control systems.

#### 1-1.2 Facility-Related Control Systems

There are many types of control systems ranging from building control systems to manufacturing control systems to weapon control systems, all with different names and terminology. Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS) are a subset of control systems that are used to monitor and control equipment and systems related to DoD real property facilities (for example, building control systems, utility control systems, electronic security systems, and fire and life safety systems).

#### 1-1.3 Risk Management Framework (RMF)

The Risk Management Framework (RMF) is the DoD process for applying cybersecurity to information technology (IT), including control systems. The RMF categorizes systems by the impact the system can have on organizational mission using HIGH, MODERATE, and LOW impact levels. The RMF is further described in CHAPTER 2 and APPENDIX A.

### 1-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

This UFC describes requirements for incorporating cybersecurity in the design of all facility-related control systems which include a network. This UFC covers the cybersecurity aspects of control system design, and the requirements of this UFC must be coordinated with the control system design and the criteria relevant to the control system. This UFC only covers aspects specific to control system design. Many projects have IT-specific components (such as IP network design security) which are not covered by this UFC; in those cases, the controls designer will need to coordinate with other disciplines. This UFC defines a process for identification of cybersecurity requirements based on the Risk Management Framework suitable for control systems of any impact rating and provides specific guidance suitable for control systems assigned LOW or MODERATE impact level.

This UFC covers the incorporation of cybersecurity concepts and requirements in support of the Risk Management Framework. This UFC does not implement the RMF and does not address anything beyond the design of the system. Use of this UFC does not result in an ATO under the RMF process but will provide a system that is more capable of receiving an ATO than a system not designed in accordance with this UFC.

### **1-3           APPLICABILITY.**

This UFC applies to all planning, design and construction, renovation, and repair of new and existing facilities (both permanent and non-permanent) and installations that result in DoD real property assets which include a control system with a network, regardless of funding source (and regardless of network type). Restated another way, this UFC applies to any project with any control system that includes architecture levels, as defined in this UFC, of 1 or higher. While this UFC can assist with the design of any system, portions of it are applicable only to the design of LOW and MODERATE impact systems and HIGH Impact system will typically require additional customized requirements to achieve appropriate levels of cybersecurity. Design of such systems should be coordinated with the points of contact provided in Paragraph 1-6.

In defining specific requirements for LOW or MODERATE systems, this UFC assumes the control system is being implemented on a DoD Installation or other DoD site, which allows inheritance of some cybersecurity controls. Systems not being implemented on a DoD Installation may require additional requirements not included in this UFC.

### **1-4           GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS.**

Comply with UFC 1-200-01, DoD Building Code (General Building Requirements). UFC 1-200-01 provides applicability of model building codes and government unique criteria for typical design disciplines and building systems, as well as for accessibility, antiterrorism, security, high performance and sustainability requirements, and safety. Use this UFC in addition to UFC 1-200-01 and the UFCs and government criteria referenced therein.

### **1-5           ORGANIZATION.**

CHAPTER 2 provides an overview of the RMF as it applies to control systems, control system architecture and the cybersecurity approach to control systems. CHAPTER 3 defines a 5-step approach to incorporating cybersecurity into the design of control systems. CHAPTER 4 defines minimum design requirements for control systems to be implemented in addition to the specific requirements identified through the 5-step process described in CHAPTER 3. CHAPTER 5 defines the submittal requirements for documenting cybersecurity aspects of control system design.

APPENDIX A provides an overview of the Risk Management Framework as it pertains to control systems. APPENDIX B provides additional detail on the Platform Enclave concept. APPENDIX C describes the 5-Level architecture for control systems. APPENDIX D describes considerations in determination of control system impact ratings. APPENDIX E discusses considerations in the integration of critical building



systems into a non-critical UMCS. APPENDIX F provides guidance for security control families, and individual security controls. APPENDIX G categorizes CCI by impact and responsibility.

## **1-6 CYBERSECURITY POINTS OF CONTACT BY SERVICE.**

Cybersecurity policies and approaches are evolving, and projects may have unique requirements. Assistance for control system cybersecurity design is available from the following Service organizations:

- Army, other than Civil Works: Control System Cybersecurity Mandatory Center of Expertise (CSC-MCX), Huntsville Engineering and Support Center ([CSC-MCX@usace.army.mil](mailto:CSC-MCX@usace.army.mil))
- Army, Civil Works: HQUSACE Engineering and Construction Control System Community of Practice Leader ([controlsystemcopleader@usace.army.mil](mailto:controlsystemcopleader@usace.army.mil)).
- Navy (and Marine Corps): Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Command Information Office (CIO).
- Air Force (and Space Force): Air Force Civil Engineering Center (AFCEC) Operations Directorate, Tyndall Air Force Base. Support can be obtained via the reach-back center at [AFCEC.RBC@us.af.mil](mailto:AFCEC.RBC@us.af.mil). Note: All requests for support must be initiated by the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) or, for government-designed projects, by the Project Lead.

## **1-7 GLOSSARY.**

APPENDIX H contains acronyms, abbreviations, and definitions.

## **1-8 REFERENCES.**

APPENDIX I contains a list of references used in this document. The publication date or revision of the code or standard is not always included in this document. Unless otherwise specified, the most recent edition of the referenced publication applies.

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## CHAPTER 2 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY OVERVIEW

### 2-1 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW.

The risk assessment process, or Risk Management Framework (RMF), inventories the system components, identifies the System Owner (SO) and Authorizing Official (AO), and implements risk reduction measures. The Authorizing Official then evaluates the risk and either accepts the risk and issues an Authority to Operate (ATO) or denies the ATO. At this point, the system is allowed to operate and (if necessary) connect to DoD network infrastructure. Risk reduction measures include removal of network and wireless capabilities, documenting the system, and altering the system to limit capabilities.

APPENDIX A contains a more extensive summary of the RMF as it relates to this UFC. It is highly recommended that readers unfamiliar with the RMF review APPENDIX A before incorporating cybersecurity requirements into control system design.

#### 2-1.1 Security Controls.

The RMF relies on the implementation of security controls, where a control is a specific action taken to secure a system. Note that this usage of the word 'control' is different from control engineering or control systems engineering, which is the engineering discipline that applies control theory to design systems with desired behaviors. To provide clarity of usage, this UFC will use the term "security control" to refer to cybersecurity controls.

#### 2-1.2 RMF Goal.

For FRCS, the goal of the RMF is to reduce and mitigate vulnerabilities until the risk to the mission supported by the FRCS is deemed acceptable by the System Owner (SO) and Authorizing Official (AO). Under the RMF, risk reduction is not "all or nothing", rather the security solution must reduce risk while considering the constraints of resources and mission requirements. For application of the RMF to control systems, the determination of cybersecurity risk reduction must also account for any additional risks to system functionality due to application of the security controls. The final decision of whether a level of risk is acceptable is made by the assigned government AO.

#### 2-1.3 RMF Roles of the Designer and Control System Installer.

##### 2-1.3.1 RMF Role of the Designer

The designer has one primary role and one secondary role in the RMF process. Their primary role is to identify security controls which can be addressed by the design (during project planning and design) and implement those security controls in the design. As a secondary role, the designer provides input into the risk analysis process by advising on the impact, or lack thereof, of applying security controls to the control system and by advising on how the control system does or does not impact supported missions.

For an example of the need for designer input, consider the mechanical design of an HVAC system. These systems are designed to specific criteria - design day environmental conditions - and those criteria are a compromise between a system that is oversized for most of its operation, and a system that is sometimes under-sized. The criteria are well-established, and the tradeoffs are understood and accepted. Cybersecurity involves similar trade-offs but, unlike for HVAC design, the criteria are not well-established, and the AO must determine the balance point between an over-secure system (which will likely be more expensive, and harder to install, commission, and maintain) and a system that still has some residual risk. Evaluating this risk requires a detailed understanding of the control system functioning which the AO may not possess, necessitating input from the designer.

### **2-1.3.2 RMF Role of Control System Installer**

The construction installer is – as with any other aspect of a construction project – responsible for meeting the specifications and requirements of the contract. They are not directly responsible for Cybersecurity. Given a proper design, meeting the specifications will provide for a proper implementation of Cybersecurity.

### **2-1.4 Platform Information Technology.**

DoD Instructions 8500.01 and 8510.01 define the Risk Management Framework (RMF) for the DoD and establish a category for “special purpose” systems that are not traditional information technology or information systems, called Platform Information Technology (PIT) systems. These PIT systems, including control systems, use specifically tailored security controls sets and require the AO to have expertise in the system.

As further discussed in CHAPTER 3, the designer provides input into the determination of the control system impact rating by advising on the relationship between the control system and the mission supported and provides input on the security control selection by advising on the feasibility and potential impacts of applying a security control.

### **2-1.5 Inherited Security Controls.**

An inherited security control is a security control that a system meets by virtue of someone else addressing it in such a way that it applies to the system. A control system will generally inherit security controls one of three ways: by existing within a physical security boundary, by being covered by policies and procedures already in place, or by connection to another system which addresses the security controls.

Since inheritance often requires the SO to coordinate with others, it's critical to document all security controls the control system expects to inherit. During control system design, the designer must identify and document any security controls which are expected to be inherited.

### **2-1.5.1 Physical Security Inheritance Example.**

DoD installations implement physical security to manage risk to an acceptable level. For a control system on a DoD Installation, a security control requiring that members of the public not be allowed unrestricted physical access to components of a control system will be met by virtue of the control system existing within that physical security boundary. Although military installations are on occasion opened to the public for events such as boot camp graduations, the access is not unrestricted, and the level of access has been accepted by installation security. Since control systems are innately tied to and co-located with the physical systems they control, in most cases a control system will be able to inherit physical security from the installation or separately secured facilities.

### **2-1.5.2 Policy and Procedures Inheritance Example.**

The DoD has policies in place governing many aspects of cybersecurity. A control system can therefore inherit a security control such as “the organization defines the frequency to review and update the current security planning policy”.

### **2-1.5.3 Connection to another System Inheritance Example.**

When a control system connects to another system, such as an Installation-wide network, inheritance may not be automatic but may require an agreement between the SOs of the systems. Such an agreement would cover acceptable behavior of the control system and explicitly define the security controls that will be inherited from the other system.

## **2-1.6 Applicability of RMF Security Controls to Design.**

Security controls cover a wide range of requirements, many of which must be addressed by someone outside the control system design process. For example, a security control<sup>1</sup> that states “The organization protects the control system from unauthorized modification by members of the organization” is normally not addressed by the designer; but rather is addressed through policies and procedures put in place by the organization that owns and operates the control system.

### **2-1.6.1 Applicability of RMF Security Controls to Design of Critical Systems.**

The determination of whether a security control should be applied at design can become particularly complex for more critical (higher impact) systems. While it may be sufficient for a LOW impact system to assume a particular security control is addressed by another entity, the designer of a HIGH impact system may need to explicitly address

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<sup>1</sup> This is not an actual security control, but rather an illustrative example using a fictitious control.

a security control to ensure it is being implemented properly, to apply it at a higher standard, or to provide tools to the responsible parties to assist their implementation of the security control. For example, while a security control stating<sup>2</sup> “The organization protects the control system from unauthorized modification by members of the organization” might be addressed through policies and procedures for a LOW impact system, a higher impact system may require the designer to explicitly design in additional barriers to unauthorized modification, or to provide guidance to the organization concerning the importance of properly securing the control system against modification. In this case, however, it’s vital to consider the impact these restrictions may have on the ability to make necessary authorized changes. For this reason, designers of systems with HIGH mission impact should likely seek the assistance of a dedicated cybersecurity engineer. MODERATE systems may also require specialized attention depending on the circumstances of the design.

### **2-1.6.2 Applicability to Control Systems as Compared to IT Systems**

Another issue to be considered in the design of critical systems is the potential gap between the strict requirements of the (IT-centric) RMF and what is practical in control system design. Consider, for example, a fire alarm system and the level of support a fire alarm panel will have for Personal Identity Verification (PIV, such as the DoD CAC) compared to the RMF requirements at the MODERATE level. As a practical matter, it’s likely impossible to install a fire alarm system that meets the PIV requirements of a MODERATE impact system.

In this case, insisting on RMF requirements “as written” is particularly problematic as it would prevent the procurement and installation of the system until the manufacturer develops a custom system and then obtains UL certification. In other cases, the designer could insist on the RMF-required functionality, driving the installing contractor to create custom solutions using specialized equipment, but this is rarely the best approach as it greatly increases the overall risk that the system will not function properly. The unique solutions required to meet these requirements will likely require controllers that are not designed for the purpose in which they are used, and the system will likely be installed by contractors with experience in securing systems but not in the specific functionality of the control system. Because of its non-standard nature the system is likely to be significantly more expensive and more difficult to install, test, operate and maintain, all of which reduce the overall reliability of the system.

### **2-1.6.3 Other Applicability Input**

In addition to providing input on the impact the control system will have on the supported mission, designers may be required to provide input on the ability (or inability) of the control system to meet cybersecurity requirements. This assists the AO in defining and accepting requirements that address cybersecurity risks without introducing functional risks.

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<sup>2</sup> This is not an actual security control, but rather an illustrative example using a fictitious control.

## 2-2 5-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

Even though control systems are becoming more like standard IT systems, there remain major differences that must be recognized. The 5-Level control system architecture shown in Figure 2-1 is a framework for describing the system architecture of any control system. This architecture allows distinctions to be made between portions of the control system that look like standard IT, and portions that do not look like standard IT. This is important as many security controls can be applied in the normal fashion to the portion of the control system that looks like a standard IT system but cannot be applied without modification (or sometimes cannot be applied at all) to the portion that does not look like a standard IT system.

APPENDIX C provides a more in-depth description of the 5-Level control system architecture.

### 2-2.1 Architecture Is a General Architecture


This architecture is designed to highlight Cybersecurity aspects of the control system; it is not intended to be an exact depiction of a control system. A single control system may have multiple authorizations and the boundaries of these authorizations may not be easily depicted by the architecture itself. Other control systems with a single authorization might lack a system-wide network and – from an IT perspective – appear to be several distinct systems; these might not be easily depicted by a single architecture drawing. For example, an installation-wide fire protection system generally does not have a system-wide network; each building has a separate network, and the buildings are connected to a central monitoring station by radios and relay panels<sup>3</sup>.

A single system may be described by the architecture in multiple ways – a multi-building control system with a dedicated IP network connecting the buildings may be described as a single FCS consisting only of levels 0-2 with the entire IP network residing at level 2, or it could be described as using levels 0-4 with multiple Level 2 networks connecting to a Level 4 IP network through multiple FPOCs. Depending on the system functionality as well as the cybersecurity approach, either or both may be valid, and which is the more appropriate depiction of the system depends on the details of the system itself and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Both fit within and can be described by the 5-level architecture, and the intent of the architecture is to provide a common lexicon for defining systems and not to confine systems to a set definition.

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<sup>3</sup> The use of relay panels breaks the system into a base-wide radio network and a collection of buildings, each with an *independent* network in it.

Figure 2-1 5-Level Control System Architecture



### 2-2.2 “Standard IT” Parts of the Control System.

The parts of the control system that most resemble a standard or traditional IT system are referred to as the “Standard IT” parts:

- The IP Network portion of Level 4 (Level 4N).
- The IP Network portion of Level 2 (Levels 2N and 2B).
- The field point of connection (FPOC) at Level 3.
- The computer hardware for both servers and workstations (Levels 2D, 4A, 4B)
- The computer OS and other standard packages (such as antivirus) for both servers and workstations (desktops and laptops) (Levels 2D, 4A, 4B). Note that this does not include control system software such as front-end packages or engineering tools, but it might include things like web servers and database engines used by the front end. While front end packages and engineering tools likely run on standard desktop operating systems and have many characteristics



in common with standard IT applications, they may have unique features and applying cybersecurity to them may require special expertise.

- External connections and control system management at Level 5.

The cybersecurity for the “standard IT” parts of the control system are largely addressed using standard cybersecurity practices and are generally outside the scope of control system design and are not addressed by this UFC. The designer should coordinate with IT experts for cybersecurity of those portions of the control system. The designer must address the IP Network at Level 2N, which is generally procured and installed by the control system contractor, and the control system specific software used by the front end, which is generally not adequately covered by standard IT approaches.

### **2-2.3 “Non-Standard IT” Parts of the Control System.**

What makes cybersecurity for a control system challenging are the parts of the control system that do not generally resemble a standard IT system: Level 0, Level 1, Level 2A, Level 2C and the control system applications at Level 2D, Level 4A and Level 4B. These parts of the control system are referred to as the “non-standard IT” parts in order to differentiate them from the “standard IT” parts. Traditional cybersecurity tools and requirements such as vulnerability management alerts, bulletins, Secure Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), Security Requirements Guides (SRGs), and DoD IT Policies are seldom applicable to these non-standard IT components, particularly to devices at Levels 0, 1 or 2. For example, a security control<sup>4</sup> requiring the screen to be locked when the user leaves the computer is not applicable to devices that do not have a screen or support user login. Different levels of the architecture have different issues related to the application of standard cybersecurity tools and requirements.

Cybersecurity for these portions of the control system must be addressed by the control system designer.

#### **2-2.3.1 Computers at Level 2**

If front end computers are on the same dedicated IP network as the control system (generally within the same building as the control system) they are considered to be at Level 2 rather than Level 4. This is a common scenario in legacy systems, and is sometimes found in new installations, particularly for systems that are not interfaced to a base-wide front end or where (typically to meet availability requirements) the front end servers (Level 4A) must be placed on that building’s Level 2 network. However, when installing new computers as part of a project, the cybersecurity requirements are largely the same regardless of whether the computers are at Level 2 or Level 4.

#### **2-2.3.2 Level 0 Components vs Systems**

A common question that arises is: “How complex can a ‘thing’ be and still be considered a Level 0 device?” For example, consider a packaged backup power unit, with diesel engine, generator, and Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS). This unit has dozens of

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<sup>4</sup> For reference – security control AC-11 deals with session lock requirements.

sensors and actuators, multiple controllers, and an internal network connecting them all together. Since it is a **packaged unit** and procured as a single component, if the unit **does not** have a network interface to the rest of the system it **could** be considered a single Level 0 device, even if procured independently of any other control system. Alternatively, the unit could be considered its own mini field control system.

Ultimately the decision on how best to address such units must be made in coordination with the SO and AO, but a general guideline is to consider packaged units with hardware interfaces to be Level 0 devices, and to consider built-up units connected with hardware interfaces to be separate FCS. Note that any device, no matter how “dumb,” is not a Level 0 component if it is connected to a network (has a network interface as opposed to simple binary and analog connections), so even a simple networked temperature sensor is not a Level 0 device.

#### **2-2.3.2.1 As a Level 0 Component**

A Level 0 device with an internal network - particularly if procured independently of any other control system -, might need to go through the RMF process – as a FRCS consisting of a single Level 0 device with a greatly reduced set of cybersecurity requirements. Or the AO could greatly simplify the process and accept the risk up front for a Level 0 device (albeit an expensive and complex Level 0 device).

#### **2-2.3.2.2 As a Mini Field Control System**

The unit could be considered its own mini field control system, which requires the internal components of the packaged unit be defined as well as the hardware (non-networked) interface between the backup power unit and the building system. This adds a lot of effort and documentation for very little benefit, and is almost never the right choice. Note that this may also cause a separate ATO for the unit to be required, significantly increasing the burden even further.

#### **2-2.3.3 Describing Systems Using the 5-Level Architecture.**

As stated previously, the 5-level architecture provides a common lexicon for defining systems and is not intended to confine systems to a set definition. The basic architecture drawings presented in this UFC generally describe a single system with a single authorization, or with two authorizations where one of them is a Platform Enclave. Other control systems may require architecture drawings which depict systems using the 5-level architecture in various other ways. In some cases, the architecture may need to indicate additional authorization boundaries, and in others the architecture levels may be connected in ways not shown on the basic drawings in this UFC. For example:

- A base-wide fire reporting system where a system in a building is connected via radio to a base-wide central monitoring system at the main fire station. In this case, the building level system exists at Levels 0 – 2 and there is a Level 0 interface (relay panel) between it and a sitewide radio network. The radio network is (typically) a Level 1 (dedicated non-IP

network) interface to a central front end and other Level 0 – 2 building level fire systems.

- A fire protection system where some subsystem (such as the releasing panel controlling a pre-action fire sprinkler system in a datacenter) has a higher cyber impact rating (say MODERATE) than the rest of the system (presumed to be LOW). In this case, the system may be authorized in two different ways:
  - A single authorization covering the entire building fire protection system. Because the releasing panel has a MODERATE impact, the entire system would need to meet MODERATE requirements.
  - Two separate authorizations: a) A small MODERATE authorization for the releasing panel, and b) A large LOW authorization for the remainder of the building. In this case, the two systems would need to have a cyber-secure separation between them; the easiest (but not only) way to achieve this this would be via an interposing relay panel.
- A MODERATE building control system needing integration into a base-wide LOW system. Again, there is a choice between either treating the base-wide system as a MODERATE system (a potentially very expensive solution) or having two authorizations – a MODERATE for the building and a LOW for the base-wide system. The tradeoff in this case is that the integration will need a high level of isolation and will likely be more expensive and provide much less functionality than the normal integration of a building into the base-wide system. This specific case is covered in more detail in APPENDIX E.

The key point here is that all FRCS can be described in terms of components at one or more of the 5 levels of this architecture.

#### **2-2.4 Wireless Networks**

Although not explicitly shown in the architecture, wireless networks may exist at Level 1, Level 2 or Level 4 of the architecture. Wireless networks require additional cybersecurity measures, and unless furnished by the project site must be carefully coordinated to ensure the use of wireless is approved and meets all the additional requirements.

#### **2-2.5 Platform Enclave.**

Many control systems are hosted within a network that is segmented from the general day-to-day business application (such as email, file servers) network either physically or virtually. This separate IT infrastructure environment dedicated to the delivery of common level services (for example, Active Directory Services, Assured Compliance Assessment Solution (ACAS) Services, Host Base Security System (HBSS) Services) to the FRCS is referred to as the Platform Enclave. In some cases, this Platform


Enclave will have a separate authorization from the control systems within the enclave. The control systems will have their own authorization for their Operational Architecture which primarily covers the “non-standard IT” components of the system. In other cases, it is possible that a single authorization will be used for the entire system, both the enclave and the control system. Even in cases where a single authorization is used, however, it’s helpful to identify and categorize the “standard IT” portions of the control system. More information on the Platform Enclave approach is in APPENDIX B.

### **2-3 CONTROL SYSTEM PROCUREMENT OVERVIEW.**

The DoD does not procure most installation-wide control systems as an entire 5-Level system as depicted in Figure 2-1. Typically, some Field Control Systems (FCS; architecture Levels 0 - 2 as shown in Figure 2-2) are procured along with a front end for those systems. Over time additional FCS are procured; these new FCS are integrated with the existing front end and added to the authorization (ATO) for the existing system to expand the installation-wide system. When designing an FCS that will be added to an existing system, there may be cybersecurity requirements that are specific to the authorization of the existing system which must be incorporated into the FCS design. Also note that the Level 3 FPOC and Level 4 IT infrastructure are usually provided by the site-wide IT support organization; they are not procured for (and are often not dedicated to) the control system. This UFC cannot address site-specific requirements; when designing systems which will be added to an existing system authorization coordinate with the project site to obtain relevant requirements from the existing system.

Some control systems are procured to operate independently, with no integration to a larger system and without further significant expansion. Depending on the circumstances and architecture, treat these systems either as complete systems, containing all 4 or 5 Levels, or as a FCS (Level 0-2) with its own user interface at Levels 1 or 2. See Table C-3 in APPENDIX C for more information on the Level 2D computers.

Figure 2-2 Control System Architecture



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## CHAPTER 3 APPLYING CYBERSECURITY IN DESIGN

### 3-1 OVERVIEW.

The design of cybersecurity for facility-related control systems is a five-step process. In some cases, a specific step may be performed by someone other than the designer but may still require input from the designer. Documentation of cybersecurity-related design decisions and input to others is described in CHAPTER 5.

In addition to requirements specific to Control Correlation Identifier (CCIs), design all control systems according to the minimum cybersecurity design requirements in CHAPTER 4 and cybersecurity requirements otherwise standard for the type of control system being designed.

#### 3-1.1 Five Steps for Cybersecurity Design.

The five steps for cybersecurity design are:

Step 1: Identify the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (C-I-A) impact levels (LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH) to use for the control system design.

Step 2A: Use the impact levels to select the proper list of controls from NIST SP 800-82.

Step 2B: Using the DoD master Control Correlation Identifier (CCI) list, create a list of relevant CCIs based on the controls selected in Step 2A.

Step 2C: Categorize CCIs and identify CCIs that require input from the designer or are the designer's responsibility.


Step 3: Include cybersecurity requirements in the project specifications and provide input to others as required.

These steps are numbered in this way to align with the corresponding steps of the 7-step<sup>5</sup> RMF Process. For example, Steps 2A, 2B, and 2C all occur at Step 2 of the RMF process, "Select Security Controls". APPENDIX G contains tables covering Steps 2A, 2B and 2C for LOW and MODERATE systems, assuming the existence of a Platform Enclave. These tables, with additional information in a filterable format, are also available in Excel format on the RMF Knowledge Service (<https://rmfks.osd.mil>) and the use of that spreadsheet is highly recommended. This website is CAC-enabled; designers without a CAC must request assistance from the Service if tables and information were not provided. Figure 3-1 below provides an overview of steps 2A through 3, and APPENDIX F provides additional guidance on the implementation of specific controls.

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<sup>5</sup> Formerly a six step process, the RMF has introduced a seventh step as "Step 0: Prepare"

Figure 3-1 Overview of Steps 2A through 3





### 3-1.1.1 Beginning Mid-Process

These five steps fully define the Cybersecurity portion of the design process when starting with a “blank page”. Strictly speaking, Step 1 should be completed by the AO or SO, and in some cases, the asset owner or Service may also have defined the list of cybersecurity controls (they have completed Step 2A), or the list of CCIs (they have completed step 2B), or even the specific CCIs to be addressed by the designer (they have completed step 2C). In these cases, (as shown in Figure 3-1 above) begin the design process at the appropriate step using the information provided.

### 3-1.2 Definition of “Organization”.

Security controls often refer to the “organization” in identifying responsibilities and risk, making proper determination of “organization” critical to proper evaluation of impact. For example, loss of heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) at the Houston franchise of a national hotel chain in August might be catastrophic to the local facility manager, but it is hardly a significant blow to the United States, or even to the hotel chain. Unless otherwise indicated, for the purposes of implementation of the RMF to control systems:

- For determining the impact level of a system, treat the “organization” as the relevant Service (Army, Navy, Air Force).
- For determining implementation requirements for specific controls, treat the “organization” as the Installation (garrison, post or base) or Region (for regional systems). Note that this doesn’t conflict with the above statement regarding the organization for determining impact, but rather indicates the portion of the Service that will have responsibility for implementation of the control.

### 3-1.3 Designer Coordination

- Meeting cybersecurity requirements may require substantial coordination between different design disciplines. Many systems will be unable to meet identification and authentication requirements for user interfaces and physical security is recommended as a compensating control. These requirements (such as “install controllers in locked enclosures”) will need to be coordinated with the physical security designer. Similarly, the use of insecure network protocols may require physical security to prevent unauthorized access to the network.
- In almost all cases, the control system is only as important as the controlled equipment. For example, an air handler controller is of no relevance if the air handler has failed for some simple mechanical reason. Some cyber requirements may suggest additional requirements on underlying equipment and coordination with those designers may be required.
- In many cases, good cybersecurity design is best accomplished via good control system design. In the case where the designer following this UFC is other than the controls designer, some requirements needed to address cybersecurity

controls must be included in the control system specification by the control system designer and documented in the design submittals defined in this UFC.

- Requirements in the cybersecurity specification have potential to conflict with those in the control system design or may pose functional issues for the control system. Close coordination is required to ensure requirements are implementable.

### **3-2 STEP 1: DETERMINE CONTROL SYSTEM IMPACT RATING TO USE FOR DESIGN.**

The first step of the design process is to determine an impact rating for the control system design. Ideally this impact rating will be the actual impact rating for the control system, but, in some cases, it will be an impact rating determined or assumed for the purposes of the design only.

#### **3-2.1 Obtaining Actual Impact Ratings**

***The SO, with concurrence from the AO, determines the impact levels of the control system.*** The SO may seek assistance from the designer in defining the functionality of the control system, the information the control system contains, and the ***impact of failure of the control system***. While the SO and AO are uniquely qualified to determine the criticality of the mission in the facility, they will likely require assistance from the designer to determine the impact of the control system on the mission. For example, a critical mission of processing real-time DoD intelligence data may not depend at all on the lighting control system in the data center. For the DoD, impact levels are determined based on the mission of the relevant Service and in many cases can use the mission criticality rating of the facility (mission support, mission essential, mission critical) as a starting point to determining control system impact. It's also important to note that while a traditional information system generally prioritizes Confidentiality, then Integrity and lastly Availability, control systems usually prioritize Availability and Integrity over Confidentiality.

Note this discussion assumes that the SO and AO have been identified for the system. In many cases, this may be difficult – at this stage of the project the SO may not yet be identified. In many cases the impact of the control system is driven by the impact of the control system on the mission supported by the control system (such as a data center supported by mechanical and electrical systems) so, while the local O&M staff may “own” the control system, the impact of the control system is driven by the underlying mission supported by the control system so that the “effective” SO is a facility tenant. Ultimately, while identification of an SO and AO is not the designer’s responsibility, lack of identification can present a roadblock to successful project implementation.

### **3-2.2 When Impact Ratings Aren't Provided**

If impact ratings aren't provided, request them from the Service. If the Service is unable to provide impact ratings, then request direction from the Service and follow one of the following three courses of action as directed:

1. Use one of the categorization methods discussed in APPENDIX D to categorize the system for purposes of design and document how the categorization was determined.
2. Design the system to a L-L-L impact rating.
3. Do not proceed with the design until C-I-A Impact ratings are provided.

Note that these options are presented in preference order, with course of action 1 being the preferred solution. When the Service provides direction on which course of action to follow, follow that course of action. Should the Service not provide direction, use the first course of action.

### **3-2.3 Considerations for Reduction of Control System Impact**

Whether assisting the SO and AO in determining the control system impact rating, or determining a design impact rating, it's vital to remember that the impact rating of the control system may be less than (but not greater than) the impact rating of the mission served, and a MODERATE impact mission does not necessarily imply a MODERATE impact control system. Only when loss of the control system necessarily results in loss of mission is the control system impact the same as the mission's impact rating. Several options (suggested in a flowchart in APPENDIX D) are available to the designer to potentially reduce the impact rating of the control system, such as:

- Can manual controls be added to compensate for a compromised control system?
- Some critical facilities may be staffed 24/7. In this case, a local controls front end might be installed inside the facility and facility staff provided sufficient training to make basic adjustments to the system. Another option is to add local display panels (limited operator interfaces within the control system) in mechanical rooms, again with the intent of allowing onsite staff the ability to maintain system operation (perhaps in a degraded state, but sufficient to maintain basic mission capabilities).
- Can simple standalone backup systems be added to compensate for a failed (base-wide) control system? For example, for a data center, can a standalone air conditioning unit be added that would start based on a local thermostat and run independently of the base-wide system? Particularly in the case of a critical facility (which likely has redundant HVAC equipment), can the "normal" or "primary" unit be connected to the base-wide UMCS, while the "backup" or "secondary" unit operates in a standalone configuration with purely local controls? Again, note that control system operation in a degraded state may be acceptable, provided it continues to support the mission.

- Some buildings may overall be non-critical but have a small critical room or facility inside the larger building. Again, can a small standalone unit, such as a small backup generator unit be added specifically to support the critical room or facility?

Critical facilities often require redundant mechanical / electrical equipment, and in these cases, the question is: “Can the control system design take advantage of this equipment to reduce the dependency of the mission on the control system to the point that the impact rating of the control system is LOW?” By use of redundancy and following general principals of design simplicity, the effect of a compromised control system can be minimized. The additional hurdles required to secure a MODERATE impact system will often make reduction of control system impact rating a worthwhile approach.

**3-3 STEP 2A: DETERMINATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS.**

When the list of relevant controls is not provided by the Service, determine a starting list of controls based on the Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Availability (A) impact ratings (or C-I-A ratings) provided by the Service (or using the design CIA rating if the actual rating was not provided) and the appropriate control system overlay or baseline. Using the resultant initial control set, review the security controls to recommend security controls that should be considered for tailoring out by the SO and AO.

**3-3.1 Overlay versus Baseline**

In the RMF process, a baseline is a complete set of security controls, and an overlay is a defined set of changes (additions or subtractions). So, in the example table (Table 3-1) below we have 2 baseline sets of controls, Base 1 and Base 2, along with a single overlay that is applied to both. The baselines define controls to apply (“Do control A”, “Do control B”, etc.) and the overlay can be applied to either Baseline, with the results shown in B1 + Overlay and B2 + Overlay.

**Table 3-1 Overlay versus Baseline**

<b>Base 1</b>	<b>Overlay</b>	<b>B1 + Overlay</b>		<b>Base 2</b>	<b>Overlay</b>	<b>B2 + Overlay</b>
Do A	Add A	Do A			Add A	Do A
Do B		Do B		Do B		Do B
Do C	Skip C				Skip C	
Do D		Do D		Do D		Do D
	Skip E			Do E	Skip E	
				Do F		Do F

While this is technically the definition of overlays and how they work, as a practical matter, overlays are rarely presented as a “bare” overlay, but as the result of an overlay applied to a specific baseline – effectively becoming a baseline. The initial set of security controls will come from a baseline or an overlay and the fact that one may be called a “baseline” and the other an “overlay” is of no practical significance to the designer.

### **3-3.2 Determining Initial Control Set Using an Overlay**

#### **3-3.2.1 High Water Mark Versus Individual C-I-A Values**

The DoD implements RMF for control systems using CNSSI 1253, which identifies applicability of security controls using individual C-I-A values - so a L-L-M system may have different controls than a M-L-L system. Other processes (including those based on NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-82), and many overlays, employ a “high water mark” which assigns a single overall impact rating equal to the highest impact rating, so a L-L-M and M-L-L system are both essentially treated as M-M-M. CNSSI 1253 provides a table defining, for each control, whether that control affects C, I, or A, so it is possible to take a table prepared using a “high water mark” and back out a table appropriate to individual C-I-A values<sup>6</sup>, but for control system design purposes this is often not worthwhile and the high water mark can generally be used as a “conservative” approach (since the high water mark will at least have all the controls as the individual impact approach)

#### **3-3.2.2 Identifying An Appropriate Overlay**

Based on the Service, project site and control system type there are several different overlays that may apply, including:

- NIST SP 800-82
- The Control System Overlay for Moderate Impact Systems published by the Risk Management Framework Technical Advisory Group (RMF TAG Overlay)
- (NAVY) The Navy Assess-Only Overlay
- (AIR FORCE) The Air Force Control System Overlay

When the Service does not provide a specific overlay, use NIST SP 800-82 or the RMF TAG Overlay (or a combination) to define the control set for design based on the C-I-A Impact Ratings:

- For a system with L-L-L Impact ratings: Use NIST SP 800-82.
- For a system with M-M-M Impact ratings: Use the RMF Tag Overlay

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<sup>6</sup> Imagine a L-M-M system using a M-M-M table that includes a control that states “Sensor values must be protected against unauthorized disclosure”. CNSSI 1253 indicates that this control is for C. Consult the corresponding L-L-L table and see if the control is required, if not, it may be removed from consideration.

- For a system with a mix of Impact Levels (such as L-M-M), use CNSSI 1253 to determine – for each control – which element of the CIA triad (the Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability) that control applies to. Then determine applicability of the control based on the assigned impact levels using the appropriate overlay:
  - For Low impact elements, use NIST 800-82
  - For Moderate impact elements, use the RMF TAG Overlay
  - For High impact elements, use both NIST 800-82 and the RMF TAG Overlay and include controls in the baseline if they are included by either overlay.

As described in the next paragraph, there are tables in the UFC that use these overlays with a high-water mark, and an Excel tool that can be used for systems with a mix of Impact Levels.

### **3-3.2.3 UFC Control Set and Control Set Tool**

The control lists in APPENDIX G of this UFC have been generated as described above using the NIST 800-82 Revision 2 overlay for LOW impact systems and the RMF TAG Overlay for MODERATE Impact Systems. Both of these overlays are based on NIST 800-53 Revision 4. An Excel spreadsheet is posted to the document page for this UFC<sup>7</sup> which will generate control sets based on these two overlays for any combination of C, I and A impacts, where those overlays have been converted from the high-water mark employed by the overlay to the individual C-I-A value approach used by CNSSI 1253.

### **3-3.3 Recommend Security Controls to Tailor Out (or In).**

Review the starting controls baseline obtained by applying the overlay(s) and provide recommendations for controls to be tailored out from (or added to) the security control set as part of the cybersecurity documentation required by CHAPTER 5. The standard security control baselines were developed for standard information systems and contain security controls that are inapplicable to control systems (or other Platform Information Technology), or are impractical to implement due to technical or resource constraints. The RMF process allows these baselines to be tailored for the project by the removal or addition of specific controls (with the constraint that the final set must be approved by the AO). While not likely to impact the final design (controls recommended to be tailored out won't apply to the system and will not result in design requirements), this step allows the AO to consider additional tailoring based on subject matter input from the designer.

Note this tailoring can either be applied at the security control level during Step 2A, at the CCI level during Step 2B, or at both Steps 2A and 2B of the design process.

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<sup>7</sup> UFC Document Page is at <https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc/ufc-4-010-06>

Tailoring at the security control level is often easier, but the CCI level offers a more precise level of control over which requirements to include.

### **3-3.4 Additional Resources and Information for Step 2A**

Additional resources and information related to this step can be found as listed here. The use of these resources is optional, and the designer remains responsible for ensuring all design requirements are met whether or not these resources are used.

- There is a spreadsheet which automates the application of the NIST 800-82 and RMF Tag Overlays as described above located on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org). This spreadsheet provides a list of controls and CCIs identifiers for given impact levels.
- There is a spreadsheet which provides a table of control information (control text, etc.) based on a list of control identifiers located on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org).
- APPENDIX G of this UFC contains tables showing the control sets obtained from applying the NIST 800-82 and RMF Tag Overlay to LOW and MODERATE Impact systems.
- For LOW and MODERATE Impact systems, APPENDIX G lists recommended Controls to be tailored out.

### **3-4 STEP 2B: IDENTIFICATION OF CONTROL CORRELATION IDENTIFIERS.**

Using the list of security controls provided by the Service or derived from Step 2A, generate the list of corresponding control correlation identifiers (CCIs). Note that generating CCIs from control lists is a purely mechanical process, a given control (perhaps SI-4) always maps to a specific list of CCIs. This list of CCIs provides the starting point for identifying cybersecurity requirements to be included in control system design. The complete CCI list (covering all controls) is available at the RMF Knowledge Service website via the "Export All Assessment Procedures to Spreadsheet" link at: <https://rmfks.osd.mil/rmf/General/SecurityControls/Pages/ControlsExplorer.aspx>. From the URL, select "All Control Families" from the "Choose Control Family" pull-down. After the page re-populates with the controls, click on "Export Implementation Guidance and Assessment Procedures" to download the CCIs into Excel. Note: This website is CAC-enabled; designers without a CAC must request the CCI list from the Service if it was not provided.

Additional resources are listed here. The use of these resources is optional, and the designer remains responsible for ensuring all design requirements are met whether or not these resources are used.

- There is a spreadsheet which provides a table of CCI information based on a list of CCIs located on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org).
- APPENDIX G includes tables of all CCIs for LOW and MODERATE impact systems based on the initial control sets determined by the application of the NIST 800-82 and RMF TAG Overlays as described above.

### 3-5 STEP 2C: CATEGORIZATION OF CONTROL CORRELATION IDENTIFIERS BY RESPONSIBILITY.

#### 3-5.1 Identifiers by Responsibility

Categorize each CCI provided by the Service or identified in Step 2B as ***one or more of*** the following categories:

- ***DoD-Defined:*** Either the DoD has provided a value for the “organization selected” values, or the DoD implementation guidance states that the CCI is already met by existing policy or regulation. These values are defined in the CCI list obtained from the RMF Knowledge Service. Note that definition or guidance provided may not be relevant for a control system – the organization definitions were determined from the perspective of a traditional information system, not for a control system.
- ***Designer:*** The designer has a role to address for this CCI. The designer must do one of the following:
  - provide design specifications to cover a requirement for the control system itself, or
  - provide input to others regarding the implementation of the CCI, or
  - provide input to others regarding lack of feasibility of the CCI (typically because the CCI was written with an IT system, rather than a control system, in mind).
- ***Non-Designer:*** The CCI is not the responsibility of the designer, and is the responsibility of someone else – typically the SO. This does not diminish the importance of these CCIs, but, as these CCIs are not the responsibility of the designer, they are beyond the scope of this UFC.
- ***Platform Enclave:*** The CCI contains a requirement which is expected to be implemented at the Platform Enclave and inherited by the control system or is mostly implemented at the Platform Enclave but also needed within the field control system (in which case the CCI is also in the “Designer” category). For example, passwords are implemented at the Platform Enclave, but are also necessary at the control system user interface itself, local display panels and some controllers (those which support passwords). While implementation of the Platform Enclave is not the designer’s responsibility (a key point of the Platform Enclave is that it



is a standard approach that can be implemented across multiple control systems), it's important to document CCIs the control system expects to inherit from the Platform Enclave, should there be one.

In cases where there is a Platform Enclave, some non-designer CCIs should be addressed by the Enclave and these CCIs are identified as such. For projects or sites that do not have a Platform Enclave, all "Platform Enclave" CCIs (not also listed as "Designer") can be considered Non-Designer.

- **Impractical:** The CCI is impractical to fully implement in a control system but may be applied in a limited manner to at least some part of the control system. In most cases, these are CCIs that can be implemented at Level 4 of the architecture but would be prohibitively difficult to implement at Levels 0, 1, or 2. Note that these CCIs are generally also categorized as "Designer", and the designer must indicate what was done and what wasn't.

Many CCIs will be assigned multiple categories. For example, a security control related to passwords would be categorized in both "Platform Enclave" and "Designer" categories as it must be addressed at the Level 4 computers as well as at Level 1 and Level 2. If the DoD has selected a minimum password length for use with this control which cannot be met by all devices, it would also be categorized as "Impractical", and the designer must document how the security control was implemented for devices unable to meet the DoD selected value.

### **3-5.2 Additional Resources and Information For Step 2C**

Additional resources and information related to this step can be found as listed here. The use of these resources is optional, and the designer remains responsible for ensuring all design requirements are met whether or not these resources are used.

- APPENDIX G includes tables with example categorization for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems.
- There is a spreadsheet which provides a table of CCI information based on a list of CCIs located on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org). This spreadsheet includes example categorization for LOW and MODERATE Impact systems

### **3-6 STEP 3: INCORPORATE CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.**

In addition to requirements specific to CCIs, design all control systems according to the minimum cybersecurity design requirements in CHAPTER 4 and cybersecurity requirements otherwise standard for the type of control system being designed.

For each CCI identified as "designer" during Step 2C (see APPENDIX G for example tables resulting from Step 2C), address the CCI in one or more of the following three ways (summarized here, with details provided in following paragraphs):

- First, select or identify required changes to standard CCI requirements which affect CCI implementation, such as the value of a specific parameter. Note that approval or rejection of these values by the Service (the AO or their designated representative) will impact control system design.
- Based on requirements and CCIs (including potential changes identified above), incorporate cybersecurity requirements appropriate to the control system in a dedicated Cybersecurity specification for the system based on UFGS 25 05 11 “Cybersecurity for Facility-Related Control Systems”. Some requirements may instead be covered in the project control system specifications.
- For the remaining “designer” CCIs (those that do not directly translate to a control system requirement), provide information about the design to others so they can implement a CCI. In particular, document CCIs that the system is expected to be inherited from another system or the Platform Enclave.

### **3-6.1 Addressing DoD Selected Values in CCIs.**

Many CCIs have DoD standard values and are indicated in the Master CCI List as being automatically met or inherited based on the standard value. These CCIs have been derived from the general security controls in NIST SP 800-53, without regard to special consideration which might apply to a control system, such as the tailoring and supplemental guidance in NIST SP 800-82. Many of these CCIs cannot be applied to control systems using the approach identified by the DoD. In these cases, implement the CCI to the greatest extent practical, and document the incompatibilities.

### **3-6.2 Other “Organization Defined Values” in CCIs.**

For CCIs which refer to “organization defined values” where the DoD has not defined a value and one has not been provided, request appropriate values from the Service. If the Service is unable to provide values, propose reasonable values and document the proposed value with rationale.

### **3-6.3 Requirement Definition and Implementation CCIs.**

Often, one CCI defines a requirement, and a second requires the implementation of that requirement. A hypothetical example<sup>8</sup> is:

- CCI #1 says “organization defines which components collect audit records”. The implementation guidance for this CCI says “this is automatically met because the DoD has defined the components as ‘all components’”.

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<sup>8</sup> This example uses simplified fictitious CCIs for illustrative purposes. The AU family of security controls deals with audit logs.

- CCI #2 says “the information system collects audit records at the defined components”.

Together, these create an impossible requirement: if one accepts the definition in #1 (and that it’s “automatically met”), then the system fails to meet #2 because, for example, Level 0 sensors can’t collect audit records. In this case, both CCIs are “Designer” category; propose reasonable values for CCI #1, implement CCI #2 using these values and document the proposed values for CCI #1.

### **3-6.4 Additional Resources and Information for Step 3**

Additional resources and information related to this step can be found as listed here. The use of these resources is optional, and the designer remains responsible for ensuring all design requirements are met whether or not these resources are used.

- APPENDIX G includes tables which indicate where specific CCIs are referenced in (an unedited/untailored) UFGS 25 05 11.
- There is a spreadsheet located on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org) which provides a table of CCI information based on a list of CCIs. This spreadsheet includes UFGS references for LOW and MODERATE Impact systems.
- There is a spreadsheet which parses a SpecsIntact file to identify the location of CCI References (provided specific formatting rules are followed for the CCI references) on the document page of this UFC at the Whole Building Design Guide Website (WBDG.org).

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## CHAPTER 4 MINIMUM CYBERSECURITY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

### 4-1 DESIGN TO MINIMIZE FAILURE.

#### 4-1.1 Reduce Dependency on the Network.

Avoid dependence on the network for the execution of control strategies. For example, a backup generator should always start based on a local measurement of utility availability, and not require a network "START" command. When dependence on the network is unavoidable, isolate that portion of the network as much as possible so that non-local network outages do not affect the required portions of the network. When operator input is absolutely required for the functioning of a control strategy, consider a local interface (local display panel) or a dedicated front end (Level 2 front end) physically co-located with the equipment.

In some cases, it may be necessary to take additional steps to protect critical functions from modification over the network, for example a controller where critical parameters are exposed to network manipulation based on the controller design. In these cases, design barriers to manipulation into the control network architecture itself. See APPENDIX E for one possible approach.

#### 4-1.2 Reduce Extraneous Functionality

Since additional capabilities often result in additional vulnerabilities, a key cybersecurity concept is "least functionality", which means not adding capabilities which are not specifically needed. Design control systems to minimize additional functionality which may create vulnerabilities in the control system, including but not limited to:

- Consider mission requirements before implementing remote adjustment of system parameters which are not expected or required to change. For example, a critical air conditioner serving a data center, a critical command and control building, or a UPS room which needs to maintain space temperature at 65 degrees Fahrenheit, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year should not have a network configurable operating schedule or set point.
- Advanced or complex control strategies often require increased sensor inputs and a greater level of maintenance. Use care when requiring these strategies as the increased complexity results in increased probability of failure if the system is not properly maintained or if any specific parameter is compromised.

### 4-2 DESIGN TO MANAGE FAILURE.

#### 4-2.1 Design for Graceful Failure.

##### 4-2.1.1 Unitary Control Systems.

For control systems controlling a single process or piece of equipment, coordinate with the equipment designer to determine any additional redundancy and failure

requirements, and design the control system to match the requirements for the underlying equipment. In all cases design these systems to fail “safe” as defined by the criteria for the controlled system. For example, in cold climates, outside air intake dampers must fail closed based on the requirements of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning UFC. Similarly, zones that are dominated by interior loads should consider failing to full cooling.

#### **4-2.1.2 Control Systems with Independent Subsystems.**

Many control systems are described as a single system but are actually composed of many (hundreds, even thousands) of essentially independent systems. A common example of this would be an installation-wide UMCS, where the air handler (AHU) controllers in one building have no dependence on the AHU in another building, and often no dependence on AHUs in the same building.

For control systems with independent subsystems, design each subsystem as required in paragraph 4-2.1.1, Unitary Control Systems, and design the overall system such that loss of a single subsystem does not affect the operation of the rest of the system. Reduce information required to be shared between subsystems and minimize dependence on the network. For subsystems which must rely on other subsystems define default (“fall back”) behavior should the other subsystem fail.

#### **4-2.2 Degraded Operation.**

After a system fails to a safe state, it may need continue or resume operation in a degraded capacity using some automated or manual method, recognizing there may be risk in this operation, but that the risk is manageable and outweighed by mission requirements.

Based on mission requirements, consider requiring means for manual operation including both monitoring instrumentation (thermometers, pressure gauges, meters), and manual control devices (such as “hand-off-auto” switches and actuators with manual actuation capability). Consider if a local controls front end might be installed inside the facility and facility staff might be provided sufficient training to make basic adjustments to the system. Another option to consider is the addition of local display panels (limited operator interfaces within the control system) in mechanical rooms, again with the intent of allowing on-site staff the ability to maintain system operation (perhaps in a degraded state, but sufficient to maintain basic mission capabilities).

#### **4-2.3 Redundancy.**

If the criticality of the mission requires redundancy in the design of the control system, then the system must be designed to provide that redundancy without external intervention, and especially without human intervention. Design control strategies such that spare units start automatically when running units shut down, or have all units run and share load. Care must be taken when load-sharing to ensure that operators are notified when one unit of a redundant set fails since the remaining units will automatically pick up the load with no disruption in the load. Do not rely on an operator

to start any backup unit; the odds of the operator not being available, or taking an incorrect action are too great. Provide alarms to alert operators of failures.

Note that the control system is often more reliable than the underlying controlled equipment. For example, a backup electrical source powered by a diesel generator is most likely to fail due to a mechanical fault. If installing a redundant control system do not neglect to install redundant mechanical and electrical controlled equipment as well.

#### **4-2.4 Redundancy with independent control systems.**

Where backup systems are required to meet mechanical or electrical needs consider installing simple, standalone backup systems with a simple, but completely independent control system. For example, for a data center, perhaps a standalone computer room air conditioner (CRAC) unit could be added that would start based on a local thermostat and run independently of the base wide system. Particularly in the case of a critical facility (which likely has redundant HVAC equipment), consider if the primary unit could possibly be connected to the base wide UMCS while the secondary unit might operate in a standalone configuration with purely local controls

Another example might be a non-critical buildings containing a small critical room or facility inside the larger building. Consider if it is possible to add a small independent standalone unit, such as a small Direct Expansion (DX) unit or dedicated backup generator.

#### **4-3 DO NOT IMPLEMENT STANDARD IT FUNCTIONS.**

As a type of Platform IT, control systems are special purpose systems and must not be used as general computing resources. In particular:

- Do not share control system resources with other systems, particularly with any system that is not a control system. Some exceptions such as separate virtual servers running on common hardware or shared Ethernet media with separate VLANs, may be permitted, but the overlap between control systems and other systems must be minimized.
- Do not allow control systems to provide, or share resources with, other applications that provide standard IT services. For example, do not use control system components as Domain Name System (DNS) servers. (DNS servers may be implemented within the “Platform Enclave” at Level 5, but that is beyond the scope of the control system designer’s responsibility and not addressed by this UFC.)
- Do not allow control systems to be publicly accessible over the Internet (if this capability is required, it must be restricted access and carefully implemented by IT professionals).
- Ensure that user interfaces with the ability to manipulate the system are secured with some combination of authentication (passwords, etc.) and physical security (in controlled space or locked enclosures).

- Prohibit the use of mobile code, except mobile code may be allowed at Level 4. Note that control systems may use mobile code technologies, Java in particular, within the control system, but must not download code without direct user approval.
- Do not use control system computers as standard computers for general applications.
- Do not implement Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) within the control system.
- Do not implement collaborative computing devices, technologies or protocols within the control system.
- Unless specifically authorized by the Service and required by the project site, do not allow control system components to access non-military IP addresses. Do not allow control system components to access social media. (Note that access to non-military IP address space is generally not needed, and when needed will generally be a function of the front end, not the field control system.)
- Do not allow control systems to receive email (note that at Level 4 they may need a method of sending email for notifications).

#### **4-4 DO NOT PROVIDE REMOTE ACCESS.**

Do not provide remote (off site) access to the control system. If required, remote access to the Level 4 network should be provided by the Platform Enclave or the site IT organization. Coordinate remote access requirements with the project site IT organization and with the POCs listed in 0.

#### **4-5 AVOID PROBLEMATIC NETWORKS**

While wireless networks are of great value in IT systems, their value in FRCS is very limited and they should - for the most part – be avoided. Most FRCS are fixed, they do not move, and there is no requirement for a wireless network. While wireless may apparently have a lower first cost, the frequent necessity to provide power to the control system devices or controlled equipment itself means that wires will be installed to provide power and there are multiple technologies that allow both power and network over the same wires (such as Power over Ethernet (PoE) and Powerline Networking).

- Be careful when designing for or allowing the use of wireless networks. Coordinate all use of wireless with the project site and where it is allowed require FIPS 140-2 validated radios wherever possible. Where using wireless IP (such as Wi-Fi) coordinate closely with the site IT group to ensure that the network meets current IT security standards.
- Where radios cannot be avoided – for example, in fire protection systems where buildings use radios to communicate with a base fire department – provide hardware isolation panels (relays) to isolate the control system from the radio.



- While many control systems run over IP networks, others instead use protocols that were designed specifically for the control system – protocols that are inherently more limited and have fewer vulnerabilities. Before selecting IP as a network protocol, carefully consider the pros and cons and consider implementing the control system using a less vulnerable non-IP protocol.

#### **4-6 PROTECT THE CONTROL SYSTEM WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY**

Ensure that access to the control system – controllers and network – is at least as difficult to obtain as access to the controlled equipment (mechanical and electrical) itself. Controllers should be co-located with the controlled equipment. Consider the potential for an aggressor with access to one controller to affect equipment controlled by another controller. Protect the network media itself from physical access. Depending on the situation, this may involve keeping controllers in locked controlled spaces, providing separate locked enclosures for controllers, and installing network media in metallic conduit.

#### **4-7 PROTECT PRIVILEGED USER INTERFACES**

By analogy with privileged users in the IT world, a Privileged UI is a UI that has sufficient capabilities or functionality that it requires specific cybersecurity measured to be put in place to limit its unauthorized use. Typically, this requires one or more of the following:

- Use of physical security to block access to the interface. Note that this will not work with interfaces that can be accessed over the network.
- Use of strong access controls, including hard passwords and/or PIV (smart cards)
- Use of strong network encryption for interfaces with network access.

#### **4-8 EMPLOY PRINCIPALS OF DESIGN SIMPLICITY**

Often there exist performance requirements that will push a control system towards increased complexity, and operational requirements that will drive a system towards simplicity. The more complex a system is, the more difficult the maintenance and operation of that system tends to be. More complex systems often have more vulnerabilities as well. For control systems, typically (historically), this complexity is in terms of number of components or the complexity of the sequence of operation of the system.

RMF requirements are geared toward IT systems and drive control systems to resemble IT, introducing new complexities. Simple controllers typically found in many BCS, for example, cannot begin to meet the access control and auditing requirements that a computer so easily meets. Left unchecked, this will lead to incredibly complex and unique systems which meet cybersecurity requirements at the cost of control functionality, maintainability, or operational capability.

#### 4-8.1 Example: Using PLCs for HVAC Control

For example, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) will generally more readily meet cybersecurity requirements than the direct digital controllers used for HVAC control systems. However, because PLCs are not generally used for HVAC, using PLCs to control the HVAC systems introduces significant risks:

- The standard and well-tested HVAC control routines developed by the HVAC controls industry won't be available to the system, and custom PLC programming will be required.
- The controls installer of the PLC system is unlikely to know HVAC well, so is more likely to miss operational requirements or pitfalls – including basic system physics such as thermodynamics of air-to-water heat exchangers.
- The HVAC maintenance staff is unlikely to be familiar with PLCs, resulting in an increased training burden or a reliance on contracted maintenance.

#### 4-8.2 Consideration of Overall System Risk

It's vital that the cybersecurity requirements for the control system be balanced with the complexity of the system and the risk involved with an overly complex system. There is a point for every system where the application of an additional cybersecurity requirement will result in an overall increase in risk. This is an especially important consideration for more critical (higher impact) systems where the control system must operate properly to support the mission.

#### 4-9 CYBERSECURITY DURING CONSTRUCTION

Do not neglect the potential for an aggressor to introduce malware into the control system during the construction process. While the government does not own the system during construction, it is naive to assume that there are no bad actors targeting government systems during the construction process<sup>9</sup> and that any cyber exploits during construction will be uncovered during the commissioning process. Require basic “cyber hygiene” of contractor systems touching the control system.

#### 4-10 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MODERATE SYSTEMS

For MODERATE impact systems, also include the following requirements:

- Do not allow devices with user interfaces capable of being accessed remotely, or capable of accessing other devices unless one is specifically required for the system. Do not allow devices with full remote user interfaces to execute sequences of operation.

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<sup>9</sup> Consider the case of listening devices designed into overseas embassies during construction by foreign adversaries.

- Do not allow networked sensors or actuators unless one is specifically required for the system. (A networked sensor or actuator is a sensor or actuator that has an integral network interface where the device does not execute a sequence of operation; the sole purpose of the network interface is to communicate the sensor/actuator data over the network.) Note that this requirement does not prohibit networked I/O where the network is required to support high reliability/redundant I/O – such as PROFIBUS or CHARMS networked I/O busses.
- Do not rely on the network for execution of a sequence; to the greatest extent possible homerun I/O via analog/binary signals to a single controller executing the sequence of operation.

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## CHAPTER 5 CYBERSECURITY DOCUMENTATION

This chapter describes cybersecurity documentation that is required as part of the control system design package. This documentation is in addition to the documentation required by the relevant control system design criteria.

### 5-1 OVERVIEW.

Cybersecurity documentation for control system design documents the security controls and CCIs applied to the control system along with assumptions made regarding CCI selection, implementation, and information required by others.

### 5-2 USE OF GUIDE SPECIFICATION.

The design specifications for control system cybersecurity developed in accordance with this UFC must derive from UFGS 25 05 11.

For projects designed by or for USACE, develop separate cybersecurity specifications for each system type and for each impact level. This prevents misinterpretation of specification requirements. Use fourth level numbering of the specification to differentiate the specification by system. Different fourth level numbering schemes are possible; the scheme that is clearest for the project should be used and should be used across the entire project. Two example schemes are using sequential numbering (such as Section 25 05 11.01: Low Impact HVAC, Section 25 05 11.02: Low Impact Lighting Controls, Section 25 05 11.03: Moderate Impact HVAC Controls, etc.) or using numbering that aligns with the division that the control specification is in (such as Section 25 01 11.23: HVAC, Section 25 05 11.26: Lighting). Note that the second scheme becomes unusable when multiple different systems have the same division number, or there are multiple systems of the same type but with different impact levels.

### 5-3 COORDINATION WITH OTHER DISCIPLINES

As discussed in CHAPTER 3, in order to develop a specification properly aligned with site choices, several design steps must be coordinated with other disciplines. To facilitate this coordination, an optional reference Cybersecurity Design Coordination Worksheet is posted on the Whole Building Design Guide document page for this UFC (<https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc/ufc-4-010-06>).

#### 5-3.1 Determination of Points of Contact

For this document, the primary points of contact are the System Owner (SO) and the Authorizing Official (AO) for the determination of the C-I-A Impact ratings. In addition there may be coordination with the controls designer, if this individual is separate from the cybersecurity designer, and possibly the SO and AO for the discussion of cybersecurity controls that are not feasible for the FRCS.

### **5-3.2 UFGS Coordination Issues**

- For UFGS 25 05 11, there are many designer options that require input from the control's designer, SO, AO, and site personnel. Major consideration includes the following:
- Whether wireless will be allowed. If so, where? How will it be secured? How will it be tested?
- User Interfaces. Where will they be located? Which, if any, will be privileged? How will they be secured?
- User Interface behavior such as session termination and unsuccessful login handling
- Specific requirements for Fire Protection systems
- Submittal review. Specific details about documentation, level of inventory reporting, and other submittal requirements
- Specific hardware or software requirements: Ethernet switches, web and database servers, and device and equipment power.
- Auditing: front-ends, software, storage capacity, and information system monitoring
- User Authentication: PKI, passwords, and setting of passwords
- Cybersecurity testing and training: Field QC, PVT, level of training

### **5-4 REQUIREMENTS BY DESIGN PHASE.**

Cybersecurity documentation requirements are indicated here by typical Design-Build or Design-Bid-Build design submittals. Some of these will require new design documents while others add requirements to design documents that are already required by other criteria or project requirements. The percentage design levels provided here are notional only to demonstrate the order and extent of information needed by each submittal. If the design is using a different submittal schedule, adjust accordingly. The documentation requirements here apply per system and impact level – if the project includes multiple systems or impact levels, a copy of the required documentation for each is required. Submittal templates are posted to the document page for this UFC.

The requirements here reference the five-step cybersecurity design process defined in CHAPTER 3.

#### 5-4.1 Basis of Design (10-15%).

At the Basis of Design (10-15% design) submittal, or the equivalent submittal step for projects not incorporating a Basis of Design submittal, provide the following items:

- **System Description:** A brief functional description of the system
- **CIA Impact Level:** The C-I-A impact level for the control system and whether it was provided by the Service, or was determined using one of the courses of action described in CHAPTER 3 for when impact ratings aren't provided. If using the methods discussed in APPENDIX D provide a narrative documenting how the impact rating was determined.
- **Starting Security Control Set and Tailoring Recommendation:** A list of the security controls generated during Step 2A along with recommendations and justifications for further tailoring of the security control set
- **Network Connectivity Description:** A general description of expected network connectivity type, such as stand-alone, closed restricted network, dedicated transport, or shared transport.
- **System Connections:** Planned, expected, or required connections to other systems (if any).

#### 5-4.2 Concept Design (30-35%).

At the Concept Design (30-35% design) submittal, or the equivalent submittal step for projects not incorporating a Concept Design submittal, provide a list of the CCIs resulting from the approved tailored security control list (Step 2B) or provided by the Service, and an initial classification for each CCI (Step 2C).

#### 5-4.3 Interim Design (50-65%).

At the Interim Design (50-65% design) submittal, or the equivalent submittal step for projects not incorporating an Interim Design submittal, provide the following items:

- **CCI List:** The recommended format for this list is to use the format of the tables in APPENDIX G with the addition of a column to document the required information. In addition to any other required formats, provide the CCI list in a format compatible with Microsoft Excel. The list must include the following items.
  - The final classification (Designer, etc..) of each CCI (Step 2C).
  - For each CCI categorized as designer and addressed in the design, include:

- ◇ Identification where and why the standard CCI requirements cannot be incorporated into the design (identified in Step 3), description of what requirements will be incorporated instead, and an explanation of the changes.
- ◇ Documentation of how the CCI has been incorporated into the control system design (Step 3), including specification or drawing references. If there are specific changes from standard requirements, or multiple options available, document these changes or options..
- For each CCI categorized as designer due to requiring information be provided (Step 3), provide the relevant information for use by others.
- **Redlined Specifications and Drawings:** Draft specifications based on UFGS 25 05 11 with appropriate tailoring for system type and impact rating and edited for project requirements, and any relevant drawings or other attachments when requirements have been incorporated into drawings or other attachments.
- **Riser Diagrams:** One-line/riser diagram showing concept architecture and major components.
- **System Connections:** A document either indicating no network connections to other systems will exist or describing the network connections to other systems. For system connections include a description of the other system, the nature and purpose of the connection, and all protocols used by the communication interface.

#### **5-4.4 Final Design (Unreviewed 100%).**

At the Final Design (Unreviewed 100% design) submittal, or the equivalent submittal step for projects not incorporating a Final Design submittal, provide all items from the Interim Design (50-65%) with updated Final Design information.

#### **5-4.5 Issued for Construction (Reviewed 100%).**

At the Issued for Construction (Reviewed 100% design) submittal, or the equivalent submittal step for projects not incorporating an Issued for Construction submittal, provide all items from the Final Design (Unreviewed 100%) with updated Issued for Construction information.



## APPENDIX A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF) OVERVIEW

### A-1 RMF OVERVIEW

As defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the RMF is “The process of managing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of an information system, and includes: (i) the conduct of a risk assessment; (ii) the implementation of a risk mitigation strategy; and (iii) employment of techniques and procedures for the continuous monitoring of the security state of the information system.”. The RMF details how Risk Management is applied to Department of Defense (DoD) information technology in accordance with DoDI 8510.01.

### A-2 RMF PROCESS


As shown in Figure A-1, the RMF is a seven-step process:

0. Prepare: Carry out essential activities to help prepare all levels of the organization to manage its security and privacy risks using the RMF
1. Categorize the System: Categorization of the control system by Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (C-I-A) Impact levels, taking into consideration both the importance of the mission and the importance of the control system to the mission. Determination of the C-I-A Impact levels will be made by the System Owner (SO) and is outside the scope of this UFC. The dashed box around Step 1 in the figure indicates that the designer needs information from this step when executing design in accordance with this UFC. When this information is not provided, the designer may need to determine a “design C-I-A” rating to use for the design.
2. Select Security Controls: Based on the C-I-A level, a set of controls and an overlay to be implemented will be selected from CNSSI No. 1253 and NIST SP 800-82. In many cases, these controls will be further tailored based on the requirements of the Control System prior to implementation. While this UFC includes guidance concerning applicability of specific controls, the process of selecting security controls is generally outside the domain of the designer. The solid box around Step 2 in the figure indicates that the designer must select controls for the design using the provided C-I-A value, and must provide information on the controls that are applicable (or not) to the control system.
3. Implement Security Controls: Implementation of many security controls will be outside the scope of designer responsibilities. This UFC focuses on security controls which the designer must somehow address in design, generally through the incorporation of requirements into the plans and drawings, and on security controls which others may ask the designer to

provide input on. The solid box around Step 3 in the figure indicates that the designer must develop specifications and designs that implement cybersecurity protections based on the controls identified in Step 2.

4. Assess Security Controls: After implementation, the effectiveness of the implementation is evaluated.
5. Authorize the System: Assuming a satisfactory evaluation, the Authorizing Official (AO) formally accepts the residual risk from the control system and authorizes operation of the system by issuing an authorization to operate.
6. Monitor Security Controls: The RMF enters a monitoring and evaluation phase, where the control system is monitored and periodically re-evaluated.

**Figure A-1 NIST Risk Management Framework Steps**



## A-3 DEFINITION OF CONTROLS FROM NIST AND DODI 8510

### A-3.1 Control Families

Since it is difficult to evaluate a performance requirement (“reduce risk below a specific level”), NIST provides a catalog of prescriptive requirements where meeting a particular requirement reduces the overall risk to the system. These requirements are broadly

categorized into the following groupings (which are often referred to as “control families”):

- AC – Access Control
- AT – Awareness and Training
- AU – Audit and Accountability
- CA – Security Assessment and Authorization
- CM – Configuration Management
- CP – Contingency Planning
- IA – Identification and Authorization
- IR – Incident Response
- MA – Maintenance
- MP – Media Protection
- PE – Physical and Environmental Protection
- PL – Planning
- PM – Program Management
- PS – Personnel Security
- RA – Risk Assessment
- SA – System and Services Acquisition
- SC – System and Communications Protection
- SI – System and Information Integrity

### **A-3.2 Control Elements and Enhancements**

Within each control family, there are numerous controls; most having multiple sub-elements. Many controls also have enhancements, additional actions that can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the control. Individual controls are assigned a number within the control family, enhancements are sub-numbered, and elements of controls or enhancements are lettered. Enhancements and elements are written in parenthesis after the control number. An example of the AC-2 control from NIST SP 800-53 (Revision 4) is shown in Figure C-4.

Figure A-2 NIST SP 800-53 Control AC-2

**AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT**

Control: The organization manages information system accounts, including: Identifying account types (i.e., individual, group, system, application, guest/anonymous, and temporary);

- a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [*Assignment: organization-defined information system account types*];
- b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;
- c. Establishing conditions for group and role membership;
- d. Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;
- e. Requires approvals by [*Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles*] for requests to create information system accounts;
- f. Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with [*Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions*];
- g. Monitors the use of information system accounts;
- h. Notifying account managers:
  1. When accounts are no longer required;
  2. When users are terminated or transferred; and
  3. When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;
- i. Authorizes access to the information system based on:
  1. A valid access authorization;
  2. Intended system usage; and
  3. Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions;
- j. Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements [*Assignment: organization-defined frequency*]; and
- k. Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system account types include, for example, individual, shared...<sup>10</sup>

Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-10, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AU-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, PL-4, SC-13.

Control Enhancements:

- (1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT<sup>10</sup>  
**The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information system accounts.**
- (2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS<sup>10</sup>  
**The information system automatically [*Selection: removes; disables*] terminates temporary and emergency accounts after [*Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account*].**
- (3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS  
**The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [*Assignment: organization defined time period*].**
- (4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS<sup>10</sup>  
**The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions and notifies [*Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles*].**
- (5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For sake of brevity, complete 'Supplemental Guidance' text is not shown for AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT.

The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-period of expected inactivity or description of when to log out].

- (6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT<sup>10</sup>  
The information system implements the following dynamic privilege management capabilities: [Assignment: organization-defined list of dynamic privilege management capabilities].
- (7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES<sup>10</sup>  
The organization:
  - (a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;
  - (b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and
  - (c) Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are no longer appropriate.
- (8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION<sup>10</sup>  
The information system creates [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts] dynamically.
- (9) <sup>10</sup>ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS  
The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].
- (10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL TERMINATION  
The information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave the group.
- (11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS<sup>10</sup>  
The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts].
- (12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE<sup>10</sup>  
The organization:
  - (a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage]; and
  - (b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
- (13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS<sup>10</sup>  
The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.

In this notation, AC-2 (5) is enhancement 5: “The organization requires that users log out when....”.

### A-3.3 Control Correlation Identifiers

The DoD implementation of the NIST controls for control systems is DoDI 8500. The DoD took the additional step of breaking down each control and control element into specific actions; each action is identified by a unique Control Correlation Identifier (CCI). For example, the above control, AC-2, is broken down into 61 separate CCIs, with 11 distinct CCIs for AC-2 (4) alone.

While this leads to a very fine level of implementation (the control system could audit account creation, but not audit account modification), it also leads to many dependencies between CCIs. For example, two of the CCIs associated with security control AC-2(4) found on the RMF Knowledge Service (Security Control Explorer) are:

- CCI-000018: “The information system automatically audits account creation actions.”
- CCI-001683: “The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account creation actions.”

Note: The RMF Knowledge Service website is <https://rmfks.osd.mil>.

While these are written as independent CCIs, they are clearly closely related, and it is difficult to imagine a notification system that did not include an auditing capability.

## **A-4 REQUIREMENT DEFINITION VS IMPLEMENTATION**

Broadly speaking, CCIs can be categorized into requirement definition and requirement implementation.

1. A CCI defines a requirement when the CCI is of the form “<someone> defines a <requirement>”. Examples of CCIs that define a requirement include those that state “The organization defines ....”
  - a. “...a minimum level of detail for documentation”,
  - b. “...a minimum frequency to review some criteria”,
  - c. “...a list of events that raise a red flag for security”, or
  - d. “...a policy or procedure for modifications to the control system”
2. A CCI implements a requirement when the CCI is of the form “<someone/something> meets a <requirement>”, where the requirement is typically defined in a related CCI. Examples of CCIs which implement a requirement defined in the previous example include CCIs that state “The organization ....”
  - a. ...obtains the required level of documentation”,
  - b. ...reviews a security plan annually”,
  - c. ...responds to breaches of physical security”, or
  - d. ...approves changes to the control system via a configuration management board”

### **A-4.1 CCIs Defining a Requirement**

CCIs which define a requirement may be addressed by the designer but are often addressed by the organization or already defined DoD-wide. In some cases, the final statement of the requirement may be by the organization, but with input from the designer based on knowledge of the control system and the specific vulnerability to be addressed. For example, the designer needs to provide input on password complexity

since not all control system components will support passwords, and those that do may support different complexities. In many cases, DoD-defined requirements are completely inappropriate for control systems and the designer must document deviations from the DoD definitions for these requirements in the design.

#### **A-4.2 CCI's Requiring Implementing a Requirement**

Implementation CCI's may further be classified by who/what does the implementation: the organization (or inherited from some other element), or the control system. "The organization conducts background checks" is an example of the former while "the control system logs users off after a period of inactivity" belongs to the latter. In some cases, this is not clear – a CCI that states "The organization enforces a minimum password length"<sup>11</sup> appears to create a requirement on the organization, but a moments consideration will make clear that this action must be implemented by the control system (since the control system either accepts or rejects a password entry), not the organization. CCI's that are implemented by the organization are not addressed by the designer and are outside the scope of this UFC. On the other hand, CCI's that are implemented by the control system must typically be addressed by the designer since implementing a CCI becomes a performance requirement in the specification of the control system.

#### **A-5 PLATFORM INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

The DoD implementation of the RMF defines Platform Information Technology (PIT) as "IT, both hardware and software, which is physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the mission performance of special purpose systems", and differentiates PIT systems from standard information systems. Most specifically, DoDI 8500.01 indicates that PIT Systems "require uniquely tailored security control sets and control validation procedures and require security control assessors and AOs with specialized qualifications"

The Cybersecurity of PIT systems, such as control systems, requires not only the use of customized control baselines, but also further tailoring of controls as appropriate for the specific control system.

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<sup>11</sup> This is not the text of an actual CCI, but rather a simple fictitious example used for illustrative purposes.

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## APPENDIX B PLATFORM ENCLAVE

### B-1 PLATFORM ENCLAVE CONCEPT OVERVIEW

The fact that a significant portion of the control system resembles a standard IT system which can be implemented for different control systems regardless of the details of the control system itself has led to the creation of the Platform Enclave concept. This concept groups the standard IT portions of the control system into an entity which can be handled separately from the rest of the control system. In some cases, this Platform Enclave will be separately authorized, and the overall control system will have two authorizations, while in other cases a single authorization will be used for the entire system. Even in cases where a single authorization is used, however, it's helpful to identify and categorize the standard IT portions of the control system.

### B-2 PLATFORM ENCLAVE USING TWO AUTHORIZATIONS

A primary reason to define to a Platform Enclave is to enable the approach where a control system is implemented using **two** Risk Management Framework authorizations, one for the Platform Enclave and one for the non-Platform Enclave portions of the control system, sometimes referred to as the “non-standard IT” portions. While this may seem to lead to a duplication of effort, in practice this generally isn't the case:

- While many controls, such as policies and procedures, will need to be done at both the Platform Enclave and “non-standard IT” portions, these policies and procedures can often be inherited by both from another Authorization, or implemented the same way in both the Platform Enclave and the “non-standard IT”.
- Some controls can be applied at the Platform Enclave and then inherited by the “non-standard IT”. For example, controls related to remote access can be defined independently of the “non-standard IT” by the Platform Enclave, and then inherited by the “non-standard IT” if necessary.
- While some controls will need to be addressed by both the Platform Enclave and the “non-standard IT”, they will need to be addressed differently, and often to a different extent, in each.

### B-3 PLATFORM ENCLAVE BENEFITS

The primary benefit of the Platform Enclave approach is that it allows for separation of the “standard IT” and “non-standard IT” components of the control system and allows for a single authorization for the IT portion to cover multiple control system types. This approach is most beneficial when there is an existing network and cybersecurity infrastructure on which to establish the Platform Enclave, such as those that exist on most DoD installations. Ideally, the Platform Enclave will be a standard established and authorized by each Service for implementation at every installation, in contrast to the authorization for the “non-standard IT” portion of the control system (the “Operational Architecture”), where factors such as control system type, vendor and protocol are more likely to make each authorization unique and non-standard.

**B-4 ARMY PLATFORM ENCLAVE APPROACH**


The Army has not formalized a Platform Enclave approach.

**B-5 NAVY PLATFORM ENCLAVE APPROACH FOR BCS AND UCS**

Figure B-1 shows which components of the 5-Level control system architecture are included in the Navy's Platform Enclave (PE) called the Control System Platform Enclave (CS-PE). The Navy's CS-PE is implemented at and has a presence today at Navy installations. The Navy is deploying an operational architecture (OA) called the Navy Utilities Monitoring and Control System (NUMCS), which is also shown in Figure B-1.

All Control Systems must connect to the Platform Enclave and must either be separately authorized or fall under the type accreditation of the CS-PE and NUMCS.

**Figure B-1 Navy Platform Enclave and Operational Architecture**



**B-6 AIR FORCE PLATFORM ENCLAVE APPROACH**

The Air Force currently does not have a formal Platform Enclave approach. The AF has deployed the Civil Engineering Community of Interest Network (COIN) at most locations. COIN has its own type accreditation and individual control systems for the most part have their own individual accreditations. CE control systems can use COIN for connectivity, but are not covered under the COIN authorization in a Platform Enclave approach at this time. As a prototype, the AF is deploying the Installation Resilience

Operations Center (IROC) network concept at selected locations, which will include selected control systems within the IROC type accreditation.

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## APPENDIX C 5-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE


### C-1 INTRODUCTION

As shown in Figure C-1, control systems are represented as a 5-Level architecture, where each level represents a collection of components that are logically grouped together by function, and which generally share a cybersecurity approach. This architecture is defined as a general architecture suitable for a wide range of control systems, thus there are some key considerations when using it to describe a specific control system:

- Not every implementation of a control system will make use of every level, or every type of component shown at a level.
- The same device may reside in different levels, depending on its configuration and its network interface. Some controllers even support different networks based on onboard switches, and thus the same device could reside in either Level 1 or Level 2 (but not both simultaneously – though a single system could have the same type of controller shown at both levels).
- In many cases, a device will fit multiple sub-levels within the same principal level, usually within Level 2. For example, a Level 2A controller may act as a Level 2C router to a Level 1 network beneath it.

This Appendix describes the 5-Level architecture for control systems and presents cybersecurity considerations for each level. Note that although there are more than five levels in the architecture shown in Figure C-1, it is commonly referred to as the “5-Level Control System Architecture”. This architecture applies to all control system types; while many of the example components or technologies included in this Appendix are based on building or utility control systems this is not meant to imply that this architecture is specific to these types of control systems.

Figure C-1 5-Level Control System Architecture



## C-2 5-LEVEL ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

A brief description of each Level (from simple to complex devices) is:

- Level 0. Non-networked devices which communicate using analog and binary signals. These include (“dumb”) sensors and actuators as well as non-networked controllers (including their dedicated sensors and actuators). These communicate with Level 1 via hardware I/O (analog and binary signals).
- Level 1. Networked controllers not on an IP network (such as BACnet MS/TP, RS-485 (DNP, Modbus), LonWorks TP/FT-10).
- Level 2. Networked controllers on an IP network.
- Level 3. The Field Point of Connection (FPOC), which is a connection between the field control system IP network at Level 2 and the Level 4 IP network.

- Level 4. The site-wide IP network used for the control system, along with front end servers and workstations (desktops and laptops).
- Level 5. Interfaces to “external” networks (IP networks other than the control system network). In many cases this level will not be a requirement of the project and will be provided by others. When it is part of the project it must be specified separately than the control system using IT specifications and standards.

Note that some levels contain sub-levels as indicated in Figure E-1.

**C-3                      LEVEL 0: SENSORS AND ACTUATORS**

Level 0 consists of non-networked devices which communicate using analog and binary signals. These include (“dumb”) sensors and actuators, as well as non-networked controllers. These communicate with Level 1 or Level 2 via hardware I/O (analog and binary signals). Details for Level 0 are shown in Table C-1.

**Table C-1 Level 0**

<b>LEVEL 0: Sensors and Actuators</b>	
Definition	Level 0 devices lack a network and therefore cannot be attacked over a network. Level 0 devices, if they communicate at all, use only simple analog and binary signals, they do not use any form of digital protocol for communication. A sensor or actuator that uses a communications protocol (such as Zigbee, Bluetooth) is a Level 1 (non-IP) or Level 2 (IP) device.
Functional Description	<p>The interface between the control system and the underlying controlled process / equipment where electrical signals in the control system get converted to/from physical values and actions in the underlying controlled system.</p> <p>Level 0A consists of Sensors and actuators</p> <p>Level 0B consists of non-networked controllers and their integral sensors and actuators. Level 0B devices may have some intelligence and may even have an <u>internal</u> network, but the device does not expose any internal network to other devices. These devices are typically packaged units with factory-installed integral controllers.</p> <p>Note that a “stand-alone” built-up unit with multiple field installed controllers which communicate over a network specific to that unit is NOT a Level 0 component, but rather a stand-alone field control system of its own.</p>

<b>LEVEL 0: Sensors and Actuators</b>	
Implemented Via	<p>Devices which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Convert physical properties (temperature, pressure, etc.) to a binary or analog electrical signal</li><li>• Take a binary or analog electrical signal and produce a physical action (open / close a valve or damper, etc.)</li></ul> <p>These electrical signals are purely binary or analog – there are no exposed digital signals or networks at this level. Also note that "smart" sensors or "smart" actuators which include a controller and network connection are considered to be Level1 or Level 2 devices.</p>
Installed By	Controls contractor during installation or renovation of underlying mechanical or electrical system.



<b>LEVEL 0: Sensors and Actuators</b>	
Example Components	<p>The vast majority of these devices are very simple (“dumb”) sensors or actuators, but more complex equipment may be at level 0 – as long as it lacks a network connection. Some examples are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A thermistor temperature sensor which simply provides a changing resistance as an indication of temperature is a Level 0A device.</li><li>• An electric actuator which takes a 4-20 mA signal and produces a proportional physical response is a Level 0A device.</li><li>• An occupancy sensor which uses BACnet to communicate occupancy values is a Level 1 (or Level 2) device, <b>not</b> a Level 0 device.</li><li>• A variable frequency drive controlling an air handler fan and using only binary and analog signals to communicate with the air handler controller is a Level 0B device.</li><li>• A flow sensor using HART over an analog wire is using a digital protocol (HART) and is a Level 1 device, <b>not</b> a Level 0 device.</li><li>• A packaged diesel generator operating in a stand-alone configuration – again with no network connection to other devices - is a Level 0B device, even if it has binary or analog connections to other devices.</li><li>• A relay panel acting as a Level 0 hardware interface between a building fire protection system and a sitewide radio network to a sitewide fire department.</li></ul> <p>The last three examples illustrate that the defining characteristic for Level 0 is not the complexity of the device, but rather whether the device communicates with other devices using a network.</p>

<b>LEVEL 0: Sensors and Actuators</b>	
Security Control Considerations	In general, management and operational controls such as physical security and access control may still apply to this level. These devices are physically attached to the mechanical/electrical system and physical security is dictated and implemented based on the physical access to the equipment. Utility vaults, Mechanical, Electrical, Plumbing rooms, Pump Stations, etc. should be secure and only authorized personnel should have access. These devices, while they do not have network communication, can cause physical damage, for example a valve left in the “Open” position.

**C-4                      LEVEL 1: FIELD CONTROL SYSTEM (NON-IP)**

Level 1 contains networked controllers not on an IP network (such as BACnet MS/TP, RS-485 (DNP, Modbus), LonWorks TP/FT-10). Details for Level 1 are shown in Table C-2.

**Table C-2 Level 1**

<b>LEVEL 1: Field Control System (non-IP)</b>	
Definition	That portion of the controls network which does not use the IP protocol. This includes both the controllers themselves (Level 1A) and the network (Level 1N).
Functional Description	<p>(Level 1A) This is where the control logic resides and gets converted to or from binary and analog electrical signals, as well as the portion of the control system where:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analog and binary electrical signals (from sensors) get converted to digital signals via analog-to-digital (A-D) converters.</li> <li>• Digital information is converted to analog and binary electrical signals (to actuators) via digital-to-analog (D-A) converters.</li> <li>• Digital information is transmitted and received over a network.</li> <li>• Digital information is processed according to a user-defined sequence to generate new digital information.</li> </ul>

<b>LEVEL 1: Field Control System (non-IP)</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Devices may incorporate integral Level 0 sensors and actuators, for example, many variable air volume (VAV) box controllers incorporate an electric actuator.</li> </ul> <p>Not all controllers will have hardware inputs. While there is exchange of data over the network, good design practice dictates that most of the data processing occurs using local (integral or via analog or binary signals) sensor data and local actuator outputs; the system is designed to minimize dependence on networked data.</p> <p>(Level 1N) The Level 1 network (media and hardware) does not use IP. It uses a variety of media at OSI Layers 1 and 2 (some standard, some not) and it uses Layer 3 protocols other than IP. Some examples are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BACnet over MS/TP, or BACnet over ARCnet</li> <li>• LonTalk over TP/FT-10 or LonTalk over TP/XF-1250</li> <li>• Modbus over RS-485</li> </ul> <p>For this reason, it is generally very specific to the control application and cannot be used for "standard" IT protocols and applications.</p>
Implemented Via	<p>(Level 1A) Controllers, typically equipped with multiple analog and binary inputs and outputs and corresponding A-D and D-A converters. These devices are driven by cost to have the minimal functionality for the application and are very constrained in random access memory (RAM), processing power, and network input/output (I/O). In addition, these devices come in a vast variety of architectures, processors, vendors, and firmware.</p> <p>(Level 1N) The network media and hardware are similarly dedicated to that specific control protocol and are made by a variety of vendors.</p>
Installed By	<p>Controls contractor during installation or renovation of underlying mechanical or electrical system.</p> <p>Generally during new building construction or major renovation.</p>
Example Components	<p>VAV box controllers</p> <p>Networked (non-IP) electric meter</p> <p>Intelligent (networked) thermostat</p>

<b>LEVEL 1: Field Control System (non-IP)</b>	
	LonWorks TP/XF-1250 (media) to TP/FT-10 (media) router. (This is not an IP router but routes the control system protocol at Open Systems Interconnection layer 3.)
Security Control Considerations	<p>Since devices (controllers) in this tier tend to be simpler devices, often few security controls can be applied, particularly after the system has been designed and installed. Since they do not use IP, network attacks must be very protocol-specific. Some basic controls/measures that can be applied at this tier include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disabling (or at a minimum prohibiting) secondary network connections (connections other than to the Level 1 network)</li> <li>• The use of passwords on devices such as displays (to the capability supported by the device – many of which do not permit 14 character passwords, for example)</li> <li>• The application of physical security measures – which will be dictated and implemented by the underlying equipment</li> </ul>

**C-5                      LEVEL 2: FIELD CONTROL SYSTEM (IP)**

Level 2 consists of networked controllers on an IP network. Details for Level 2 are shown in Table C-3.

**Table C-3 Level 2**

<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>	
Definition	The portion of the control system which uses IP but is not shared with any other system. “Shared” in this context primarily refers to physical equipment and media. Note the Level 2 IP network is typically contained within a single building but may span multiple buildings in support of a control system for a single (linear) facility.
Functional Description	<p>2A      This Level (along with Level 1) is where the control logic resides and where it gets converted to/and from electrical signals and can have the first IP connections. This is the portion of the control system where:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analog and binary electrical signals (from sensors) get converted to digital signals via A-D converters</li> </ul>

<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>		
		<p>(although not all controllers will have hardware inputs).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Digital information is converted to analog and binary electrical signals (to actuators) via D-A converters (although not all controllers will have hardware outputs).</li> <li>• Digital information is transmitted and received over a network.</li> <li>• Digital information is processed according to a user-defined sequence to generate new digital information.</li> <li>• These devices may incorporate integral Level 0 sensors and actuators, for example, many Variable Air Volume (VAV) box controllers incorporate an electric actuator.</li> </ul> <p>Note this functional description is identical to that of Level 1. From a controls perspective, there is little difference between Level 1 and Level 2.</p>
	2N/2B	The IP network (media and hardware) dedicated to the control network and carrying the control protocol (such as Distributed Network Protocol (DNP), IEC-61850, BACnet/IP or Lon/IP)). Generally, IP over Ethernet.
	2C	Control Protocol Routers and Gateways. Control Protocol Routers route the control protocol – that is, they selectively forward control protocol packets based on destination address. They are not IP routers. Control Protocol Gateways translate between Control Protocols.
	2D	<p>Where the local control system has an elevated C-I-A requirement (due for example to a reliability requirement, an operator response time, or a need for local operators which cannot be met by the remote site-wide front end), the facility control system may contain a local operator interface similar to what is normally found at Level 4 but dedicated to this specific control system.</p> <p>In other cases, for either legacy or stand-alone systems (not necessarily isolated but stand alone in that they do not rely on another system such as a control system), the front-end operator interface may be physically local to that system. In this case, the operator interface is considered</p>

<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>		
		to be part of Level 2 since it is dedicated to that building or facility and traffic between it and the Level 1 and Level 2 devices does not pass through the Level 3 FPOC.
Implemented Via	2A	Controllers, typically equipped with multiple analog inputs and outputs and corresponding A-D and D-A converters. These devices are driven by cost to have the minimal functionality for the application and are very constrained in RAM, processing power, and network I/O. In addition, these devices come in a vast variety of architectures, processors, vendors, and firmware. Aside from the fact that they use IP and are generally more powerful than Level 1A devices, they are otherwise identical to Level 1A devices. Many devices are available as either Level 1A or 2A devices, where the hardware is identical except for the transceiver; some can even be field configured for one or the other
	2N/2B	The Level 2N IP network is generally Ethernet, and the Level 2B network hardware is standard IT network hardware, though sometimes with reduced functionality. For example, there may not be any requirement for remotely managed switches. Similarly, there is seldom a need for an IP router, since field control systems generally reside within a single (private) IP subnet.
	2C	Controllers very similar in hardware characteristics to Level 2A devices except that these devices typically have multiple network interfaces.
	2D	Computers (as for Level 4) Computers for legacy systems Custom or modified computers with a touch screen interface
Installed By		Controls contractor during installation or renovation of underlying mechanical or electrical system.  Generally during new building construction or major renovation
Example Components	2A	Air Handler Controller Chiller Controller

<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>		
		Boiler Controller Terminal Unit Controller Hydronic System Controller Supervisory Controller System Scheduler Electric Meter Local Display Panels Electrical Protective Relay Voltage Regulator Controller
	2B	Ethernet Switch
	2C	BACnet MS/TP to BACnet/IP Router LonWorks TP/FT-10 to LonWorks IP Router
	2D	Control system at a central plant where the nature and criticality of the system requires a local operator interface.
Security Control Considerations	2A	<p>Controllers residing on the dedicated IP network vary greatly from devices residing on a typical IP network.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• They use a single fixed protocol (or a small number of fixed protocols)</li> <li>• They often do not support “log in” functionality</li> <li>• There is often no “session” capability</li> <li>• They usually do not include a user interface, and if they do it’s generally extremely limited.</li> <li>• They have very limited hardware capabilities (RAM, CPU, storage, etc.)</li> <li>• They generally do not use Windows, and seldom use Linux. They are generally some version of a real time operating system (RTOS).</li> </ul> <p>Many of the controllers will have the same limitations as the controllers in Level 1, where most security controls cannot/or will not apply to them. Some controllers will have significantly more capability, however, and additional controls will be applicable. In either case, the controllers</p>

<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>		
		should disable any network connections or services not required for operation of the control system.
	2N/2B	<p>This network is dedicated to the control system and is generally installed by the control system contractor, not the IT organization. This doesn't reduce the need for securing this network, but does affect the way in which this network is secured, and the risks and vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Some key differentiators between the Level 2 network and a standard IP network are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The network structure and connected devices remain more static throughout the life of the system. Generally components are not added and removed on a regular bases.</li> <li>• The protocol(s) used are fixed, and in many cases only a single protocol is used. The protocols also differ from "regular" IP networks in that they are control system protocols rather than standard IT protocols. This allows for the implementation of very simple (a few very broad rules) firewalls to limit traffic.</li> <li>• Bandwidth usage is lower. Because the network configuration is more static, the bandwidth usage is also more fixed.</li> <li>• The devices residing on the network have fewer capabilities, and generally don't support network security standards such as IEEE 802.1X.</li> <li>• The control system does not require the level of functionality that Approved Product List (APL) network infrastructure devices provide. The Navy, however, does require APL products for all IP Network Hardware..</li> <li>• Standard IT devices typically do not meet the UL Listing requirements for fire and life safety systems, so specialized network hardware may be required to meet the control system needs.</li> </ul>
	2C	These devices are not manufactured by traditional IT companies and do not run standard IT software. Their functionality is often included as part of a Level 2A device. They do not route IP.



<b>LEVEL 2: Field Control System (IP)</b>		
	2D	<p>While functionally, Level 2D components act similarly to computers at Level 4, the fact that they are local to (and dedicated to) a specific control system means that from a security controls perspective, they are better addressed as Level 2 components.</p> <p>There are two main reasons for computers at Level 2D:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legacy systems that cannot be patched. The computers at Level 2D may be running an older operating system and may not support some of the security controls. In this case, the controls which can be applied without negatively affecting the availability of the system should be applied, and mitigating controls and measures should be taken when otherwise needed. Systems containing these computers should not be connected to other systems (i.e., should be operated stand-alone) until they can be properly addressed, with the computers replaced or otherwise upgraded to Level 4 standards.</li> <li>• Where a new system requires a local front end that, for whatever reason, cannot be installed on the base-wide shared IP network (Level 4). This is typically due to a C-I-A requirement. When installing a new system with a Level 2 front end, it's important to note that the Level 2 front end should be subject to the same controls as a Level 4 front end. While implementation and inheritance of security controls at this level may differ from the Level 4 front end, computers at this Level should be subject to the same controls as a "normal" Level 4 front end of equivalent criticality.</li> </ul>

**C-6                      LEVEL 3: FIELD POINT OF CONNECTION (FPOC)**

Level 3 is the Field Point of Connection (FPOC), which is a connection between the field control system IP network at Level 2 and the Level 4 IP network. Details for Level 3 are shown in Table C-4.

Note that there may be devices which resemble an FPOC in the sense that they are a security device providing a managed interface between different networks but are not located between a dedicated IP network and a base-wide shared IP network. While

these devices (discussed in Chapter 2, and under the Level 0 description above) act as a security barrier, the term FPOC is reserved for a security device between Level 2 and Level 4.

**Table C-4 Level 3**

<b>LEVEL 3: Field Point of Connection (FPOC)</b>	
Definition	The device which connects the dedicated Level 2 IP network with the Level 4 IP network.
Functional Description	<p>For each field control system, the FPOC is the specific single demarcation point in the control system between that field control system and the front-end system. The FPOC is a standard IT device, usually an Ethernet Switch.</p> <p>The FPOC generally has security controls in that it restricts access (by user, protocol, or specific commands) between levels above and levels below.</p> <p>Note that a large system (consisting of hundreds of FCSes) will have hundreds of these FPOC devices, one at each connection of a field control system to the local network.</p>
Implemented Via	Almost always an Ethernet switch or IP router
Installed By	Generally installed by installation network staff or by the control system contractor with oversight by the network staff.
Example Components	Standard IT managed Ethernet switch or IP router
Security Control Considerations	<p>This device is critical from a security controls perspective as it is where the dedicated local field control network connects to the installation-wide IP network. Normally, securing this device protects the installation-wide network from the local field systems (which often have a difficult time meeting security controls). Occasionally, where there is a critical field control system, this device can protect the more critical field control system from the less-secure local system (i.e., where there are 99 non-critical systems and 1 critical one, isolate the 1 from the 99 rather than try and secure the 99).</p> <p>This device should, in effect, have a "deny all / permit by exception" policy applied. The FPOC should be set up with the most restrictive set of access control list (ACL) possible.</p>

**C-7 LEVEL 4: CONTROL SYSTEM FRONT END AND CONTROL SYSTEM IP NETWORK**

Level 4 is the IP network used to connect multiple Level 2 networks, along with front end servers and workstations (desktops and laptops). Details for Level 4 are shown in Table C-5.

**Table C-5 Level 4**

<b>LEVEL 4: Control System Front End and Control System IP Network</b>	
Definition	Front End computers and the IP network which connects multiple Level 2 Field Control Networks and is (generally) not dedicated to a specific FCS. The IP network may be shared with other applications, a dedicated physical network, or a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) or a Virtual Private Network (VPN) riding on top of another network.
Functional Description	<p>(Level 4A and 4B) The multi-facility operator interface for the system. This is typically a web-based client-server system with the servers (Level 4A) running vendor-specific software on standard server PCs and the clients (Level 4B) accessing the servers via standard web browser software. Some functions of the control system are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing graphical screens for monitoring and control of the system</li> <li>• Allowing operators to schedule systems, set up historical trends, and respond to alarm conditions</li> <li>• Provide for and support global control and optimization strategies that are impractical to implement within the control systems</li> <li>• Perform real-time analytical analysis and take appropriate real-time actions through supervisory commands to devices at levels 1 or 2.</li> </ul> <p>This level usually also includes Engineering Tool Software which provides tools for creating and modifying the control system.</p> <p>The Level 4N network is the network that connects multiple facility networks into a common base-wide network. (Note that generally this network is referred to as base-wide as that's the normal use case, but it could be entirely contained within a single building)</p>



Table C-6 Level 5

<b>LEVEL 5: External Connection and Control System Management</b>	
Definition	Additional hardware, software, and networking used to manage the control system, provide security functionality, user management, and external access. These are IT management and IT security functions, and don't provide control system functionality.
Functional Description	<p>In many architectures, this level provides the enclave boundary defense between the control system (at Level 4 and below) and IP networks external to the control system. (In other architectures, this boundary defense occurs in the external network). In many cases, there is a component within the control system which would reside in Level 5.</p> <p>This level may be absent for a variety of reasons: there may not be an external connection, or the connection may be handled in the external network.</p> <p>Additional functionality allowed through external connections may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sending alarm notification using outbound access to a SMTP email server.</li> <li>• Upload of historical data and meter data to an enterprise server using outbound HTTP/HTTPS access for uploading.</li> </ul> <p>In some cases, inbound HTTP/HTTPS may be allowed from web clients on the external network to the Level 4A server, but this is not required and is often prohibited for security reasons. The Navy prohibits this functionality.</p>
Implemented Via	Firewalls DMZ/Perimeter Networking Proxy Servers Domain Controller, etc.
Installed By	IT and communications staff and contractors.
Example Components	Wide Area Networks Metropolitan Area Networks Local Area Networks

	<p>Campus Area Networks</p> <p>Virtual Private Networks</p> <p>Point of Presence</p> <p>Demarcation Point or Main Point of Presence</p>
Security Control Considerations	<p>Generally speaking, if the control system can function in a completely isolated configuration, it should, and external connection should be absent. This Level should implement a "deny all / permit exception" policy to protect the control system from the external network and the external network from the control system.</p>

### C-9 ARCHITECTURE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ)

- **Can there be controllers at Level 4?** No, all networked controllers must be at Level 2 or Level 1. Non-networked controllers may also exist at Level 0.
- **Can one Field Control System have multiple Level 2 networks?** Yes. One case is multiple Level 2 networks with no IP connection between. In this case there may still be a Level 1 or Level 0 connection between them. Another possibility is that instead of having a single Level 2 network, you may architect the system to have multiple Level 2 networks which are connected by a Level 4 network.
- **Can one Level 2 network support multiple field control systems?** Yes, but they would have to share a cybersecurity authorization.
- **I have a control system supporting a linear facility that operates across a wide geographic area using a network that no other system used. Is that a Level 4 or Level 2 network?** It could be either – it can be defined using the architecture as a single Level 2 network, or as multiple Level 2 networks connected by a Level 4 network. Which is more accurate will depend on the details of the specific installation. Factors affecting how this system is best described include authorization boundaries, procurement and operation responsibilities for the network, and preference of the Authorizing Official. In a broad sense, the more tightly the network is tied to the control system (maintained by the same people for example) the more it resembles Level 2.

## APPENDIX D CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM IMPACT RATINGS

### D-1 BACKGROUND

This appendix discusses methods for determining the cybersecurity impact rating for a building control system. A system is categorized based on an evaluation of the impact associated with the loss of confidentiality (C), integrity (I), or availability (A) (generally written as CIA) in organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. The system impact is categorized as high, moderate, or low. This is sometimes referred to as either the CIA level, CIA value, impact level, or security category. Where this categorization is not provided by the system owner (SO) or authorizing official (AO), the procedures in this appendix may be used to determine interim categorization values to allow the design process to move forward. These values cannot be assumed to be the values that will be used for authorization.

Before defining the system categorization, it is important to understand what is meant by a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, and what is meant by a high, moderate and low impact.

#### D-1.1 Types of Security Breach

The RMF considers three types of security breaches:

- Loss of Confidentiality. Information within the system is leaked to the outside.
- Loss of Integrity. Information in the system is subject to unauthorized modification.
- Loss of Availability. The system (or information in the system) is unavailable.

#### D-1.2 Impact Ratings

The RMF categorizes systems as LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH based on the potential impact of a security breach. The DoD definitions for LOW, MODERATE, and HIGH impact are given in FIPS-199 (Federal Information Processing Standards) as modified in CNSSI-1253. (CNSSI adds the phrase “exceeding mission expectations” to each definition):

##### D-1.2.1 LOW Impact Definition

The potential impact is LOW if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

AMPLIFICATION: A limited adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might (i) cause a degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its primary functions,

but the effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced; (ii) result in minor damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in minor financial loss; or (iv) result in minor harm to individuals [exceeding mission expectations].

### **D-1.2.2 MODERATE Impact Definition**

The potential impact is MODERATE if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

AMPLIFICATION: A serious adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might (i) cause a significant degradation in mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is able to perform its primary functions, but the effectiveness of the functions is significantly reduced; (ii) result in significant damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in significant financial loss; or (iv) result in significant harm to individuals that does not involve loss of life or serious life-threatening injuries [exceeding mission expectations].

### **D-1.2.3 HIGH Impact Definition**

The potential impact is HIGH if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

AMPLIFICATION: A severe or catastrophic adverse effect means that, for example, the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability might (i) cause a severe degradation in or loss of mission capability to an extent and duration that the organization is not able to perform one or more of its primary functions; (ii) result in major damage to organizational assets; (iii) result in major financial loss; or (iv) result in severe or catastrophic harm to individuals involving loss of life or serious life-threatening injuries [exceeding mission expectations.]

## **D-2 SYSTEM CATEGORIZATION AND DETERMINATION OF IMPACT RATING**

Step 1 of the RMF requires categorizing the system in accordance with Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 1253. This instruction describes how the CIA impact level is determined by the type of information on the system and mission criticality of the system. Rationales for system categorization will be required and may be supported by four approaches (listed in order of preference):

1. Compare to Similar Systems. This is probably the most defensible and easiest approach; is the project similar to an existing project with established categorization values?
2. Methodical System Review. This is a “common sense” approach to determining impact ratings based on the mission and the relationship the control system has to the mission.



3. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Energy, Installations and Environment) FRCS Master List ([https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP\\_CSC.html](https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_CSC.html)). This list includes “starting point” CIA impact ratings by control system type for three mission criticalities. The values here have generally (and more specifically for Utility Monitoring and Control System (UMCS), BCS, and UCS) been determined through an application of the “common sense” methodical process defined here.
4. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guidance. This is the “proper formal way” to determine impact ratings but is not easily applicable to control systems. In practice, the approach used is to determine CIA using another approach first and then to confirm/document that impact rating determination using the NIST guidance.

### **D-2.1 Compare to Similar to Systems**

At many sites, the project will be similar to existing control systems in similar mission space. It may be possible to simply determine what categorization values were used in the other project and assume those same values in the current project. Note that “similar” in this context must include the following elements (in order from most to least important):

- The other project should have the same organizational AO. Since acceptance of risk is subjective, it is vital to have the same organization accepting the risk.
- The other project must have a control system supporting a mission with a similar impact of the mission itself. Note: this has nothing to do with the control system, it is the criticality of the mission itself. Even if the mechanical systems were identical, a project supporting a mission of “processing real-time battlefield intelligence” cannot be compared to a project supporting a mission of “providing recreational facilities to soldiers.”
- The other project must have a similar dependency between the control system and mission. The key question here is “if the control system fails, how much impact is there on the mission?”

If there is a similar project that can be referenced, then a reasonable assumption is that “similar projects will have similar C-I-A impact categorization values”.

### **D-2.2 Methodical System Review**

In almost all cases, loss of confidentiality of the information in the control system is of little or no consequence (even when it is, it is generally much less important than integrity or availability) and the impact of the control system is primarily due to loss of integrity or availability. Loss of integrity or availability relates to how these losses may impact the mission supported by the specific facility-related control system (FRCS). Determination of impact for the control system is typically a two-step process:

- What is the impact of the mission? Will loss of the mission result in a LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH impact?
- How much will a loss of (integrity or availability of) HVAC controls impact the mission?

This process will provide a rational (“common sense”) starting point for determining criticality of an FRCS to use during design but is not official policy. Ultimately, system criticality is determined by the AO (in coordination with the SO and based on input from the designer of the control system).

## **D-2.2.1 Impact of the HVAC Control System**


### **D-2.2.1.1 Mission Impact**

Ideally, the AO, SO, or mission tenant will identify the mission impact, but this is often not feasible (mission tenants may not in fact know and frequently overstate their own importance). In cases where the mission impact is not known, or when the claimed mission impact seems exaggerated and confirmation is desired, the flow chart in Figure D-1, Figure D-2, and Figure D-3 may be helpful. The flowchart assumes that availability and integrity have the same impact rating and disregards confidentiality. (Although this is a single flowchart, it has been broken out across three figures to facilitate discussion of the flowchart).

The first part of the flowchart, Figure D-1, deals with the determination of the impact of the mission itself. This chart relies on three observations:

1. Critical mission facilities are often on a (classified) list of critical facilities.
2. Critical mission facilities generally have a requirement for local backup generators. UFC 3-540-01, Engine-Driven Generator Systems for Prime and Standby Power Applications requires that “For Army Secure Critical Missions, the Army will reduce the risk by being capable of providing necessary energy and water for 14 days.”
3. Critical mission facilities generally have a requirement for physical security above and beyond what is typical on the installation. Note that this is not definitive: child development centers typically have additional security but might not be considered mission critical. These security measures might include such things as additional fencing, cameras, security guards, additional badging, or requirements for escorts inside the facility. When electrical and mechanical infrastructure is outside the facility (for example, a diesel generator), there is typically a security fence surrounding the facility and the electrical and mechanical infrastructure.

Figure D-1 - FRCS Impact Determination Flowchart Part 1  
Determining Mission Impact



### D-2.2.1.2 Impact of Control System on Mission

Once the impact of the mission is known, the impact of the FRCS on the mission is evaluated. The flowchart continues in Figure D-2 and Figure D-3 and considers the relationship between the FRCS, the underlying equipment, and the mission itself:

- A key consideration is whether the mission depends on the equipment controlled by the FRCS. A computer server room is clearly dependent on continuous cooling for operation, while an outdoor training area is clearly not. Other related considerations are:
  - How long the mission can function before a loss of the controlled equipment will cause a mission failure. For example, a computer server room might fail completely if it loses cooling for 30 minutes, while an office environment (even one performing a critical function) might continue to function for hours before their mission was impacted and may be able to carry on indefinitely (with some reduced efficiency) without completely failing at their mission.
  - The extent that the controlled equipment relies on the FRCS for operation. For example, a lighting system controlled by an occupancy sensor that also has a manual ON/OFF switch relies very little on the occupancy sensor for meeting mission goals.

The next several considerations address the equipment controlled by the FRCS and the ability of site personnel to operate the underlying equipment after a control's failure.

- If the equipment controlled by the FRCS is critical, it likely requires the same level of backup power as the supported mission, which normally means local backup power generation.
- If the equipment controlled by the FRCS is critical, there will likely be redundant equipment to allow for failure (such as mechanical failure) of a piece of equipment (such as a broken belt or burned out bearing).
- If local controls are available that will allow staff (either installation operations and maintenance [O&M] staff or adequately trained mission staff) to restore operation of the equipment before the mission fails. Note that these manual controls might lead to reduced energy efficiency, but the key point is that the mission can continue with minimal disruption.
- The ability of O&M staff to repair or restore system operation before the mission fails due to the loss of the systems must be considered, as this ability to repair before failure is a mitigation that would lower the FRCS Impact level.
- The Integrity and Availability impact of the FRCS controls cannot exceed the supported mission impact. However, in cases where confidentiality is important, the Confidentiality impact rating of the FRCS impact may exceed the mission impact.

Figure D-2 - FRCS Impact Determination Flowchart Part 2a  
Determining FRCS Impact Based on Mission Impact





Figure D-3 - FRCS Impact Determination Flowchart Part 2b  
Determining FRCS Impact Based on Mission Impact.



**D-2.2.2 Addressing the critical control system and reducing system criticality**

Several options for addressing a critical FRCS (and possibly reducing its criticality) are suggested by the above drawing and are described in CHAPTER 4, such as the addition of manual controls, the use of local front ends or local display panels, and redundant equipment with independent control systems.

If the standalone system approach is used, this might mean that the standalone system cannot be monitored by the primary systems. Multiple strategies are discussed in APPENDIX E to allow for a lower-impact system to monitor a higher-impact system.

**D-2.3 System categorization based on Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS) Master List**

The Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS) Master List available on the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment FRCS Cybersecurity Website ([https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP\\_CSC.html](https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_CSC.html)), provides preliminary impacts dependent on supported mission criticality.

**D-2.3.1 Supported Facility Criticality**

The Master List uses three categories of mission criticality into which the facility or mission the system supports will fall. The DoDI 5000.02 defines them as:

- Mission Support. Not designated as mission essential or critical
- Mission Essential. “is basic and necessary for the accomplishment of the organizational mission. (designated by the DoD Component head)”
- Mission Critical. “the loss of which would cause the stoppage of warfighter operations or direct mission support of warfighter operations. (designated by the DoD Component head)”

Assuming that the mission is heavily dependent on the FRCS, then the CIA values under the mission criticality for the facility or mission can be used as preliminary CIA values for the FRCS. Figure D-4 shows an excerpt of the Master List for UMCS.

**Figure D-4 – Example FRCS Master List Entry  
UMCS Categorization Based on Mission Criticality**

FRCS Type and Description	Preliminary Baseline C-I-A								
	Mission Support			Mission Essential			Mission Critical		
System Name	C	I	A	C	I	A	C	I	A
Utility Monitoring and Control System (UMCS)	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	M	M

\* C=confidentiality, I = integrity, A=availability\*\* L=low, M=medium, H=high

Note that the CIA values for mission essential or mission critical facilities should be lower than shown on the “Master List” if the mission does not depend heavily on the FRCS.

Note also that the Baseline C-I-A values from the Master List are not policy, rather they are guidance in helping one determine categorization. The focus on determining categorization is in the following instructions on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-60 (NIST 2008). For example, one may have a physical access control system that does not rise to the suggested CIA impact categorization of MMH (for moderate confidentiality, moderate integrity, and high availability impact) as depicted in the “Master List.” Follow the next section and provide a clear concise categorization rationalization.

**D-2.4 NIST SP 800-60, Vol. II -Rev. 1, Information Types**

NIST SP 800-60, Vol. II, Appendices to Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information System to Security Categories (NIST 2008) is the authoritative document to help SOs determine the CIA values for the information processing types of their systems.

NIST SP 800-60, Table D-1, “Mission-Based Information Types and Delivery Mechanisms Mission Areas and Information Types” lists information type. (NIST 2008).

While many system types are not an ideal match to the systems listed in Table D-1, UMCSs (and HVAC, electrical, and lighting systems) will most likely fall into information systems described in Section D.7, “Energy.” The information types in D.7 are

- Energy Supply
- Energy Conservation and Preparedness (common information type for an Army UMCS)
- Energy Resource Management
- Energy Production

NIST SP 800-60, Table D-2 (shown in Figure D-5) lists the anticipated CIA categorization for each of the above types. Note that UMCSs fall in the energy conservation and preparedness information type and have a baseline CIA level of low-low-low.

**Figure D-5 – Example FRCS Master List Entry  
UMCS Categorization Based on Mission Criticality**

Information Type	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability
Energy Supply	Low	Moderate	Moderate
Energy Conservation and Preparedness (includes UMCS)	Low	Low	Low
Energy Resource Management (does not include UMCS)	Moderate	Low	Low
Energy Production	Low	Low	Low



This is still not enough information for you to appropriately justify your CIA categorization. Go to NIST SP 800-60 section D.7 “Energy” and review the definitions of the four types of energy (as listed above) and determine what best fits the system. Select all information types that are applicable to your system. Make sure you look at the definitions of confidentiality, integrity, and availability and any special factors that could elevate the baseline CIA.

#### **D-2.5                    Summary and required categorization rationale**

Where applicable, the best approach is likely “compare to similar systems.” If that is not an option, the best approach may be to use the “methodical system review” approach to determine impact level, then select (if there is a plausible fit) the system type from NIST SP 800-60 to defend the decision.

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## APPENDIX E CYBERSECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTEGRATING CRITICAL UTILITY OR BUILDING CONTROL SYSTEMS WITH NON-CRITICAL UMCS

NOTE: This appendix applies to Utility Control Systems (UCS) and Building Control Systems (BCS). For the purpose of this Appendix, the term Field Control Systems (FCS) is used to refer to both UCS and BCS, but not necessarily to other Field Control System (FCS) types.

### E-1 INTRODUCTION

In those cases where a Building Control System (BCS) or Utility Control System (UCS) contains classified information, controls critical infrastructure, or otherwise supports critical missions or life safety, the FCS is a critical system. While some of the requirements for securing the FCS are covered in the list of CCIs to be applied to a MODERATE or HIGH system, there are issues specifically related to critical systems on a typical installation where the preponderance of systems is non-critical.

There are three main approaches to address the connection of a critical FCS to a UMCS:

1. **Secure the UMCS at the same Impact level as the FCS.** Conceptually, this is the most straightforward approach, but it requires the UMCS Front End to be addressed at the higher Impact level and requires special consideration all other connected FCS which are not at the higher impact level (and are therefore connecting to a higher impact system). A typical DoD installation will have many more non-critical FCS than critical FCS, so this approach will often prove to be impractical, particularly when connecting a lower impact FCS to a higher impact UMCS Front End is difficult. This approach is the preferred solution for the Navy, and the Navy has identified an approach to connect the lower impact systems without requiring them to be assessed at the higher impact level.
2. **Implement a stand-alone UMCS for the FCS.** In this case, the FCS is part of a dedicated local critical UMCS which is not connected to the UMCS serving the larger installation. This approach eliminates the risk of connection to a less critical system, but requires that the critical UMCS function independently, with its own dedicated UMCS operators. It also removes the ability to remotely monitor the critical system.

In many cases this approach is logistically infeasible to sustain and must be carefully considered before implementing. Facility operation and maintenance staff must be willing and able to operate the stand-alone facility for this approach to work.

3. **Provide a secure connection between the critical FCS and a non-critical UMCS.** This approach connects the critical FCS to the installation-wide UMCS in a way that does not increase the impact level of the UMCS. While this connection requires a great deal of planning and

care, it can provide a more practical means of connecting the critical FCS than either implementing a stand-alone UMCS or raising the Impact level of the installation-wide UMCS.

This approach provides a security separation between the FCS and UMCS and is the preferred approach for the Army.

This Appendix presents design considerations specifically for connecting critical building control systems to a non-critical UMCS as described in approach 3. Considerations for the implementation of approach 1 or 2 are NOT addressed herein. While the considerations in this Appendix may be applicable to other control systems, particularly other building control systems or utility control systems, they are discussed here within the context of a Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Building Control System.

## E-2 LIMIT OUTSIDE FUNCTIONALITY

The key concept in connecting a critical FCS to a non-critical UMCS is limiting the ability of the UMCS to affect the FCS. The interactions between the FCS and UMCS should be specific and well-defined, and restricted to those required for system operation. In general, this will entail information from the FCS being sent to the UMCS for monitoring while greatly restricting or even eliminating information from the UMCS being sent to the FCS for control purposes. For example, a critical FCS may send status and alarm information to the non-critical UMCS but should not be receiving start/stop commands from the UMCS as this introduces vulnerabilities to the critical system. Operator changes to the critical FCS should always be carefully considered – by an operator in the zone, with ***full awareness of their actions and understanding of the impact of their actions***.

## E-3 FCS-UMCS CONNECTION METHODS

Limiting ***possible*** actions is a very difficult requirement for networked controllers; in many cases the aggressor can connect their laptop to the UMCS network and download a new program to a device in the critical FCS. This is not to trivialize the significant barriers preventing this action, but by assumption, the UMCS is not sufficiently secured to protect the FCS, so it must be assumed that this action is possible and guard against it. This is similar to the additional physical security usually protecting a critical facility. Even though there are barriers limiting access to the installation in general, the assumption is that an aggressor can get access to the installation and critical facilities have additional physical security to further limit access.

There are three primary methods which can be employed to provide a secure connection between a critical FCS and a non-critical UMCS: a Hardware I/O interface, Hardware Gateway, and Network Firewall. Of these three, the recommended approach for critical FCS is the use of the Hardware I/O interface.

### E-3.1 Hardware I/O Interface


The most secure method to connect an FCS to a UMCS is to share data across the boundary using only analog and binary signals. Do **not** connect the FCS to the UMCS via a network. Using hardware I/O prevents an aggressor from “piggybacking” an unwanted command onto the interface as the information exchange is defined and restricted by the hardware connections. Even if an aggressor controls the untrusted device, the trusted device can only receive the commands that it has been designed and constructed to receive.

#### E-3.1.1 Hardware I/O Interface Overview

A Hardware I/O Interface consists of two controllers which share information between systems via binary or analog I/O, typically using dry contacts, 4-20mA signals or 0-10V signals.

Figure E-1 illustrates a Hardware I/O Interface where a generator serving a critical facility provides a few key monitoring points to a UMCS, and receives a control point, “Request to Start” from the UMCS. It’s important that this point is only a **Request** for the system to start, and that the actual decision of whether the generator will start or stop **must** be made by the critical FCS.

Figure E-1 Hardware I/O Interface Example



### E-3.1.2 Hardware I/O Interface Implementation

Implementing a Hardware I/O Interface requires controllers on the FCS and UMCS with matching hardware points. An aggressor could apply excessive voltages to the I/O lines and physically damage the controller on the FCS side. To mitigate this vulnerability, either:

- Use a controller dedicated to the communication interface and performing no other functions on the FCS side so that damage to it doesn't impact the control system.
- or
- Provide optical isolation of the analog and binary signals between the devices.

The controller on the UMCS side of the connection may be on a controller which performs other functions as the concern is exposing the more critical FCS to risk from the UMCS, and not the other direction. While the controller on the UMCS side is logically part of the UMCS (a "hardware I/O gateway"), procurement and installation may be simpler if it is furnished and installed by the FCS contractor.

### E-3.1.3 Hardware I/O Interface Advantages and Disadvantages

This method is by far the most secure method of communication between the FCS and UMCS, as there is nothing an aggressor can do to the untrusted device that impairs the critical system. The potential disadvantage of this approach is the additional cost in the procurement and installation of two additional hardware I/O points each monitoring and/or control point. Depending on the amount and complexity of data being shared this may or may not be more costly than other approaches.

This approach is also conceptually the easiest to implement and requires no particular cybersecurity expertise skill, other than careful attention to limiting control points.

## E-3.2 Hardware Gateway Interface

A Hardware Gateway is another means of connecting a critical FCS to a non-critical UMCS. While not as secure as a Hardware I/O Interface, it will be much more cost-effective if there is a large amount of data to exchange between the FCS and UMCS.

### E-3.2.1 Hardware Gateway Overview

In this context, a gateway is a device with a connection to the UMCS network and a **separate** connection to the FCS network that does not pass network traffic between the two connections (i.e., it does not route packets between the two networks). Instead, information from one network is received by the gateway, processed by the gateway and then identical information is transmitted on the other network. While in theory the UMCS and FCS could both use the same protocol (like BACnet), in practice it may be difficult to find a gateway using the same protocol on "both sides" that is sufficiently secure, as typical designs would use the same connection for matching protocols.

### **E-3.2.2 Hardware Gateway Implementation**

The key requirements for implementing a secure gateway are:

- The gateway must provide complete isolation / separation between the UMCS network and FCS network. This requires 2 separate network connections and may be difficult to meet if the FCS and UMCS protocols are the same.
- The gateway must not be able to be programmed, configured, or otherwise modified from the UMCS network. Since the gateway can likely be configured over the “primary” network, this requirement may be difficult to achieve if the UMCS and FCS protocols are the same. If both use the same protocol, the gateway is more likely to be configurable from both the UMCS and FCS. The configuration capability depends on the actual implementation of the gateway, so care must be taken to specify that the Gateway is not configurable from the UMCS network.
- The gateway must be configured to only expose those points absolutely necessary for the UMCS.

The gateway is part of the FCS and should be installed by the FCS contractor.

### **E-3.2.3 Hardware Gateway Advantages and Disadvantages**

The main security concern with the gateway (assuming the above requirements are met) is security flaws in the gateway implementation. Just as a web server may have a flaw which allows an aggressor to take control of the server, a gateway may have an implementation flaw which would allow control of the gateway; once in control of the gateway, the aggressor could reconfigure the gateway to attack the FCS itself.

The gateway may provide a cost-effective alternative to the use of Hardware I/O points for systems with a requirement to share many points, and the cost of the gateway is not as dependent on the number of points as the Hardware I/O Interface.

## **E-3.3 Firewall Interface**

The third option for securing a network connection between the UMCS and FCS is to allow a network connection but use a firewall to selectively block traffic between the two networks. The firewall requires a network connection and is therefore only applicable when the UMCS and FCS use the same protocol.

### **E-3.3.1 Firewall Interface Overview**

Unlike a gateway where there is no network connection between the two networks and the gateway explicitly transmits information from one to the other, with the firewall the two networks are connected, and the firewall selectively limits the traffic allowed between the two. This inherently makes the firewall less secure than the gateway.

### **E-3.3.2 Firewall Interface Implementation**

The key requirements for a secure firewall are:

- The firewall can only be programmed from within the critical facility. This is usually not a difficult requirement to meet because as security appliances, firewalls are designed with a "secure" side and an "insecure" side.
- Unlike traditional IT firewalls, the firewall must be able to filter traffic based on the detailed information in the packet. While a standard firewall can limit traffic based on IP address and TCP/UDP port and might block all traffic except that going to or from the UMCS server, the control system firewall must also be able to block all but specific commands. In addition to blocking all traffic except to/from the UMCS front end server, it might also block all traffic except for very specific messages – such as a BACnet ReadProperty requests for specific point values. This requires a firewall that understands the specific control protocol (BACnet in this case) and can selectively block traffic based on the specific message.

### **E-3.3.3 Firewall Interface Pros and Cons**

The main implementation problem with a firewall is the lack of availability of a firewall that can decode control protocol packets and selectively filter based on the message. One advantage of the firewall over the gateway is that the firewall is designed for security and is less likely to have an implementation flaw than the gateway, which is typically not designed as a security device.

### **E-3.4 Data Diodes**

Data diodes provide a physically-enforced, one-way data flow which can be used for the monitoring of control systems. This technology was until recently very expensive and geared more toward IT applications, but data diodes by multiple providers are coming down in price and some even have legacy RS-485 (screw terminal) connections to bring older equipment into a modern, connected architecture.

#### **E-3.4.1 Methods of Isolation**

Most data diodes provide isolation by (both of) the following two methods:

- Optical isolation. While inputs and outputs are via electrical signals, information is passed between the inputs and outputs via light (usually an LED and a photodetector). This isolation prevents electrical surges coming in from outside from causing damage to the inside network.
- Uni-directional transmission: Signals and information can only pass from inside to outside, there is no capability for information to come in from outside.



### E-3.4.2 Data Diode Protocol Challenges

Uni-directional transmission can create problems for many protocols which use acknowledged transmissions. Consider the difference between regular email and email with acknowledgement or read receipt. In many cases, it's important to know that the information was received by the recipient, but that requires the ability to send a response message back to the sender; by definition the data diode blocks any sort of return message. For some protocols, this can be a showstopper; the protocol itself uses acknowledged transmissions. While all data diodes have hardware to copy the input to the output, data diodes supporting these protocols must "understand" these protocols and incorporate additional hardware to support them.

Consider a case where device A, an "inside" device, wants to send data to device B, an "outside" device, using an acknowledged send.

- Initially, device A sends the data to the data diode. The "inside" side of the data diode does two things:
  - Send the information across the optical isolator to the "outside" side of the diode
  - Uses additional hardware to generate an acknowledgement message to send back to device A.
- The "outside" side of the data diode then forwards the data on to device B and (if the message is received) gets an acknowledgement back from device B.

While this process can support protocols that use acknowledged transmissions, note that the overall message is not acknowledged – device A device received an acknowledgement from the data diode, but there's no knowledge of whether device B ever received the message. (While device B sends an acknowledgement back to the data diode, there's no capability to do anything based on the receipt, or lack thereof. The data diode cannot tell device A whether or not device B ever got the message.)

### E-3.4.3 Data Diode Pros and Cons

Some pros and cons of data diodes are:

- If used with protocols that use acknowledged transmissions, the data diode must understand the protocol well enough to be able to reproduce the acknowledgements.
- There is no actual indication of end-to-end success of the transmission, and it may be desirable to send the information multiple times to ensure success.
- Unlike the simple hardware I/O interface, the data diode can easily move large amounts of data rapidly across the security boundary.
- Unlike the hardware I/O interface, the data diode cannot send any information in from outside. If there is a need to send in carefully

proscribed information (e.g., “Request Generator Start”), then the hardware I/O interface is likely the only viable solution.

## **E-4 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

### **E-4.1 Local User Interfaces**

Critical systems should be provided with additional local User Interfaces to allow maintenance personnel inside the secure area access to control data to allow for troubleshooting. Liberal use of local display panels is strongly recommended. For larger critical systems, it might be desirable to provide a more functional interface than normally obtainable via LDPs, such as an independent UMCS front end or a web interface appliance. For the largest or most critical systems, consideration should be given to installing a full-featured UMCS as specified in UFGS 25 10 10. This UMCS should be dedicated to the FCS (such as a Level 2D front end) and should reside fully within the physical security footprint of the critical systems.

### **E-4.2 Management of Risk**

It must always be remembered that there is no perfect solution for cybersecurity for control systems. Cybersecurity experts often say, “there is no such thing as an air gap”. While it may be more accurate to say, “there are always ways to go around the air gap”, the intent remains – a determined aggressor will always find a way around, over, or through the protections put in place. The goal in the design of cybersecurity of control systems, and critical control systems in particular, is to do whatever is practical to make this as hard as possible.

## APPENDIX F IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY CONTROLS

### F-1 INTRODUCTION

This Appendix contains guidance on the implementation of security controls for control systems. The focus of this guidance is on LOW and MODERATE impact systems (L-L-L or M-M-M C-I-A Impact rating) which are being fielded on a DoD installation, particularly building control systems and utility monitoring and control systems. The CCI tables in APPENDIX G provide specific breakout of responsibilities by security control and CCI. The notes in this appendix supplement those CCI tables. Where these notes refer to the UFGS, it is UFGS 25 05 11, Cybersecurity for Facility-Related Control Systems.

### F-2 GENERAL GUIDANCE

#### F-2.1 Control System versus Standard IT System Terminology

Security controls and CCIs were written for traditional IT systems, and many contain terminology and requirements that are confusing and conflicting when applied to a control system. For example, “incident” as used in the IR family of security controls includes all incidents – a broken fan belt is an “incident”, but “flaw” as used in security control SI-2 only covers security flaws, not operational flaws – an inaccurate sensor is not a “flaw”.

In most cases, the notes below will help make the application of the security control to a control system clear. In other cases NIST SP 800-53 should be consulted as it contains the best definition of the security controls as well as “Supplemental Guidance” that can assist in the interpretation and application of the CCI to a control system. NIST SP 800-82 (section 6.2 of revision 2) also has general information on the security control families, as well as guidance on the application of the security controls to Industrial Control Systems, which are a subset of control systems and have similar characteristics to facility-related control systems.

#### F-2.2 DoD-Defined Values

Many CCIs have DoD defined values of “all employees”, and many CCIs have DoD defined values of “all components” or similar where this level of detail is not appropriate for a LOW impact control system. It will be necessary to re-define (and document) values for CCIs when the DoD-defined values do not make sense for control systems.

#### F-2.3 Security Controls Which are “Automatically Met”

Some security controls may be “automatic” in the sense that they have already been implemented for another information system or control system. A security control that states “the organization does <something>...” may have already been met as a requirement for a different authorization for a different system.

## **F-2.4 Security Controls Applicability by Architecture Level**

Many security controls may be difficult or impossible to apply below Level 3 for most control systems. Note, however, that some system, Electronic Security Systems (ESS) in particular, may be able to meet many of these security controls below Level 3. For example, an air handler controller (with a user interface) may have only a 4-character password, or no password support at all. A door lock on an ESS may have a CAC reader.

## **F-2.5 Impact Level Applicability**

Only security controls for systems categorized with L-L-L (“LOW impact level”) and M-M-M (“MODERATE impact level”) are addressed by this Appendix and the CCI tables in APPENDIX G. The guidance provided for the baseline security controls is determined by the C-I-A impact level value for the control system:

- **L-L-L Baseline Security Controls:** Guidance is provided for a system categorized with a LOW impact value. These same security controls are also required for a system determined to have a MODERATE (or HIGH) impact level value, but additional security enhancements and implementation guidance may be required. When applying this guidance to MODERATE (or HIGH) impact systems, evaluate the guidance to determine if it applies or must be modified for the system.
- **M-M-M Baseline Security Controls:** Guidance is provided for a system categorized with a MODERATE impact value. These security controls aren’t used for LOW impact value systems. The guidance may not be the same for HIGH impact systems (using the same security controls).

The guidance in this Appendix and in the CCI tables in APPENDIX G is primarily targeted to LOW impact systems which are most capable of being addressed in a standard fashion. Care must be taken when extrapolating this guidance to systems with MODERATE or HIGH impact values.

## **F-3 GUIDANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **F-3.1 Access Control (AC) Control Family**

Design guidance for the Access Control (AC) control family is shown in Table F-1

Table F-1 Access Control (AC) Control Family

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
AC-2	<p><b>Account Management:</b> One significant issue is that many control system field devices cannot support accounts at the level of granularity required by the RMF. The UFGS defines three levels of support: NONE, MINIMAL, and FULL and then provides specific requirements for which devices must provide what level of support for accounts.</p> <p>Specify what account types provide which permissions in the control system (e.g. “view only”, “acknowledge alarms”, “change set-points”, etc.). Note that designer may need to explain these roles to the ISSM / ISSO so they can perform their DoD-defined duties under this control. Note that “accounts” (and particularly “temporary” or “emergency” accounts) likely exist at Level 4 and may or may not exist at Levels 1 or 2, depending on the control system type. (For example, many building control systems won’t have user accounts at these levels, but many utility control systems do). Designer may need to explain lack of “accounts” at Levels 1 and 2. Specifications should require that account activities be audited (logged), but auditing may be limited to software applications, and require notification be supported. Note that notification (e.g. email, rollup to another system) will generally require Platform Enclave or other Level 4 and Level 5 support for actual execution.</p>
AC-3	<p><b>Access Enforcement:</b> AC-3 is met by requiring the contractor to configure any control system component which has a STIG or SRG in accordance with that STIG or SRG”. The UFGS has additional specific requirements for computers and web servers.</p>
AC-4	<p><b>Information Flow Enforcement:</b> Information flow can be regulated by the IT organization at the FPOC. Level 2N devices exist that could be used at Level 2 to regulate flow (but they are not required in the UFGS). Similar Level 1N devices may exist. Include requirements in the specification that the installing contractor document necessary communications (to be used for “whitelisting”). If information flow enforcement at Level 2N is a requirement, include implementation requirements in the specification.</p>

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
AC-6	<p><b>Least Privilege:</b> Within the control system (as opposed to the Platform Enclave) least privilege should be met by specifications that limit functionality at the front end by user and roles (e.g., some users can only viewpoints, others can change values, etc.). Note the DoD definition of what requires explicit authorization includes (for a control system) everything – up to and including hardware. This may not be practical. Designer would need to ensure implementation via project specification requirements including physical security. Note also that AC-6 (2) requires that control system operators with access to privileged functions (via login to a privileged account) have a separate account when accessing non-privileged functions. This is probably not practical, or desirable for control system applications when considering the role that operators play (where it's impractical to expect an operator to log out and then back in to override a point, for example).</p>
AC-7	<p><b>Unsuccessful Logon Attempts:</b> Note that a requirement for a HIGH availability at the front end may preclude locking out an account for failed login attempts. This control may be impractical below Level 3 and, even at Level 4, may only be implemented by login to the OS as a prerequisite for access to the control system. Designer needs to identify where this can be supported and include requirements in the specification where this is needed. The UFGS groups interfaces by level of account support, then provides different requirements for each group.</p>
AC-8	<p><b>System Use Notification:</b> Login banners must be implemented at user login to government computers – e.g. at the Platform Enclave, Level 4 and Level 2 computers. User interfaces at Levels 0, 1 and 2 (e.g. Local Display Panels (LDP)) generally won't support a login banner. Require login banners where practical according to best industry practice and indicate where implementation is not practical. The UFGS allows for a permanently affixed label.</p>
AC-11 and AC-12	<p><b>Session Lock and Session Termination:</b> The whole notion of a "session" generally only makes sense at a computer (i.e., Level 4) and for the computer these controls should be implemented by the operating system and inherited from the Platform Enclave. At Level 1 and Level 2, devices generally lack user interfaces. Designers should require that devices with user interfaces (e.g. LDPs) be password protected and automatically log out a user after a certain period of inactivity.</p>

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
AC-14	<p><b>Permitted Actions Without Identification or Authentication:</b> At Level 4, all actions should require authentication to the (Windows) Operating System. User interfaces at Level 1 or 2 should be password protected. Note that this security control is specifically about user actions, not “processes acting for a user”. In most cases, this is met by virtue of the user having logged into a computer. Physical security may be required to deny access to devices and equipment and can be implemented at multiple levels through means such as lockable enclosures, tamper switches, room access control, people trap, and paper access logs.</p> <p>Some user interfaces may not sufficiently support authentication and necessary physical security should be considered. When considering physical security of such devices, it is generally not beneficial to secure an interface which is co-located with the controlled equipment without also securing the controlled equipment, as the equipment would remain vulnerable.</p>
AC-17	<p><b>Remote Access:</b> Remote access should be covered by the Platform Enclave (see general notes for AC control family).</p>
AC-18	<p><b>Wireless Access:</b> Wireless at Level 4 should be provided by the appropriate IT organization. Avoid wireless to the greatest extent possible at Levels 1 and 2. Wireless may be considered for retrofits where running wires would be prohibitive, but other technologies (such as powerline carrier) should be considered first. When permitting wireless, require extremely limited range such that signals are not available beyond the necessary ranges. In many cases Authentication and Encryption support will be marginal at Levels 1 and 2.</p>
AC-19	<p><b>Access Control for Mobile Devices:</b> Mobile devices refer to tablets, phones, etc. These are addressed at the Platform Enclave. When permitted they may be used as workstations for browser-based clients or may be restricted to receiving alerts/notifications from the control system.</p>
AC-20	<p><b>Use Of External Information Systems:</b> Connections from External systems, and portable storage, should all be handled at the Platform Enclave.</p>
AC-21	<p><b>Collaboration And Information Sharing:</b> Control systems typically shouldn’t share information. Any sharing is handled at the Platform Enclave.</p>
AC-22	<p><b>Publicly Accessible Content:</b> Control systems should not be publicly accessible.</p>

### F-3.2 Audit and Accountability (AU) Control Family

Auditing (in the cybersecurity sense) can typically only be performed at Level 4, although some Level 1 or 2 devices may provide limited auditing capability. Designer needs to require auditing where possible and be prepared to justify not auditing where it is simply impractical. Designer may provide input into what can be audited, where it can be audited, and what types of information may be gathered. It might make sense for these controls to be inherited from the Platform Enclave.

Design guidance for controls in the Audit and Accountability (AU) control family is shown in Table F-2.

**Table F-2 Audit and Accountability (AU) Control Family**

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
AU-2	<b>Audit Events:</b> No additional control-specific guidance. Use general control family guidance preceding this table for this control. The UFGS has extensive discussion of this, but not particularly definitive guidance.
AU-3	<b>Content Of Audit Records:</b> Note that this – particularly the “user” portion - may only be possible at Level 4
AU-4	<b>Audit Storage Capacity:</b> Long term audit storage will be at a computer at Level 4. Transfer from the control system to long term storage is likely a manual process, or perhaps scripted via by the computer operating system, but it is likely not an inherent feature of the control system. Designer needs to require that control system auditing can be accessed by operating system tools (e.g. control system supports or exports to standard file formats). The UFGS considers the possibility that there may be a separate computer specifically for audit storage and processing (review, analysis, reporting).
AU-5	<b>Response To Audit Processing Failures:</b> Notifications and specific actions may only be possible at Level 4.
AU-6	<b>Audit Review, Analysis, And Reporting:</b> No additional control-specific guidance. Use general control family guidance preceding this table for this control.
AU-7	<b>Audit Reduction and Report Generation:</b> Post-processing of audit logs can typically only be done by external tools at Level 4, but since the tools are specific to the control system audit log format, this will likely need to be met within the control system, not the Platform Enclave.



Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
AU-8	<b>Time Stamps:</b> Typically, the timing requirement inherent in the control system will be sufficient.
AU-9	<b>Protection Of Audit Information:</b> Can only be done at the Level 4 front end server or another computer. Audit logs must be stored (and protected) there.
AU-11	<b>Audit Record Retention:</b> No additional control-specific guidance. Use general control family guidance preceding this table for this control.
AU-12	<b>Audit Generation:</b> No additional control-specific guidance. Use general control family guidance preceding this table for this control. For UFGS content, see note on AU-2.

### F-3.3 Security Assessment and Authorization (CA) Control Family

Design guidance for controls in the Security Assessment and Authorization (CA) control family is shown in Table F-3.

**Table F-3 Security Assessment and Authorization (CA) Control Family**

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
CA-3	<b>System Interconnections:</b> Note this is about connections to other systems. These should be documented at the Platform Enclave. Specifications should define a specific protocol. The UFGS has an Interconnection Submittal.
CA-6	<b>Security Authorization:</b> The Authorizing Official is a senior-level executive or manager.
CA-9	<b>Internal System Connections:</b> The control system is a special purpose system. By design, only necessary connections should be allowed; typically this means use of a single specific protocol with limited capabilities. The specifications, points schedules, and network design document these controls. The UFGS has a submittal requirement if the standard controls submittals are insufficient.

**F-3.4 Configuration Management (CM) Control Family**

Design guidance for controls in the Configuration Management (CM) control family is shown in Table F-4.

**Table F-4 Configuration Management (CM) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>CM-2</b>	<p><b>Baseline Configuration:</b> This control is for a type accredited system. Typical control system contract submittals (drawings, software licenses, programmable controller “source code” etc.) should meet this CCI. Designer should assist in determining which devices are in areas of significant risk, and what additional configurations should be applied to those devices. Note that control systems (supporting fixed facilities) are not mobile.</p>
<b>CM-5</b>	<p><b>Access Restrictions for Change:</b> Much of the control system may be in space outside the organization’s control. May only apply at Level 4. See comments on PE Controls.</p>
<b>CM-6</b>	<p><b>Configuration Settings:</b> For the designer, this is largely ensuring that other security design requirements are included in the control system requirements document and that these requirements are verified during control system commissioning. Designer should ensure specifications disable unnecessary ports, protocols, and services. Note that the assumption that the control system is “automatically” compliant because of existing STIGs etc. is completely false below Level 3 and designer may need to provide justification for the control system not meeting the standard checklists. As a control system is designed to have regularly configurable parameters, documentation and approval for all changes to controllers at Levels 1 and 2 is not practical. Significant architectural configuration changes should still be documented and approved. See UFGS comment on CA-9.</p>
<b>CM-7</b>	<p><b>Least Functionality:</b> The control system has a specific purpose (not a general one), and its functions (and limitations) are specified by the control system architecture and protocols. Specifications should require disabling any ports/protocols/services not specifically needed by the control system. Required software should be covered by specification; all other software should be prohibited.</p>

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
CM-8	<b>Information System Component Inventory:</b> Initial configuration is specified by as-built documentation. In most cases automated tools for component inventory below Level 3 do not currently exist for many systems, although new tools may be available for systems in the future and should be implemented once available. See UFGS comment on CA-9.
CM-9 and CM-10	<b>Configuration Management Plan and Software Usage Restrictions:</b> Contract documents must require that the software licenses grant the Government the Rights in Technical Data to operate and maintain the systems and use the software as required.

### F-3.5 Contingency Planning (CP) Control Family

Design guidance for controls in the Contingency Planning (CP) control family is shown in Table F-5.

**Table F-5 Contingency Planning (CP) Control Control Family**

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
CP-2	<b>Contingency Plan:</b> Designer should assist in identifying critical control system assets supporting essential missions.
CP-6	<b>Alternate Storage Site:</b> For a control system, alternate storage only makes sense for backups and is at the Platform Enclave.
CP-7 and CP-8	<b>Alternate Processing Site and Telecommunications Services:</b> A PIT system can have an alternate front end (Level 4) and/or alternate connections from the front end to the lower levels, but you can't separate the control system from the controlled equipment – whatever site-wide incident disables the AHU controller will also disable the AHU. These controls only apply at the Platform Enclave (Level 4), and, when determining whether to apply them, note that the front end (Level 4) will typically have lower availability requirements than the field controls (Levels 1 and 2). If the requirements are for a redundant control system at the field control system, then redundant controlled equipment and/or redundant tenant spaces should be considered as well.
CP-9	<b>Information System Backup:</b> Backups at Level 4 / Platform Enclave only

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
CP-10	<p><b>Information System Recovery and Reconstitution:</b> Designer should require submittals containing data, documentation and software sufficient to restore the system to its final accepted as-built state. This must include custom programming and configuration for controllers or workstations. The UFGS has a specific submittal requirement.</p>
CP-12	<p><b>Safe Mode:</b> The designer should determine, based on the criticality of the controlled equipment, what conditions to consider and which actions, if any, the control system should take when these conditions are true. This should all be specified in the control logic (e.g. sequence of operations), in particular by addressing normal/failed positions of output devices, and in the overall system design. Where high reliability is required, the analysis should consider the addition of redundant equipment to the design. See also SC-24 and SI-17, and CHAPTER 4.</p>

### F-3.6 Identification and Authorization (IA) Control Family

Note that authenticators might be either physical authenticators (CAC cards, tokens, etc.), non-physical ones (such as passwords), or biometrics. While Level 4 (Platform Enclave) may use any of these, most control systems will not support anything other than passwords at Level 2 and below – and even password support may only allow for “weak” passwords (much of IA-5 will not be supported except at Level 4). Therefore, DoD defined requirements may not be appropriate at Level 2 or below. Note that ESS is an exception, ESS will likely support CAC or biometrics - for example a door swipe. Designer should specify where possible to standard/best industry practice and be prepared to defend that decision when it does not meet DoD IT-centric standards.

Design guidance for controls in the Identification and Authorization (IA) control family is shown in Table F-6.

Table F-6 Identification and Authorization (IA) Control Control Family

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
IA-2	<p><b>Identification And Authentication (Organizational Users):</b> Much of this can only be met at Level 4, and much of it depends on the computer operating system. Designer should provide specifications where possible and be prepared to justify non-implementation in the control system. Whenever possible, require that the control system (for access via a computer) support CAC (or similar) logins. Note that remote access is covered at the Platform Enclave. The UFGS defines these requirements by level of account support.</p>
IA-3	<p><b>Device Identification and Authentication:</b> Much of this can only be met at Level 4, and much of it depends on the computer operating system. Typically, authentication between devices can be implemented between computers (Level 2 and 4) or between network hardware (Level 2, 3 or 4). Authentication may be supported between controllers, where not all controllers will support this capability and it will be more often supported at Level 4 than at Level 2.</p> <p>In general, device authentication between controllers will not be required, for LOW impact system. Even in MODERATE or HIGH, ensure that it can be met before requiring it. Exercise care before requiring non-standard control hardware and software in order to meet this requirement.</p> <p>Designer should provide specifications requiring authentication where possible and be prepared to justify non-implementation in the control system.</p> <p>The UFGS requires (in some cases) use of HTTPS. It also calls for use of 802.1x in some cases, but strongly cautions against it in most cases.</p>
IA-5	<p><b>Authenticator Management:</b> The DoD-defined password complexity values may be impractical for control system components to meet. Specify password complexity at DoD-defined values where practical. The UFGS discusses this and provides some guidance.</p> <p>Require that default passwords be changed from defaults, and that passwords are submitted in a secure manner. For PKI systems, certificate paths should be provided by the Platform Enclave.</p>
IA-6 and IA-7	<p><b>Authenticator Feedback and Cryptographic Module Authentication:</b> Almost certainly Platform Enclave only and not supported below that level. Designer may need to provide input/justification for this. The UFGS discusses the use of feedback and provides guidance in the unlikely case that Cryptographic Modules are required.</p>

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
IA-8	<b>Identification And Authentication (Non-Organizational Users):</b> As this deals with non-organizational users, this control generally doesn't apply to control systems other than some ESS. This may be addressed by the Platform Enclave (via computer login requirements).

### F-3.7 Incident Response (IR) Control Family

Note that the definition of "incident" includes non-security related failures. A broken fan belt is an incident, as is a sticking valve, or an out-of-calibration sensor. The designer may need to provide input to the incident response plan to address any control system-specific actions. For example, the response to a successful attack on the front end might be to place equipment in Manual / Hand operation.

### F-3.8 Maintenance (MA) Control Family

Design guidance for controls in the Maintenance (MA) control family is shown in Table F-7.

**Table F-7 Maintenance (MA) Control Control Family**

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
MA-3	<b>Maintenance Tools:</b> Require that control system maintenance tools (software or hardware required to maintain the control system – most commonly engineering tool software) be provided. The UFGS requires this for MODERATE impact systems.
MA-4	<b>Nonlocal Maintenance:</b> This is met through operating system login for the use of the engineering tool maintenance software.

### F-3.9 Media Protection (MP) Control Family

Media Protection is addressed only at the Platform Enclave.

Design guidance for controls in the Media Protection (MP) control family is shown in Table F-8.

**Table F-8 Media Protection (MP) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>MP-5</b>	<p><b>Media Transport:</b> CCI-001027 (MP-5 (4)) places a requirement on the control system, but only when the control system is outside a “controlled area” where “controlled area” is defined in CCI-001016 as areas approved for processing the information. By definition, an area must be approved for processing the information necessary for the control systems in that area. For transportation outside that area, the data would have to be encrypted by tools provided by the Platform Enclave.</p>

**F-3.10 Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) Control Family**

Note that control systems are often distributed, with large portions of the system being in spaces outside the control of the organization. This impacts many of the PE controls, in particular PE-16 can only be met for spaces controlled by the organization. In general, these are met at the Platform Enclave, but implementation may be spotty below that. Designer should require locked rooms where possible. Level 4, 3, and 2N equipment should either be in locked rooms or locked enclosures. Level 2, Level 1 and Level 0 equipment will frequently be located in tenant spaces and outside the control of the organization. For some systems, it may be necessary to require lockable enclosures for some controllers at Level 2 and Level 1, but this must be weighed against the need for maintenance personnel to access the equipment. In general, there is little benefit in requiring lockable enclosures for controllers when the underlying equipment is readily accessible from the controller location.

Most of the control system is not in “normal” server spaces. For the normal server spaces, PE requirements will be met at the Platform Enclave. For the remainder of the control system, PE requirements (such as PE-14’s temperature and humidity requirements) are either N/A or are covered by design specifications. Note that NIST guidance states that several PEs (PE-10, PE-12, PE-13, PE-14, and PE-15) only apply at major server rooms, not individual components. These are covered by the Platform Enclave and are N/A in the control system. Design guidance for controls in the Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) control family is shown in Table F-9.

**Table F-9 Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>PE-4</b>	<b>Access Control for Transmission Medium:</b> Designer should require physical security for network media and may need to coordinate with electrical designer for conduit requirements. Note that physical security may be required outside spaces controlled by the organization as well. See SC-8.
<b>PE-5</b>	<b>Access Control for Output Devices:</b> Note that “physical outputs” for a control system correspond to the location of the controlled equipment, which must also be secured so there are unlikely to be additional requirements for the control system components
<b>PE-9</b>	<b>Power Equipment and Cabling:</b> For systems requiring redundant power, designer should coordinate with electrical designer. Note that the weak link in reliability will often be the controlled equipment. For example, if a single backup generator is needed, a system with 2 generators - each with a single controller - will be more reliable than a single generator with redundant controllers. Note that, for a control system, redundant power to controllers is pointless without redundant power to the controlled system. In many cases, redundant controlled equipment (N+1 equipment design) may be required. The UFGS has an extensive designer note on this topic.
<b>PE-11</b>	<b>Emergency Power:</b> Within the control system, require an uninterruptible power supply (UPS), either in the control system specification or by coordination with electrical specification, when backup power is required. At the front end, this could either be met by the Platform Enclave, or by control system specification requirements also. For the majority of LOW impact systems, this control will not be implemented. See UFGS comment for PE-9.
<b>PE-16</b>	<b>Delivery And Removal:</b> No additional control-specific guidance. Use general control family guidance preceding this table for this control.
<b>PE-17</b>	<b>Alternate Work Site:</b> PE-17 can’t be applied except at Level 4 – there is no possible “alternate work site” for PIT. This is all at the Platform Enclave.

**F-3.11 Planning (PL) Control Family**

Design guidance for controls in the Planning (PL) control family is shown in Table F-10.



**Table F-10 Planning (PL) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>PL-2</b>	<b>System Security Plan:</b> While the designer is not directly responsible for the system security plan itself, the design must provide information to be used in this plan. For example, the system architecture drawing is part of the definition of the authorization boundary. The designer may also provide input for the security categorization since they have the specific knowledge of the underlying mechanical/electrical systems and can help assess the impact of those systems on control system tenants. The UFGS covers this with a Cybersecurity Riser Diagram submittal.
<b>PL-4</b>	<b>Rules Of Behavior:</b> As indicated in CHAPTER 4, social media should be completely inaccessible from the control system.
<b>PL-7</b>	<b>Security Concept of Operations:</b> Designer needs to provide input to a security concept of operations since the range of possible operations is defined by the underlying equipment, sequences of operation, selection of controllers, and front-end capabilities.
<b>PL-8</b>	<b>Information Security Architecture:</b> System architecture submittals are necessary inputs to the security architecture. Dependencies on external services should be minimal, if any.

**F-3.12 Program Management (PM) Control Family**

Generally, the designer does not get involved in project planning; therefore the PM controls are not a primary designer responsibility, but designer may need to provide input to support others.

Design guidance for controls in the Program Management (PM) control family is shown in Table F-11.

**Table F-11 Program Management (PM) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>PM-3</b>	<b>Information Security Resources:</b> See General Guidance for PM Control Family and SA-2.
<b>PM-5</b>	<b>Information System Inventory:</b> Initial inventory is provided by as-built bill of materials.
<b>PM-11</b>	<b>Mission/Business Process Definition:</b> Calls for "...an achievable set of protection needs are obtained" and may require designer input.

**F-3.13 Personnel Security (PS) Control Family**

None of the Personnel Security controls are the responsibility of the designer.

**F-3.14 Risk Assessment (RA) Control Family**

By and large, the implementation of the RA controls is outside the responsibility of the designer.

Design guidance for controls in the Risk Assessment (RA) control family is shown in Table F-12.

Table F-12 Risk Assessment (RA) Control Family

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
RA-3	<b>Risk Assessment:</b> The designer is well versed in the control system and the underlying mechanical / electrical system and may therefore need to assist in identifying risks to the tenants served by the control system.
RA-5	<b>Vulnerability Scanning:</b> Scanning can be performed at Levels 3 and 4 and scanning of the control system at this level should be performed by the Platform Enclave. Scanning below this level – and particularly at Level 1 - is not supported by standard IT-centric tools but is supported by standard control system tools. Most control system software provides a tool which can probe the control system network and generate a map of the control system; this process corresponds to Vulnerability Scanning. Note that scanning tools should be within the Platform Enclave, scanning from outside the Platform Enclave just opens up a hole for an attacker. Designer may need to provide input to organizations attempting to meet RA-5. See SC-7, SI-3

**F-3.15 System and Services Acquisition (SA) Control Family**

The NIST description of “External information services” (SA-9) makes it clear that it’s an “external information system” not “external services (e.g. contractor) on this information system”

Design guidance for controls in the System and Services Acquisition (SA) control family is shown in Table F-13.

**Table F-13 System and Services Acquisition (SA) Control Family**

<b>Security Control ID</b>	<b>Security Control Name and Design Guidance</b>
<b>SA-2</b>	<b>Allocation Of Resources:</b> Designer may need to provide input to this process. See PM-3
<b>SA-4</b>	<b>Acquisition Process:</b> SA-4 is at least partially met by the designer incorporating security-specific requirements in the design, including acceptance testing. Requirements for FIPS PUB 201-2 may only apply at the Platform Enclave and designer may need to provide rationale for not meeting those requirements in the control system. Similarly, many of the requirements on the developer probably cannot be enforced on a COTS system. ESS systems may need to meet FIPS PUB 201-2 at Levels 1 and 2. The UFGS has extensive requirements for Cybersecurity during construction to prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited during construction to create exploits after acceptance.
<b>SA-5</b>	<b>Information System Documentation:</b> Designer should require submittals providing the documentation which is required by these CCIs. Note that some of the required documentation may not be obtainable, particularly for a COTS system. The UFGS has a submittal that covers this, but the requirements are limited by what is practical.
<b>SA-9</b>	<b>External Information System Services:</b> In general, control systems should not use external IS, so this control should not apply. Where it does, it should be addressed at the Platform Enclave.
<b>SA-10 and SA-11</b>	<b>Developer Configuration Management and Developer Security Testing and Evaluation:</b> SA-10, SA-11 are likely impossible for COTS systems. Designer needs to specify what can be specified (which will often require additional submittals) and explain what can't be specified. Note that the control assumes the developer has a role during implementation and/or operation – this is often not true.

**F-3.16 System and Communications Protection (SC) Control Family**

Design guidance for controls in the System and Services Acquisition (SA) control family is shown in Table F-14.

Table F-14 System and Communications Protection (SC) Control Family

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
SC-2	<b>Application Partitioning:</b> This is met by separating out computer administration and by design specifications that require different user permissions within the control system (e.g. “view data” vs “modify data”).
SC-4	<b>Information In Shared Resources:</b> Typically the control system will all be dedicated hardware and software, so there are no shared resources. This control might have some applicability at Level 4 if computer resources are shared.
SC-5	<b>Denial Of Service Protection:</b> Within the control system, denial of service attacks are mitigated by designing the system to not depend on the network or on computers. Otherwise, this is a Platform Enclave control. The UFGS has specific requirements for this (though they are sometimes caveated with “... whenever possible...”). The UFGS combines these requirements with SC-7 and SC-39 under “System and Communication Protection”.
SC-7	<b>Boundary Protection:</b> Implementation at the external boundary should be the responsibility of the Platform Enclave. The Platform Enclave can perform monitoring/traffic control at Level 3, and perhaps key points near Level 4 assets. Aside from those locations, this control may be difficult to meet within the control system. Designer may need to provide justification for not monitoring or controlling traffic below Level 3. It may not be prudent for the control system to fail to a “secure” state after loss of a boundary protection device since this allows an attack vector to disable controlled equipment by taking out the boundary device. Control systems must continue to run independently when boundary devices are lost. See CP-12 comments and RA-5, SI-3, SC-24. The UFGS combines these requirements with SC-5.
SC-8	<b>Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity:</b> Note that NIST guidance suggests this only applies to information outside a secure physical boundary, and that, when this control cannot be met, alternate physical security safeguards such as a protected distribution system can be employed.
SC-10	<b>Network Disconnect:</b> Data within a control system is often communicated without setting up a “session”. Most control systems will not use sessions other than for communications within Level 4.

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
SC-12	<b>Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management:</b> Below Level 4, control systems support for cryptographic keys is extremely limited and it is impractical to implement many of these controls. The UFGS discusses use of HTTPS but suggests that other cryptography is seldom required.
SC-13	<b>Cryptographic Protection:</b> Note that NIST states this control does not require cryptography, it merely provides requirements for the implementation of cryptography where it is required. The vast majority of control systems should not have any information requiring the use of cryptography (and in the few cases where it is even possible, the designer should review whether it is really necessary for the control system to have this information). For UFGS comments, see SC-12.
SC-15	<b>Collaborative Computing Devices:</b> In general, control systems shouldn't use collaborative computing devices.
SC-18	<b>Mobile Code:</b> This control can and should be fully applied at Level 4. Below that, there's an important distinction between "mobile code" and "mobile code technologies": Java is a "mobile code technology" used by many control systems at Level 2 (and possibly other Levels), but Java should not be used as "mobile code" – which is code that is downloaded and executed without explicit user action. So, while mobile code technologies may be permissible below Level 4, mobile code should not be. Mobile code restrictions within the control system should be covered by design specifications.  For example, common building control system products use Java, and serve web pages to clients. These pages do not constitute mobile code. Downloading a Java application, however, would be an example of mobile code.
SC-21 and SC-22	<b>Secure Name /Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver) and Architecture and Provisioning for Name / Address Resolution Service:</b> These controls apply only at the Platform Enclave.
SC-23	<b>Session Authenticity:</b> See comments on SC-10.
SC-24	<b>Fail In Known State:</b> What is key here is the status of controlled equipment after a control system failure. Designer should specify this where necessary. Note that the DoD requirement of a "secure state" may not be applicable and would be superseded by a "safe state", or by a "support the mission" state. Data preserved through a failure may be limited by the nature of the control system and designer should specify what is reasonable. See CP-12.

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
SC-28	<b>Protection Of Information at Rest:</b> Note that many (if not most) control systems will not have any data requiring protection at rest since they will not have PII or classified data. Note, however, that Electronic Security Systems will often require protection of data at rest.
SC-39	<b>Process Isolation:</b> For control systems controlling multiple systems, a distributed control system meets this. See comment on SC-5.
SC-41	<b>Port And I/O Device Access:</b> See comments on CM-7. The UFGS has a Network Communication Report submittal which covers this, as well as requirements under “Least Functionality”

**F-3.17 System and Information Integrity (SI) Control Family**

Design guidance for controls in the System and Information Integrity (SI) control family is shown in Table F-.

**Table F-15 System and Information Integrity (SI) Control Family**

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
SI-2	<b>Flaw Remediation:</b> SI-2 is about security updates and patches for software and firmware. While this can (and should) be applied at Level 3 and Level 4, this control may be largely “not applicable” or “impractical” below Level 3, due to both the relative infrequency of available updates and also the difficulty of patching controllers at Level 1 and 2. This is also largely irrelevant at Level 1 and 2, since it completely ignores flaws in the underlying equipment, which are likely to be much more common and much more significant. The UFGS requires security related software updates and patches.
SI-3	<b>Malicious Code Protection:</b> Should be implemented by the Platform Enclave at entry/exit points. Periodic scans within the control system may be difficult and the designer may need to justify their non-implementation. See RA-5, SC-7. The UFGS requires that computers meet the STIGS.

Security Control ID	Security Control Name and Design Guidance
SI-4	<b>Information System Monitoring:</b> Data collected can only be preserved at the Platform Enclave. Designer should provide input to monitoring objectives and methods based on the control system, the underlying mechanical/electrical system, and the impact on tenants. Note that this is not about operational monitoring of the control system (e.g. viewing graphics, receiving alarms), but about monitoring for security. The UFGS has a placeholder for this, but no default requirements.
SI-7	<b>Software, Firmware, And Information Integrity:</b> Integrity verification tools may only be possible at Level 4. Designer should provide input on what is reasonable based on the control system capabilities, and where this control is not feasible.
SI-10	<b>Information Input Validation:</b> This could cover network data, sensor input, or input from a user. Designer could require additional sanity checks on sensor input, or redundant sensors. User input validation would likely need to be addressed by policy. Network validation may not be possible except at Level 4.
SI-11	<b>Error Handling:</b> Designer should require alarm messages and other control system feedback to meet this. Note that the DoD definition of recipients is not applicable for a control system.
SI-16	<b>Memory Protection:</b> Memory Protection only makes sense at Level 4.
SI-17	<b>Fail-Safe Procedures:</b> See SC-24 and CP-12 comments, where failure is one of the conditions to consider.



## APPENDIX G CONTROL CORRELATION IDENTIFIER (CCI) TABLES

### G-1 INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides a number of tables which help classify the CCIs for a LOW or MODERATE system on a DoD installation where there is a separate authorization for the Platform Enclave and the minimum cybersecurity design requirements have been followed.

### G-2 TABLE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

Within each table, the following columns are defined. Note that not all tables use all columns:

- **CCI:** The CCI number.
- **NIST SP 800-53 Control Text Indicator:** NIST SP 800-53 breaks individual controls (i.e., single Control IDs) down into multiple elements and enhancements, where an enhancement is a more stringent requirement than the base control. The Control Text Indicator uniquely identifies each of these elements and enhancements. A letter indicates an element within a control, a number is an enhancement. For example, “AC-17 (4)(b)” is the second element of the fourth enhancement to AC-17.
- **CCI Definition:** The definition of the CCI.
- **Applies At or Above Impact:** This CCI should be applied if the control system impact is this or above.
- **Table Reference:** Indicated which other table(s) in this Appendix the CCI is found in.
- **Applicable to a Control System:** Is this CCI applicable to a control system?
- **Rational for non-inclusion:** Reason the CCI is not applicable to control systems
- **Rational for Removal from a LOW Baseline:** Reason the CCI should be removed from the baseline for a LOW impact control system.
- **Responsibility:** Indicates who has responsibility for implementing the control. One or more of:
  - **DoD-Defined:** Either the DoD has provided a value for the “organization selected” values, or the DoD implementation guidance states that the CCI is already met by existing policy or regulation. **Note that definition or guidance provided may not be relevant for a control system – the organization definitions were determined from the perspective of a traditional information system, not for a control system.**
  - **Designer:** The designer has a role to address for this CCI. Either the designer needs to provide design specifications to cover a

requirement on the control system itself, or the designer must provide input to others regarding the implementation or lack of feasibility of the CCI (typically because the CCI was written with an IT system, not a control system, in mind).

- **Non-Designer:** The CCI is beyond the responsibility of the designer and is the responsibility of someone else – typically the System Owner (SO). This does not diminish the importance of these CCIs, but as these CCIs are not the responsibility of the designer they are beyond the scope of this UFC.
- **Platform Enclave:** The CCI contains a requirement which is assumed to be implemented at the Platform Enclave and inherited by the control system or is mostly implemented at the Platform Enclave but also needed within the field control system. Note that if there is no Platform Enclave, then CCIs listed in the “Platform Enclave” category are instead in the “Non-Designer” category.
- **Impractical:** The CCI is impractical to fully implement in a control system but may be applied in a limited manner to at least some part of the control system. Most often CCIs that can be applied to only part of the control system can be implemented at Level 4 of the architecture but would be prohibitively difficult to implement at Levels 1 or 2. Note that “prohibitively” is a judgment based on a typical LOW control system – for a MODERATE or HIGH system, it may be worthwhile to implement these controls at all possible levels even if this adds significant cost and complexity.

## G-3 CCI TABLE NOTES

### G-3.1 Controls Inherited from Platform Enclave

Note that not all controls that can be inherited from the Platform Enclave have **necessarily** been identified as such -- some controls labeled “Non-Designer” may in fact be implemented at the Platform Enclave and the control system inherits from that.

### G-3.2 CCIs in Multiple Tables

Note that some CCIs will appear in multiple tables, typically “Designer and Platform Enclave” or “Platform Enclave and Other”. For example, scanning (RA-5) should happen at the Platform Enclave level and not in the control system. But the designer may need to provide input to the selection of scanning tools appropriate for the control system. The purpose of these tables is to break down the responsibilities for each control such that a specific individual/role would not be required to look at all the tables to determine what needs to be done.

**G-4 CCI TABLE DESCRIPTIONS**

Multiple CCI tables are included in this Appendix, each including CCIs that meet certain characteristics as described. An electronic version of the CCI tables in Excel format is available at the RMF Knowledge Service website.

- **Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems** summarizes all the CCIs that can be applied to a MODERATE or lower control system, based on NIST 800-82. This table also indicates which other tables each CCI can be found in.
- **Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)** lists CCIs that (assuming the minimum cybersecurity requirements in CHAPTER 4 have been met) never apply to a control system and provides a rationale for not using them.
- **Table G-3 CCIs Removed from LOW Impact Control Systems Baseline** lists CCIs that NIST 800-82 includes in the LOW baseline, but do not apply to a LOW control system, and provides a rationale. Note that CCIs here are listed as LOW but aren't used at LOW.
- **Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems** lists CCIs that should be addressed in design for both LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems. In many cases, guidance on addressing specific security controls in design is provided in APPENDIX F.
- **Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems** lists CCIs (in addition to those shown in **Table G-4**) that should be addressed in design of MODERATE Impact Systems. In many cases, guidance on addressing specific security controls in design is provided in APPENDIX F.
- Similar to Designer CCIs in **Table G-4** and **Table G-5**, **Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems** and **Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems** list CCIs in the "Platform Enclave" category. While implementation of the Platform Enclave is not the designer's responsibility (a key point of the Platform Enclave is that it is a standard approach that can be implemented across multiple control systems), those responsible for the Platform Enclave need to be aware of CCIs that the control system expects to inherit from the Platform Enclave

**G-5 CCI TABLES**

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002107	AC-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002108	AC-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000001	AC-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000002	AC-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000004	AC-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000005	AC-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001545	AC-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000003	AC-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001546	AC-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000006	AC-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002110	AC-2(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002111	AC-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002112	AC-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000008	AC-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002113	AC-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002115	AC-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002116	AC-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002117	AC-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002118	AC-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002119	AC-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002120	AC-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000010	AC-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002121	AC-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000011	AC-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002122	AC-2(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002123	AC-2(h)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002124	AC-2(h)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002125	AC-2(h)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002126	AC-2(i)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002127	AC-2(i)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002128	AC-2(i)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000012	AC-2(j)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001547	AC-2(j)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002129	AC-2(k)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000015	AC-2(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001361	AC-2(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001365	AC-2(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001682	AC-2(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000016	AC-2(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000017	AC-2(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000217	AC-2(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000018	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001403	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002130	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001404	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001405	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001683	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001684	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002132	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001685	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001686	AC-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002131	AC-2(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002133	AC-2(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000019	AC-2(5)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001406	AC-2(5)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001358	AC-2(7)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001407	AC-2(7)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001360	AC-2(7)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002136	AC-2(7)(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002137	AC-2(7)(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002140	AC-2(9)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002141	AC-2(9)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002142	AC-2(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002146	AC-2(12)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002147	AC-2(12)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002148	AC-2(12)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002149	AC-2(12)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002150	AC-2(13)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002151	AC-2(13)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000213	AC-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002163	AC-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002164	AC-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002165	AC-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001368	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001414	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001548	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001549	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001550	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001551	AC-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002219	AC-5(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000036	AC-5(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001380	AC-5(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002220	AC-5(c)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000225	AC-6	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001558	AC-6(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002221	AC-6(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002222	AC-6(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002223	AC-6(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000039	AC-6(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001419	AC-6(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002226	AC-6(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002227	AC-6(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002228	AC-6(7)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002229	AC-6(7)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002230	AC-6(7)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002231	AC-6(7)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002232	AC-6(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002233	AC-6(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002234	AC-6(9)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002235	AC-6(10)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000043	AC-7(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000044	AC-7(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001423	AC-7(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002236	AC-7(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002237	AC-7(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002238	AC-7(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002247	AC-8(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000048	AC-8(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002243	AC-8(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002244	AC-8(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002245	AC-8(a)(3)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002246	AC-8(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000050	AC-8(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002248	AC-8(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001384	AC-8(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001385	AC-8(c)(2)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001386	AC-8(c)(2)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001387	AC-8(c)(2)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001388	AC-8(c)(3)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000054	AC-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000055	AC-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002252	AC-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000059	AC-11(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000058	AC-11(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000057	AC-11(a)	MOD	None (Not Categorized)	
CCI-000056	AC-11(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000060	AC-11(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002360	AC-12	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002361	AC-12	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000061	AC-14(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000232	AC-14(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002256	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002257	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002258	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002259	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002260	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002261	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002262	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002263	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002264	AC-16(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002265	AC-16(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002266	AC-16(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002267	AC-16(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002268	AC-16(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002269	AC-16(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002270	AC-16(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002271	AC-16(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002291	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002292	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002293	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002294	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002295	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002296	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002297	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002298	AC-16(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000063	AC-17(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002310	AC-17(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002311	AC-17(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002312	AC-17(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000065	AC-17(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000067	AC-17(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002314	AC-17(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000068	AC-17(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001453	AC-17(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001561	AC-17(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002315	AC-17(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000069	AC-17(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000070	AC-17(4)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002316	AC-17(4)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002317	AC-17(4)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002318	AC-17(4)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002319	AC-17(4)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002320	AC-17(4)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000072	AC-17(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002321	AC-17(9)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002322	AC-17(9)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001438	AC-18(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002323	AC-18(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001439	AC-18(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001441	AC-18(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001443	AC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001444	AC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001449	AC-18(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002324	AC-18(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000082	AC-19(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002325	AC-19(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002326	AC-19(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000083	AC-19(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000084	AC-19(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002329	AC-19(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002331	AC-19(5)	MOD	None (Not Categorized)	
CCI-002330	AC-19(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002332	AC-10(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000093	AC-20(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002333	AC-20(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002334	AC-20(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002335	AC-20(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE



<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002336	AC-20(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002337	AC-20(1)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000097	AC-20(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002338	AC-20(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	???
CCI-000098	AC-21(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001470	AC-21(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001471	AC-21(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001472	AC-21(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001473	AC-22(a)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001474	AC-22(b)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001475	AC-22(c)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001476	AC-22(d)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001477	AC-22(d)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001478	AC-22(e)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002048	AT-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002049	AT-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000100	AT-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000101	AT-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000103	AT-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000104	AT-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000102	AT-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001564	AT-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000105	AT-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001565	AT-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001480	AT-2	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000106	AT-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000112	AT-2(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001479	AT-2(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002055	AT-2(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000108	AT-3(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000109	AT-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000110	AT-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000111	AT-3(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001568	AT-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002051	AT-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001566	AT-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001567	AT-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002054	AT-3(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002053	AT-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000113	AT-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000114	AT-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001336	AT-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001337	AT-4(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001930	AU-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001931	AU-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000117	AU-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001832	AU-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000120	AU-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001834	AU-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000119	AU-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001569	AU-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000122	AU-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001570	AU-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000123	AU-2(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001571	AU-2(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000124	AU-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000125	AU-2(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001485	AU-2(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001484	AU-2(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000126	AU-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000127	AU-2(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001486	AU-2(3)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-000130	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000131	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000132	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000133	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000134	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001487	AU-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001488	AU-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000135	AU-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001848	AU-4	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001849	AU-4	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001851	AU-4(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001850	AU-4(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000139	AU-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001572	AU-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000140	AU-5(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001490	AU-5(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001855	AU-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001852	AU-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001853	AU-5(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001854	AU-5(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000148	AU-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000151	AU-6(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001862	AU-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000149	AU-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001863	AU-6(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001864	AU-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001865	AU-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000153	AU-6(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000154	AU-6(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001872	AU-6(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001874	AU-6(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001875	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001876	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001877	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001878	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001879	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001880	AU-7(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001881	AU-7(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001882	AU-7(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000158	AU-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001883	AU-7(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000159	AU-8(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001889	AU-8(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001890	AU-8(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001888	AU-8(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001891	AU-8(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001892	AU-8(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002046	AU-8(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000161	AU-8(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001492	AU-8(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000162	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000163	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000164	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001493	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001494	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001495	AU-9	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001894	AU-9(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001351	AU-9(4)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001899	AU-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000166	AU-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000167	AU-11	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000168	AU-11	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002044	AU-11(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002045	AU-11(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000169	AU-12(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001459	AU-12(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000171	AU-12(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001910	AU-12(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000172	AU-12(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001577	AU-12(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000174	AU-12(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000173	AU-12(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001914	AU-12(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002047	AU-12(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001913	AU-12(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001911	AU-12(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001912	AU-12(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001919	AU-14(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001464	AU-14(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001462	AU-14(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001920	AU-14(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002061	CA-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002062	CA-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000239	CA-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000240	CA-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000242	CA-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000243	CA-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000238	CA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000241	CA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000244	CA-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001578	CA-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000245	CA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000246	CA-2(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000247	CA-2(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000248	CA-2(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002070	CA-2(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000251	CA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000252	CA-2(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000253	CA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000254	CA-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002071	CA-2(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000255	CA-2(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002063	CA-2(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000257	CA-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000259	CA-3(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000260	CA-3(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002083	CA-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002084	CA-3(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000258	CA-3(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002072	CA-3(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002073	CA-3(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000262	CA-3(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002081	CA-3(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002082	CA-3(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002080	CA-3(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000264	CA-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000265	CA-5(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000266	CA-5(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000270	CA-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000271	CA-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000273	CA-6(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000272	CA-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000274	CA-7	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002087	CA-7(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002088	CA-7(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002089	CA-7(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000279	CA-7(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002090	CA-7(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002091	CA-7(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002092	CA-7(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000281	CA-7(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001581	CA-7(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000280	CA-7(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000282	CA-7(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002085	CA-7(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002101	CA-9(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002103	CA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002104	CA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002105	CA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002102	CA-9(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001821	CM-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001824	CM-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000287	CM-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001822	CM-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000290	CM-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001825	CM-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000289	CM-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000286	CM-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000292	CM-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001584	CM-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000293	CM-2	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000295	CM-2	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000296	CM-2(1)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001497	CM-2(1)(a)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-000297	CM-2(1)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001585	CM-2(1)(b)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-000298	CM-2(1)(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000299	CM-2(1)(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000304	CM-2(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001736	CM-2(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001737	CM-2(7)a	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001738	CM-2(7)a	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001739	CM-2(7)a	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001815	CM-2(7)b	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001816	CM-2(7)b	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000313	CM-3(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001740	CM-3(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000314	CM-3(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001741	CM-3(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001819	CM-3(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000316	CM-3(e)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002056	CM-3(e)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000318	CM-3(f)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000319	CM-3(g)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000320	CM-3(g)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000321	CM-3(g)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001586	CM-3(g)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000327	CM-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000328	CM-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000329	CM-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000332	CM-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001745	CM-3(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001746	CM-3(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000333	CM-4	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001817	CM-4(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001818	CM-4(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000338	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000339	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000340	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000341	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000342	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000343	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000344	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000345	CM-5	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001813	CM-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001814	CM-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000349	CM-5(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000348	CM-5(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000350	CM-5(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001826	CM-5(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001753	CM-5(5)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001754	CM-5(5)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001827	CM-5(5)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001828	CM-5(5)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001829	CM-5(5)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001830	CM-5(5)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001499	CM-5(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000363	CM-6(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000364	CM-6(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000365	CM-6(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000366	CM-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001755	CM-6(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001756	CM-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000367	CM-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000368	CM-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000369	CM-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001502	CM-6(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001503	CM-6(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001588	CM-6(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002059	CM-6(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000370	CM-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000371	CM-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000372	CM-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000382	CM-7(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000380	CM-7(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000381	CM-7(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000384	CM-7(1)(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001760	CM-7(1)(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001761	CM-7(1)(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001762	CM-7(1)(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001592	CM-7(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001763	CM-7(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001764	CM-7(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000388	CM-7(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000387	CM-7(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001772	CM-7(5)a	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001773	CM-7(5)a	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001774	CM-7(5)b	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001775	CM-7(5)c	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001777	CM-7(5)c	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000395	CM-8(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000399	CM-8(a)(4)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001779	CM-8(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001780	CM-8(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000389	CM-8(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000392	CM-8(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000398	CM-8(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000408	CM-8(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000409	CM-8(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000410	CM-8(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000411	CM-8(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000412	CM-8(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000413	CM-8(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000414	CM-8(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000415	CM-8(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000416	CM-8(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001783	CM-8(3)(b)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-001784	CM-8(3)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000419	CM-8(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000421	CM-9(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000423	CM-9(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001790	CM-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001792	CM-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001793	CM-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001795	CM-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000426	CM-9(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001796	CM-9(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001798	CM-9(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001799	CM-9(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001801	CM-9(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000424	CM-9(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001726	CM-10(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001727	CM-10(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001728	CM-10(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001729	CM-10(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001730	CM-10(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001802	CM-10(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001803	CM-10(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001731	CM-10(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001732	CM-10(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001733	CM-10(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE



<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001734	CM-10(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001735	CM-10(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001804	CM-11(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001805	CM-11(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001806	CM-11(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001807	CM-11(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001808	CM-11(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001809	CM-11(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001812	CM-11(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002825	CP-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000438	CP-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000439	CP-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002826	CP-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000441	CP-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001597	CP-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000437	CP-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000440	CP-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001596	CP-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001598	CP-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000443	CP-2(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-000444	CP-2(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000445	CP-2(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000446	CP-2(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000447	CP-2(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000448	CP-2(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000449	CP-2(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000450	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-000451	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000452	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-000453	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000454	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-000455	CP-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000456	CP-2(a)(5)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000457	CP-2(a)(6)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002830	CP-2(a)(6)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000458	CP-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000459	CP-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000460	CP-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000461	CP-2(d)	LOW		TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000462	CP-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000463	CP-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000464	CP-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000465	CP-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000466	CP-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000468	CP-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002831	CP-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002832	CP-2(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000469	CP-2(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000473	CP-2(3)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-000474	CP-2(3)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000475	CP-2(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000476	CP-2(3)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002828	CP-2(8)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002829	CP-2(8)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002833	CP-3(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000486	CP-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002834	CP-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000485	CP-3(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000487	CP-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000490	CP-4(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000492	CP-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000494	CP-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000496	CP-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000497	CP-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000498	CP-4(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000505	CP-6(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002836	CP-6(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000507	CP-6(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000509	CP-6(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001604	CP-6(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000510	CP-7(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000513	CP-7(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000514	CP-7(a)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002839	CP-7(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000515	CP-7(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000521	CP-7(c)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000516	CP-7(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000517	CP-7(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001606	CP-7(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000518	CP-7(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000522	CP-8	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000523	CP-8	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000524	CP-8	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000525	CP-8	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002840	CP-8	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002841	CP-8	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000526	CP-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000527	CP-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000528	CP-8(1)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000529	CP-8(1)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000530	CP-8(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000534	CP-9(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000535	CP-9(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000536	CP-9(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000537	CP-9(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000538	CP-9(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000539	CP-9(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000540	CP-9(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000541	CP-9(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000542	CP-9(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000547	CP-9(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000548	CP-9(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000550	CP-10	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000551	CP-10	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000552	CP-10	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000553	CP-10(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002855	CP-12	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002856	CP-12	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002857	CP-12	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001933	IA-1(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001934	IA-1(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000756	IA-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000757	IA-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001932	IA-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000760	IA-1(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000761	IA-1(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000758	IA-1(b)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000759	IA-1(b)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000762	IA-1(b)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000763	IA-1(b)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000764	IA-2	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000765	IA-2(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000766	IA-2(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000767	IA-2(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000768	IA-2(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000770	IA-2(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001941	IA-2(8)	MOD	None (Not Categorized)	
CCI-001942	IA-2(9)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001947	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001950	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001948	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001952	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001951	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001949	IA-2(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001953	IA-2(12)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001954	IA-2(12)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000777	IA-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000778	IA-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001958	IA-3	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001967	IA-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001959	IA-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001965	IA-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001968	IA-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001966	IA-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001969	IA-3(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001970	IA-4(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001971	IA-4(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001972	IA-4(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001973	IA-4(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001974	IA-4(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001975	IA-4(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000794	IA-4(e)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000795	IA-4(e)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000800	IA-4(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000801	IA-4(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001988	IA-5	LOW	None (Not Categorized)	
CCI-001980	IA-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000176	IA-5(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001544	IA-5(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001984	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001985	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001986	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001987	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001982	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001981	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001983	IA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001989	IA-5(e)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000180	IA-5(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000181	IA-5(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000179	IA-5(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000182	IA-5(g)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001610	IA-5(g)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000183	IA-5(h)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002042	IA-5(h)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002366	IA-5(i)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002365	IA-5(i)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001990	IA-5(j)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000192	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000193	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000194	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000205	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001619	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001611	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001612	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001613	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001614	IA-5(1)(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000195	IA-5(1)(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001615	IA-5(1)(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000196	IA-5(1)(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000197	IA-5(1)(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000198	IA-5(1)(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000199	IA-5(1)(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001616	IA-5(1)(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001617	IA-5(1)(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001618	IA-5(1)(e)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000200	IA-5(1)(e)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002041	IA-5(1)(f)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000185	IA-5(2)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000186	IA-5(2)(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000187	IA-5(2)(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001991	IA-5(2)(d)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001992	IA-5(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001993	IA-5(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001994	IA-5(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001995	IA-5(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001996	IA-5(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001997	IA-5(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000202	IA-5(7)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000203	IA-5(7)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002367	IA-5(7)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000204	IA-5(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001621	IA-5(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002002	IA-5(11)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002003	IA-5(11)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002007	IA-5(13)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002006	IA-5(13)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002008	IA-5(14)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000206	IA-6	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000803	IA-7	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000804	IA-8	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002009	IA-8(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002010	IA-8(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002011	IA-8(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002012	IA-8(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002013	IA-8(3)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002014	IA-8(4)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002776	IR-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002777	IR-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000805	IR-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000806	IR-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000809	IR-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000810	IR-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000808	IR-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000807	IR-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000812	IR-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000811	IR-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002778	IR-2(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000813	IR-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002779	IR-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000814	IR-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000815	IR-2(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000818	IR-3	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000819	IR-3	MOD		TRUE
CCI-000820	IR-3	MOD		TRUE
CCI-001624	IR-3	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002780	IR-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000822	IR-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000823	IR-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000824	IR-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001625	IR-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000825	IR-4(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000827	IR-4(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000828	IR-4(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000829	IR-4(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002782	IR-4(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002783	IR-4(7)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002784	IR-4(7)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002785	IR-4(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002786	IR-4(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002787	IR-4(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000832	IR-5	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000834	IR-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000835	IR-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000836	IR-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002791	IR-6(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000837	IR-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000838	IR-6(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002792	IR-6(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000839	IR-7	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000840	IR-7(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000841	IR-7(2)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000842	IR-7(2)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002794	IR-8(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002795	IR-8(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002796	IR-8(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002797	IR-8(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002798	IR-8(a)(4)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002799	IR-8(a)(5)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002800	IR-8(a)(6)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002801	IR-8(a)(7)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002802	IR-8(a)(8)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000844	IR-8(a)(8)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000845	IR-8(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000846	IR-8(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000847	IR-8(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000848	IR-8(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000849	IR-8(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002803	IR-8(e)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000850	IR-8(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002804	IR-8(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002805	IR-9(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002806	IR-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002807	IR-9(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002808	IR-9(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002809	IR-9(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002810	IR-9(e)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002811	IR-9(f)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002812	IR-9(f)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002813	IR-9(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002815	IR-9(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002816	IR-9(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002817	IR-9(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002818	IR-9(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002819	IR-9(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002820	IR-9(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002821	IR-9(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002822	IR-10	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002861	MA-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002862	MA-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000852	MA-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000853	MA-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000855	MA-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000856	MA-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000851	MA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000854	MA-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001628	MA-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000857	MA-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002870	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002866	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002872	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002868	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002873	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002869	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002871	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE



<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002867	MA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000859	MA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002874	MA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000860	MA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000861	MA-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000862	MA-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002876	MA-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002875	MA-2(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000865	MA-3	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000866	MA-3	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000867	MA-3	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000869	MA-3(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000870	MA-3(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000871	MA-3(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002882	MA-3(3)(d)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000873	MA-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000874	MA-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000876	MA-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000877	MA-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000878	MA-4(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000879	MA-4(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002884	MA-4(1)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002885	MA-4(1)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002886	MA-4(1)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000881	MA-4(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000882	MA-4(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000883	MA-4(3)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001631	MA-4(3)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002890	MA-4(6)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-003123	MA-4(6)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002891	MA-4(7)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-000890	MA-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000891	MA-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002894	MA-5(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002895	MA-5(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000903	MA-6	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002896	MA-6	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002897	MA-6	MOD		TRUE
CCI-002566	MP-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000995	MP-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000996	MP-1(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000999	MP-1(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001000	MP-1(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000998	MP-1(b)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000997	MP-1(b)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001002	MP-1(b)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001001	MP-1(b)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001003	MP-2	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001004	MP-2	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001005	MP-2	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001010	MP-3(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001011	MP-3(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001012	MP-3(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001013	MP-3(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001014	MP-4(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001015	MP-4(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001016	MP-4(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001018	MP-4(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001020	MP-5(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001021	MP-5(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001022	MP-5(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001023	MP-5(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001025	MP-5(c)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001024	MP-5(d)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001027	MP-5(4)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001028	MP-6(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002578	MP-6(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002579	MP-6(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002580	MP-6(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002581	MP-7	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002582	MP-7	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002583	MP-7	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002584	MP-7	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002585	MP-7(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002908	PE-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002909	PE-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000904	PE-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000905	PE-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000908	PE-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000909	PE-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000907	PE-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000906	PE-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000911	PE-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000910	PE-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000912	PE-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002910	PE-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002911	PE-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000913	PE-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000914	PE-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000915	PE-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001635	PE-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002915	PE-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000919	PE-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000920	PE-3(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002916	PE-3(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000921	PE-3(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002918	PE-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002917	PE-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002920	PE-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002919	PE-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002922	PE-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002921	PE-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002924	PE-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002923	PE-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000923	PE-3(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002925	PE-3(f)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000925	PE-3(f)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000924	PE-3(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000927	PE-3(g)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000926	PE-3(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000928	PE-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002926	PE-3(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-000936	PE-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002930	PE-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002931	PE-4	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000937	PE-5	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002939	PE-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000940	PE-6(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000939	PE-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002941	PE-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002940	PE-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000941	PE-6(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000942	PE-6(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002950	PE-6(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002951	PE-6(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002952	PE-8(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000947	PE-8(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000949	PE-8(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000948	PE-8(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000952	PE-9	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000956	PE-10(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000957	PE-10(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000958	PE-10(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000959	PE-10(c)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002955	PE-11	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low) Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000961	PE-11(1)	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low) Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000963	PE-12	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-000965	PE-13	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000971	PE-14(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000972	PE-14(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000973	PE-14(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000974	PE-14(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000977	PE-15	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000978	PE-15	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000979	PE-15	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000981	PE-16	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000982	PE-16	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000983	PE-16	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000984	PE-16	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002974	PE-16	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003047	PL-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003048	PL-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000563	PL-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000564	PL-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000566	PL-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001636	PL-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001637	PL-1(b)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001638	PL-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000568	PL-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000567	PL-1(b)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003049	PL-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003050	PL-2(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003052	PL-2(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003054	PL-2(a)(5)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003055	PL-2(a)(6)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003056	PL-2(a)(7)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003057	PL-2(a)(8)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000571	PL-2(a)(9)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003059	PL-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003060	PL-2(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003061	PL-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003062	PL-2(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000572	PL-2(c)	LOW		TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000573	PL-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000574	PL-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003063	PL-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003064	PL-2(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003051	PL-2(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003053	PL-2(a)(4)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003065	PL-2(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003067	PL-2(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000592	PL-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001639	PL-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000593	PL-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003069	PL-4(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003068	PL-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003070	PL-4(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003074	PL-8(a)(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003076	PL-8(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003077	PL-8(b)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-003078	PL-8(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003079	PL-8(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003080	PL-8(c)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003075	PL-8(a)(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003072	PL-8(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003073	PL-8(a)(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003081	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003082	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003083	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003084	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003085	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003086	PL-8(1)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003087	PL-8(1)(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003017	PS-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003018	PS-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001504	PS-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001505	PS-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001509	PS-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001510	PS-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001507	PS-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001506	PS-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001508	PS-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001511	PS-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001512	PS-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001513	PS-2(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001514	PS-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001515	PS-2(c)	LOW		TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001516	PS-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001517	PS-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001518	PS-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001519	PS-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003022	PS-4(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001522	PS-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003023	PS-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003024	PS-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001523	PS-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001524	PS-4(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001525	PS-4(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001526	PS-4(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003025	PS-4(f)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003026	PS-4(f)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003016	PS-4(f)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003027	PS-4(1)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003028	PS-4(1)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001527	PS-5(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001528	PS-5(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001529	PS-5(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001530	PS-5(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003031	PS-5(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003032	PS-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003033	PS-5(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003034	PS-5(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003035	PS-6(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001533	PS-6(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001532	PS-6(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001531	PS-6(c)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003037	PS-6(c)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003036	PS-6(c)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003038	PS-6(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003039	PS-6(3)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001539	PS-7(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003040	PS-7(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001540	PS-7(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003042	PS-7(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003043	PS-7(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003041	PS-7(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001541	PS-7(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001542	PS-8(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003046	PS-8(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003044	PS-8(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003045	PS-8(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002368	RA-1(a)	LOW		TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002369	RA-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001037	RA-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001038	RA-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001041	RA-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001042	RA-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001039	RA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001040	RA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001043	RA-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001044	RA-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001045	RA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001046	RA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001047	RA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001048	RA-3(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001642	RA-3(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001049	RA-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001050	RA-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001051	RA-3(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002371	RA-3(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002370	RA-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001052	RA-3(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001053	RA-3(e)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001055	RA-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001054	RA-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001056	RA-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001641	RA-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001643	RA-5(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001057	RA-5(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001058	RA-5(c)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001059	RA-5(d)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001060	RA-5(d)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002376	RA-5(e)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001061	RA-5(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001062	RA-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001063	RA-5(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001064	RA-5(2)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-001067	RA-5(5)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001645	RA-5(5)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002906	RA-5(5)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003089	SA-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003090	SA-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000602	SA-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000603	SA-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000605	SA-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000606	SA-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000601	SA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000604	SA-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001646	SA-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000607	SA-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003091	SA-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000610	SA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000611	SA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000612	SA-2(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000613	SA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000614	SA-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003092	SA-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000615	SA-3(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000616	SA-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000618	SA-3(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003093	SA-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003094	SA-4(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003095	SA-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003096	SA-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003097	SA-4(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003098	SA-4(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003099	SA-4(f)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003100	SA-4(g)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000623	SA-4(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003101	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003102	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003103	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003104	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003105	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003106	SA-4(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000634	SA-4(7)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-000635	SA-4(7)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-003114	SA-4(9)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003116	SA-4(10)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000642	SA-5(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003132	SA-5(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003133	SA-5(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE



<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-003134	SA-5(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003135	SA-5(e)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003136	SA-5(e)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-003126	SA-5(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003124	SA-5(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003128	SA-5(a)(3)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003130	SA-5(b)(2)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003125	SA-5(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003129	SA-5(b)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003131	SA-5(b)(3)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003127	SA-5(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000664	SA-8	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000665	SA-8	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000666	SA-8	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000667	SA-8	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000668	SA-8	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003137	SA-9(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000669	SA-9(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000670	SA-9(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000671	SA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000672	SA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000673	SA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000674	SA-9(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003138	SA-9(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003139	SA-9(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003140	SA-9(1)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003141	SA-9(1)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003142	SA-9(1)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003143	SA-9(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003144	SA-9(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-003155	SA-10(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003156	SA-10(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003157	SA-10(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003158	SA-10(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003159	SA-10(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000692	SA-10(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000694	SA-10(d)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003160	SA-10(d)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003161	SA-10(e)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003162	SA-10(e)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003163	SA-10(e)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003164	SA-10(e)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000698	SA-10(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003171	SA-11(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003172	SA-11(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-003173	SA-11(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003174	SA-11(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003175	SA-11(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003176	SA-11(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003177	SA-11(d)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003178	SA-11(e)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000723	SA-12	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-000722	SA-12	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003233	SA-15	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003234	SA-15(a)(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003235	SA-15(a)(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003236	SA-15(a)(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003237	SA-15(a)(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003238	SA-15(a)(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003239	SA-15(a)(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003240	SA-15(a)(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-003241	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003242	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003243	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003244	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003245	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003246	SA-15(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003356	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003357	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003358	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003359	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003360	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003361	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003362	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003363	SA-19(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003364	SA-19(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003365	SA-19(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-003366	SA-19(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002380	SC-1(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002378	SC-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001074	SC-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001075	SC-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001078	SC-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001079	SC-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001077	SC-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001076	SC-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001081	SC-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001080	SC-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001082	SC-2	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001090	SC-4	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001093	SC-5	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002386	SC-5	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002385	SC-5	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001094	SC-5(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002387	SC-5(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001095	SC-5(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002388	SC-5(3)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002389	SC-5(3)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002390	SC-5(3)(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002391	SC-5(3)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001097	SC-7(a)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002395	SC-7(b)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001098	SC-7(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001101	SC-7(3)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001102	SC-7(4)(a)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001103	SC-7(4)(b)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002396	SC-7(4)(c)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001105	SC-7(4)(d)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001108	SC-7(4)(e)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001107	SC-7(4)(e)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-001106	SC-7(4)(e)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001109	SC-7(5)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002397	SC-7(7)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001113	SC-7(8)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001114	SC-7(8)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001112	SC-7(8)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002400	SC-7(9)(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002398	SC-7(9)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002399	SC-7(9)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001116	SC-7(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002403	SC-7(11)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002401	SC-7(11)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002402	SC-7(11)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002404	SC-7(12)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002405	SC-7(12)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002406	SC-7(12)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001120	SC-7(13)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001119	SC-7(13)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001121	SC-7(14)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001122	SC-7(14)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002407	SC-7(14)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001126	SC-7(18)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002418	SC-8	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002419	SC-8(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002421	SC-8(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002420	SC-8(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002422	SC-8(2)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001133	SC-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001134	SC-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002428	SC-12	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002429	SC-12	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002430	SC-12	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002431	SC-12	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002432	SC-12	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002433	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002434	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002435	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002436	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002437	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002438	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002439	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002440	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002441	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002442	SC-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002449	SC-13	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low) Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002450	SC-13	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low) Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001150	SC-15(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001151	SC-15(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001152	SC-15(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001159	SC-17	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002456	SC-17	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001160	SC-18(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001161	SC-18(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001162	SC-18(b)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001163	SC-18(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001164	SC-18(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001165	SC-18(c)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001166	SC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001662	SC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002457	SC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002458	SC-18(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001687	SC-18(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001688	SC-18(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001167	SC-18(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001168	SC-18(2)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001169	SC-18(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001695	SC-18(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002459	SC-18(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001170	SC-18(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002460	SC-18(4)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001171	SC-18(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001172	SC-18(4)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001173	SC-19(a)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001174	SC-19(a)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001175	SC-19(b)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001176	SC-19(b)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001177	SC-19(b)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001178	SC-20(a)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002462	SC-20(a)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001179	SC-20(b)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001663	SC-20(b)	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002465	SC-21	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002466	SC-21	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002467	SC-21	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002468	SC-21	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001182	SC-22	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001183	SC-22	LOW	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001184	SC-23	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001185	SC-23(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001188	SC-23(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001664	SC-23(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001189	SC-23(3)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002470	SC-23(5)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002469	SC-23(5)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001190	SC-24	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001191	SC-24	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001192	SC-24	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001193	SC-24	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001665	SC-24	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001199	SC-28	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002472	SC-28	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002475	SC-28(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002476	SC-28(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002473	SC-28(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002474	SC-28(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002528	SC-38	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002529	SC-38	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002530	SC-39	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002544	SC-41	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002545	SC-41	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002546	SC-41	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002601	SI-1(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001217	SI-1(a)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001218	SI-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001220	SI-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001221	SI-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001223	SI-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001219	SI-1(b)(1)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001224	SI-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001222	SI-1(b)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001225	SI-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001226	SI-2(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCI's for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001228	SI-2(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001229	SI-2(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002602	SI-2(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002603	SI-2(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002604	SI-2(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002606	SI-2(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002607	SI-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001230	SI-2(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001227	SI-2(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002605	SI-2(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001231	SI-2(1)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001234	SI-2(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001233	SI-2(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002615	SI-2(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002616	SI-2(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002617	SI-2(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002618	SI-2(6)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002619	SI-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002621	SI-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002620	SI-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002622	SI-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001240	SI-3(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002623	SI-3(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001241	SI-3(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002624	SI-3(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001242	SI-3(c)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001244	SI-3(c)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001243	SI-3(c)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001245	SI-3(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001246	SI-3(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001247	SI-3(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002634	SI-3(10)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002635	SI-3(10)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002636	SI-3(10)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002638	SI-3(10)(a)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002639	SI-3(10)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002640	SI-3(10)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001253	SI-4(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002641	SI-4(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002642	SI-4(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002643	SI-4(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002644	SI-4(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002645	SI-4(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002646	SI-4(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001255	SI-4(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001256	SI-4(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002647	SI-4(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002648	SI-4(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002649	SI-4(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001257	SI-4(e)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001258	SI-4(f)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002650	SI-4(g)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002651	SI-4(g)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002652	SI-4(g)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002654	SI-4(g)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002655	SI-4(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002656	SI-4(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001260	SI-4(2)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002659	SI-4(4)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002660	SI-4(4)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002661	SI-4(4)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002662	SI-4(4)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001264	SI-4(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002663	SI-4(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002664	SI-4(5)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002665	SI-4(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002666	SI-4(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002667	SI-4(10)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002668	SI-4(11)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001273	SI-4(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001671	SI-4(11)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001275	SI-4(12)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001274	SI-4(12)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-001673	SI-4(14)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001282	SI-4(15)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-001283	SI-4(16)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002673	SI-4(19)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002674	SI-4(19)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002675	SI-4(19)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002676	SI-4(20)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002677	SI-4(20)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002681	SI-4(22)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002682	SI-4(22)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002683	SI-4(22)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002684	SI-4(22)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002686	SI-4(23)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002685	SI-4(23)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES
CCI-002687	SI-4(23)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	YES



<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-002692	SI-5(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001285	SI-5(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001286	SI-5(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002693	SI-5(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002694	SI-5(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-001288	SI-5(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001287	SI-5(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-001289	SI-5(d)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002703	SI-7	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002704	SI-7	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002705	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002706	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002707	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002710	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002711	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002712	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer) Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002708	SI-7(1)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002709	SI-7(1)	MOD		TRUE
CCI-002719	SI-7(7)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002720	SI-7(7)	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002723	SI-7(8)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002724	SI-7(8)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002722	SI-7(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002721	SI-7(8)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002738	SI-7(14)(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	YES
CCI-002737	SI-7(14)(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-002741	SI-8(a)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002742	SI-8(a)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001306	SI-8(b)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001307	SI-8(1)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-001308	SI-8(2)	MOD	Table G-2 (Not Applicable)	FALSE
CCI-002744	SI-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001310	SI-10	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002754	SI-10(3)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	YES
CCI-001312	SI-11(a)	MOD	Table G-5 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002759	SI-11(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-001314	SI-11(b)	MOD	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001315	SI-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001678	SI-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002823	SI-16	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002824	SI-16	MOD	Table G-7 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002773	SI-17	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002774	SI-17	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002775	SI-17	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000073	PM-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002985	PM-1(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-001680	PM-1(a)(2)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002986	PM-1(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002984	PM-1(a)(3)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002987	PM-1(a)(3)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000074	PM-1(a)(4)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002988	PM-1(a)(4)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000076	PM-1(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000075	PM-1(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000077	PM-1(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002989	PM-1(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002990	PM-1(d)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000078	PM-2	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000080	PM-3(a)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000081	PM-3(b)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000141	PM-3(c)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002991	PM-4(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000142	PM-4(a)(1)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-000170	PM-4(a)(2)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002992	PM-4(a)(3)	LOW	Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002993	PM-4(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000207	PM-5	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000209	PM-6	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000210	PM-6	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000211	PM-6	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000212	PM-7	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-000216	PM-8	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-001640	PM-8	LOW	Table G-3 (Removed from Low)	TRUE
CCI-000227	PM-9(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000228	PM-9(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002994	PM-9(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002995	PM-9(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000229	PM-10(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000230	PM-10(a)	LOW		TRUE

<b>Table G-1 Summary of CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>Applies At Or Above Impact</b>	<b>Table Reference</b>	<b>Applicable to a Control System?</b>
CCI-000231	PM-10(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000233	PM-10(b)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000234	PM-10(c)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000235	PM-11(a)	LOW		TRUE
CCI-000236	PM-11(b)	LOW	Table G-4 (Designer) Table G-6 (Enclave)	TRUE
CCI-002996	PM-12	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002997	PM-13	LOW		TRUE
CCI-002998	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-002999	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003000	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003001	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003002	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003003	PM-14(a)(1)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003004	PM-14(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003005	PM-14(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003006	PM-14(a)(2)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003007	PM-14(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003008	PM-14(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003009	PM-14(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003010	PM-15(a)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003011	PM-15(b)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003012	PM-15(c)	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE
CCI-003013	PM-16	LOW	None (Non-Designer)	TRUE

<b>Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-001384	AC-8(c)(1)	The information system, for publicly accessible systems, displays system use information organization-defined conditions before granting further access.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001385	AC-8(c)(2)	The information system, for publicly accessible systems, displays references, if any, to monitoring that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001386	AC-8(c)(2)	The information system for publicly accessible systems displays references, if any, to recording that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001387	AC-8(c)(2)	The information system for publicly accessible systems displays references, if any, to auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001388	AC-8(c)(3)	The information system, for publicly accessible systems, includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001473	AC-22(a)	The organization designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001474	AC-22(b)	The organization trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001475	AC-22(c)	The organization reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001476	AC-22(d)	The organization reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information on an organization-defined frequency.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001477	AC-22(d)	The organization defines a frequency for reviewing the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001478	AC-22(e)	The organization removes nonpublic information from the publicly accessible information system, if discovered.	CS is not publically accessible

<b>Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-001739	CM-2(7)a	The organization issues organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices with organization-defined configurations to individuals traveling to locations the organization deems to be of significant risk.	CS aren't mobile.
CCI-001815	CM-2(7)b	The organization defines the security safeguards to be applied to devices when they return from areas of significant risk.	CS aren't mobile.
CCI-001816	CM-2(7)b	The organization applies organization-defined security safeguards to devices when individuals return from areas of significant risk.	CS aren't mobile.
CCI-000444	CP-2(a)(1)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that identifies essential business functions.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000451	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential business functions despite an information system disruption.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000453	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential business functions despite an information system compromise.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000455	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential business functions despite an information system failure.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000474	CP-2(3)	The organization defines the time period for planning the resumption of essential business functions as a result of contingency plan activation.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000476	CP-2(3)	The organization plans for the resumption of essential business functions within the organization-defined time period of contingency plan activation.	CS are not business systems
CCI-002829	CP-2(8)	The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential business functions.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000514	CP-7(a)	The organization establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential business functions within organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.	CS are not business systems

<b>Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-000523	CP-8	The organization defines the time period to permit the resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential business functions when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000525	CP-8	The organization establishes alternate telecommunication services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential business functions within organization-defined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.	CS are not business systems
CCI-002841	CP-8	The organization defines the information system operations to be resumed for essential business functions within the organization-defined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.	CS are not business systems
CCI-000963	PE-12	The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.	CS does not need lighting, it functions perfectly well in the dark
CCI-002395	SC-7(b)	The information system implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically and/or logically separated from internal organizational networks.	CS is not publically accessible
CCI-001173	SC-19(a)	The organization establishes usage restrictions for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously.	CS does not use VoIP
CCI-001174	SC-19(a)	The organization establishes implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously.	CS does not use VoIP
CCI-001175	SC-19(b)	The organization authorizes the use of VoIP within the information system.	CS does not use VoIP
CCI-001176	SC-19(b)	The organization monitors the use of VoIP within the information system.	CS does not use VoIP

<b>Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-001177	SC-19(b)	The organization controls the use of VoIP within the information system.	CS does not use VoIP
CCI-001178	SC-20(a)	The information system provides additional data origin authentication artifacts along with the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries.	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-002462	SC-20(a)	The information system provides additional integrity verification artifacts along with the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries.	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-001179	SC-20(b)	The information system, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace, provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones.	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-001663	SC-20(b)	The information system, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace, provides the means to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains (if the child supports secure resolution services).	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-001182	SC-22	The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an organization are fault-tolerant.	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-001183	SC-22	The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an organization implement internal/external role separation.	CS does not act as external DNS server
CCI-002741	SI-8(a)	The organization employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages.	While control systems may have outbound email for alarm, event and audit reporting, control systems don't use inbound email.
CCI-002742	SI-8(a)	The organization employs spam protection mechanisms at information system exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages.	While control systems may have outbound email for alarm, event and audit reporting, control systems don't use inbound email.
CCI-001306	SI-8(b)	The organization updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.	While control systems may have outbound email for alarm, event and audit reporting, control systems don't use inbound email.
CCI-001307	SI-8(1)	The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.	While control systems may have outbound email for alarm, event and audit reporting, control systems don't use inbound email.

<b>Table G-2 CCIs Not Applicable to Control Systems (CS)</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-001308	SI-8(2)	The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms .	While control systems may have outbound email for alarm, event and audit reporting, control systems don't use inbound email.



<b>Table G-3 CCIs Removed from LOW Impact Control Systems Baseline</b>			
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Rationale for non- inclusion</b>
CCI-000443	CP-2(a)(1)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that identifies essential missions.	A LOW CS doesn't have any "essential" mission
CCI-000450	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential missions despite an information system disruption.	A LOW CS doesn't have any "essential" mission
CCI-000452	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential missions despite an information system compromise.	A LOW CS doesn't have any "essential" mission
CCI-000454	CP-2(a)(4)	The organization develops a contingency plan for the information system that addresses maintaining essential missions despite an information system failure.	A LOW CS doesn't have any "essential" mission
CCI-002955	PE-11	The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate an orderly shutdown of the information system and/or transition of the information system to long-term alternate power in the event of a primary power source loss.	NIST 800-53 does not have this in a LOW baseline. NIST 800-82 included it with the rationale "ICS may support critical activities....". By definition, a CS supporting "critical activities" is not a LOW system.
CCI-000961	PE-11(1)	The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.	NIST 800-53 does not have this in a LOW baseline. NIST 800-82 included it with the rationale "ICS may support critical activities....". By definition, a CS supporting "critical activities" is not a LOW system.
CCI-002449	SC-13	The organization defines the cryptographic uses, and type of cryptography required for each use, to be implemented by the information system.	A LOW CS doesn't have any classified information
CCI-002450	SC-13	The information system implements organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each use in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.	A LOW CS doesn't have any classified information
CCI-000216	PM-8	The organization develops and documents a critical infrastructure and key resource protection plan that addresses information security issues.	A LOW Control System doesn't deal with critical infrastructure.
CCI-001640	PM-8	The organization updates the critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan that addresses information security issues.	A LOW Control System doesn't deal with critical infrastructure.

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002110	AC-2(a)	The organization defines the information system account types that support the organizational missions/business functions.	Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-000213	AC-3	The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.	Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-000043	AC-7(a)	The organization defines the maximum number of consecutive invalid logon attempts to the information system by a user during an organization-defined time period.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-000044	AC-7(a)	The information system enforces the organization-defined limit of consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during the organization-defined time period.	Designer	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-001423	AC-7(a)	The organization defines the time period in which the organization-defined maximum number of consecutive invalid logon attempts occur.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-002236	AC-7(b)	The organization defines the time period the information system will automatically lock the account or node when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-002237	AC-7(b)	The organization defines the delay algorithm to be employed by the information system to delay the next login prompt when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-002238	AC-7(b)	The information system automatically locks the account or node for either an organization-defined time period, until the locked account or node is released by an administrator, or delays the next login prompt according to the organization-defined delay algorithm when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.	Designer Impractical	3.3.2 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
CCI-002247	AC-8(a)	The organization defines the use notification message or banner the information system displays to users before granting access to the system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000048	AC-8(a)	The information system displays an organization-defined system use notification message or banner before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-002243	AC-8(a)(1)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that users are accessing a U.S. Government information system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-002244	AC-8(a)(2)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-002245	AC-8(a)(3)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-002246	AC-8(a)(4)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-000050	AC-8(b)	The information system retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access.	Enclave Designer	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-002248	AC-8(c)(1)	The organization defines the conditions of use which are to be displayed to users of the information system before granting further access.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.3 System Use Notification
CCI-000061	AC-14(a)	The organization identifies and defines organization-defined user actions that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions.	Designer	3.3.5 Permitted Actions Without Identific...
CCI-000232	AC-14(b)	The organization documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information	Designer	3.3.5 Permitted Actions Without Identific...

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
		system, user actions not requiring identification and authentication.		
CCI-001438	AC-18(a)	The organization establishes usage restrictions for wireless access.	Designer Non-Designer	3.2.3 Wireless and Wired Broadcast Commun...
CCI-002323	AC-18(a)	The organization establishes configuration/connection requirements for wireless access.	Designer Non-Designer	3.2.3 Wireless and Wired Broadcast Commun...
CCI-001439	AC-18(a)	The organization establishes implementation guidance for wireless access.	Designer Non-Designer	3.2.3 Wireless and Wired Broadcast Commun...
CCI-001441	AC-18(b)	The organization authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.	Designer Non-Designer	3.2.3 Wireless and Wired Broadcast Commun...
CCI-000123	AU-2(a)	The organization determines the information system must be capable of auditing an organization-defined list of auditable events.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001571	AU-2(a)	The organization defines the information system auditable events.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000125	AU-2(c)	The organization provides a rationale for why the list of auditable events is deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001485	AU-2(d)	The organization defines the events which are to be audited on the information system on an organization-defined frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000130	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000131	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes when an event occurred.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000132	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes where the event occurred.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000133	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes the source of the event.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000134	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes the outcome of the event.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001487	AU-3	The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the event.	Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001848	AU-4	The organization defines the audit record storage requirements.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.4 Audit Storage Capacity and Audit Up...
CCI-001849	AU-4	The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with organization-defined audit record storage requirements.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.4 Audit Storage Capacity and Audit Up...
CCI-000139	AU-5(a)	The information system alerts designated organization-defined personnel or roles in the event of an audit processing failure.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.5 Response to Audit Processing Failur...
CCI-000140	AU-5(b)	The information system takes organization defined actions upon audit failure (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records).	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.5 Response to Audit Processing Failur...
CCI-001490	AU-5(b)	The organization defines actions to be taken by the information system upon audit failure (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records).	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.5.5 Response to Audit Processing Failur...
CCI-000159	AU-8(a)	The information system uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records.	Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps
CCI-001889	AU-8(b)	The information system records time stamps for audit records that meets organization-defined granularity of time measurement.	Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps
CCI-001890	AU-8(b)	The information system records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).	Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000169	AU-12(a)	The information system provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a at organization defined information system components.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001459	AU-12(a)	The organization defines information system components that provide audit record generation capability.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000171	AU-12(b)	The information system allows organization-defined personnel or roles to select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system.	Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001910	AU-12(b)	The organization defines the personnel or roles allowed select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000172	AU-12(c)	The information system generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d with the content defined in AU-3.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000258	CA-3(b)	The organization documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 1.11 CYBERSECURITY DURING CONSTRUCTION
CCI-002103	CA-9(b)	The organization documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics.	Designer	1.9.3 Network Communication Report
CCI-002104	CA-9(b)	The organization documents, for each internal connection, the security requirements.	Designer	1.9.3 Network Communication Report
CCI-002105	CA-9(b)	The organization documents, for each internal connection, the nature of the information communicated.	Designer	1.9.3 Network Communication Report
CCI-002102	CA-9(a)	The organization defines the information system components or classes of components that that are authorized internal connections to the information system.	Designer	1.9.3 Network Communication Report
CCI-000293	CM-2	The organization develops and documents a current baseline configuration of the information system.	Designer	---

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000363	CM-6(a)	The organization defines security configuration checklists to be used to establish and document configuration settings for the information system technology products employed.	Designer	3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-000364	CM-6(a)	The organization establishes configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using organization-defined security configuration checklists.	Designer	3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-000365	CM-6(a)	The organization documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using organization-defined security configuration checklists that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-001755	CM-6(c)	The organization defines the information system components for which any deviation from the established configuration settings are to be identified, documented and approved.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-001588	CM-6(a)	The organization-defined security configuration checklists reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-000382	CM-7(b)	The organization configures the information system to prohibit or restrict the use of organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.	Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-000380	CM-7(b)	The organization defines for the information system prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.	Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALITY ...
CCI-000381	CM-7(a)	The organization configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities.	Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAST

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
				FUNCTIONALIT ...
CCI-001761	CM-7(1)(b)	The organization defines the functions, ports, protocols and services within the information system that are to be disabled when deemed unnecessary and/or nonsecure.	Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENT S FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALIT ...
CCI-001762	CM-7(1)(b)	The organization disables organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or nonsecure.	Designer Impractical	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENT S FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALIT ...
CCI-000389	CM-8(a)(1)	The organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that accurately reflects the current information system.	Designer	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report
CCI-000392	CM-8(a)(2)	The organization develops and documents an inventory of information system components that includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system.	Designer	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report
CCI-000398	CM-8(a)(4)	The organization defines information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system component accountability.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report
CCI-000550	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a disruption.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.5 Software and Configuration Backups
CCI-000551	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a compromise.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.5 Software and Configuration Backups
CCI-000552	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a failure.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.5 Software and Configuration Backups
CCI-002855	CP-12	The information system, when organization-defined conditions are detected, enters a safe mode of operation with organization-defined restrictions of safe mode of operation.	Designer	3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION



<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002856	CP-12	The organization defines the conditions, that when detected, the information system enters a safe mode of operation with organization-defined restrictions of safe mode of operation.	Designer	3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-002857	CP-12	The organization defines the restrictions of safe mode of operation that the information system will enter when organization-defined conditions are detected.	Designer	3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-000764	IA-2	The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of organizational users).	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000765	IA-2(1)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged accounts.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001953	IA-2(12)	The information system accepts Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001954	IA-2(12)	The information system electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000777	IA-3	The organization defines a list of specific and/or types of devices for which identification and authentication is required before establishing a connection to the information system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.2.7 Device Identification and Authentic...
CCI-000778	IA-3	The information system uniquely identifies an organization defined list of specific and/or types of devices before establishing a local, remote, or network connection.	Enclave Designer Impractical	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.2.7 Device Identification and Authentic...
CCI-001958	IA-3	The information system authenticates an organization defined list of specific and/or types of devices before establishing a local, remote, or network connection.	Enclave Designer Impractical	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.2.7 Device Identification and Authentic...

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000176	IA-5(b)	The organization manages information system authenticators by establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001544	IA-5(c)	The organization manages information system authenticators by ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001989	IA-5(e)	The organization manages information system authenticators by changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation.	Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000182	IA-5(g)	The organization manages information system authenticators by changing/refreshing authenticators in accordance with the organization defined time period by authenticator type.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001610	IA-5(g)	The organization defines the time period (by authenticator type) for changing/refreshing authenticators.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000192	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of upper case characters used.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000193	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of lower case characters used.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000194	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of numeric characters used.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000205	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces minimum password length.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001619	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of special characters used.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001611	IA-5(1)(a)	The organization defines the minimum number of special characters for password complexity enforcement.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001612	IA-5(1)(a)	The organization defines the minimum number of upper case characters for password complexity enforcement.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001613	IA-5(1)(a)	The organization defines the minimum number of lower case characters for password complexity enforcement.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001614	IA-5(1)(a)	The organization defines the minimum number of numeric characters for password complexity enforcement.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000195	IA-5(1)(b)	The information system, for password-based authentication, when new passwords are created, enforces that at least an organization-defined number of characters are changed.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001615	IA-5(1)(b)	The organization defines the minimum number of characters that are changed when new passwords are created.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000196	IA-5(1)(c)	The information system, for password-based authentication, stores only cryptographically-protected passwords.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000197	IA-5(1)(c)	The information system, for password-based authentication, transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000198	IA-5(1)(d)	The information system enforces minimum password lifetime restrictions.	Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000199	IA-5(1)(d)	The information system enforces maximum password lifetime restrictions.	Enclave Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001616	IA-5(1)(d)	The organization defines minimum password lifetime restrictions.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001617	IA-5(1)(d)	The organization defines maximum password lifetime restrictions.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-001618	IA-5(1)(e)	The organization defines the number of generations for which password reuse is prohibited.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000200	IA-5(1)(e)	The information system prohibits password reuse for the organization defined number of generations.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-002041	IA-5(1)(f)	The information system allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-002002	IA-5(11)	The organization defines the token quality requirements to be employed by the information system mechanisms for token-based authentication.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-002003	IA-5(11)	The information system, for token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy organization-defined token quality requirements.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT. ..
CCI-000206	IA-6	The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.4.6 Authenticator Feedback
CCI-000803	IA-7	The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.8 Cryptographic Module Authentication

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-003051	PL-2(a)(2)	The organization's security plan for the information system explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.6 Cybersecurity Riser Diagram
CCI-003053	PL-2(a)(4)	The organization's security plan for the information system provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.6 Cybersecurity Riser Diagram
CCI-001048	RA-3(a)	The organization conducts an assessment of risk of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits that includes the likelihood and magnitude of harm from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001055	RA-5(a)	The organization defines a frequency for scanning for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001054	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications on an organization-defined frequency.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001056	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001641	RA-5(a)	The organization defines the process for conducting random vulnerability scans on the information system and hosted applications.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001643	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications in accordance with the organization-defined process for random scans.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001057	RA-5(b)	The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations; formatting checklists	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
		and test procedures; and measuring vulnerability impact.		
CCI-001058	RA-5(c)	The organization analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.11 VULNERABILIT Y SCANNING
CCI-001059	RA-5(d)	The organization remediates legitimate vulnerabilities in organization-defined response times in accordance with an organizational assessment risk.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.11 VULNERABILIT Y SCANNING
CCI-003116	SA-4(10)	The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational information systems.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.12 FIPS 201-2 REQUIREMENT
CCI-003126	SA-5(a)(1)	The organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system services that describes secure operation of the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume...
CCI-003124	SA-5(a)(1)	The organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system services that describes secure configuration of the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.2.1 HVAC Control System Devices FULLY S... 1.9.8.2.2 All Other HVAC Control System Devic... 1.9.8.3.1 Lighting Control System Devices FUL... 1.9.8.3.2 All Other Lighting Control System D... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...

Table G-4 Designer CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems				
CCI #	800-53 Control Text Indicator	CCI Definition	Responsibility	UFGS Reference
CCI-003128	SA-5(a)(3)	The organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system services that describes known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e. privileged) functions.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.1 Software Applications 1.9.8.2.1 HVAC Control System Devices FULLY S... 1.9.8.3.1 Lighting Control System Devices FUL... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...
CCI-003130	SA-5(b)(2)	The organization obtains user documentation for the information system, system component or information system service that describes methods for user interaction which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.1 Software Applications 1.9.8.2.1 HVAC Control System Devices FULLY S... 1.9.8.2.2 All Other HVAC Control System Devic... 1.9.8.3.1 Lighting Control System Devices FUL... 1.9.8.3.2 All Other Lighting Control System D... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...
CCI-003125	SA-5(a)(1)	The organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system services that describes secure installation of the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-003129	SA-5(b)(1)	The organization obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes user-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security functions/mechanisms.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.1 Software Applications 1.9.8.2.1 HVAC Control System Devices FULLY S... 1.9.8.3.1 Lighting Control System Devices FUL... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...
CCI-003131	SA-5(b)(3)	The organization obtains user documentation for the information system, system component or information system service that describes user responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.1 Software Applications
CCI-003127	SA-5(a)(2)	The organization obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system services that describes effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.8 Control System Cybersecurity Docume... 1.9.8.1 Software Applications 1.9.8.2.1 HVAC Control System Devices FULLY S... 1.9.8.2.2 All Other HVAC Control System Devic... 1.9.8.3.1 Lighting Control System Devices FUL... 1.9.8.3.2 All Other Lighting Control System D... 1.9.8.5 Default Requirements for Control Sy...



<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001093	SC-5	The organization defines the types of denial of service attacks (or provides references to sources of current denial of service attacks) that can be addressed by the information system.	Enclave Designer	3.7.2 Denial of Service Protection<TAI OP...
CCI-002386	SC-5	The organization defines the security safeguards to be employed to protect the information system against, or limit the effects of, denial of service attacks.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.2 Denial of Service Protection<TAI OP...
CCI-002385	SC-5	The information system protects against or limits the effects of organization-defined types of denial of service attacks by employing organization-defined security safeguards.	Enclave Designer	3.7.2 Denial of Service Protection<TAI OP...
CCI-001097	SC-7(a)	The information system monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact... 3.7.2 Denial of Service Protection<TAI OP... 3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002530	SC-39	The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing process.	Designer	---
CCI-002544	SC-41	The organization defines the information systems or information system components on which organization-defined connection ports or input/output devices are to be physically disabled or removed.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENT S FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALIT ...
CCI-002545	SC-41	The organization defines the connection ports or input/output devices that are to be physically disabled or removed from organization-defined information systems or information system components.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENT S FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALIT ...
CCI-002546	SC-41	The organization physically disables or removes organization-defined connection ports or input/output devices on organization-defined information systems or information system components.	Designer Impractical	3.2.5 IP Control Networks 3.6 REQUIREMENT S FOR LEAST FUNCTIONALIT ...

<b>Table G-4 Designer CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002623	SI-3(c)(1)	The organization defines the frequency for performing periodic scans of the information system for malicious code.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.13.1 Malicious Code Protection
CCI-001241	SI-3(c)(1)	The organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to perform periodic scans of the information system on an organization-defined frequency.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.13.1 Malicious Code Protection
CCI-001253	SI-4(a)(1)	The organization defines the objectives of monitoring for attacks and indicators of potential attacks on the information system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.13.3 Information System Monitoring
CCI-002645	SI-4(b)	The organization defines the techniques and methods to be used to identify unauthorized use of the information system.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.13.3 Information System Monitoring
CCI-002773	SI-17	The organization defines the fail-safe procedures to be implemented by the information system when organization-defined failure conditions occur.	Designer	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-002774	SI-17	The organization defines the failure conditions which, when they occur, will result in the information system implementing organization-defined fail-safe procedures.	Designer	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-002775	SI-17	The information system implements organization-defined fail-safe procedures when organization-defined failure conditions occur.	Designer	1.9.4 Control System Inventory Report 3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-000207	PM-5	The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000236	PM-11(b)	The organization determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes and revises the processes as necessary, until an achievable set of protection needs are obtained.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001361	AC-2(2)	The organization defines a time period after which temporary accounts are automatically terminated.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001365	AC-2(2)	The organization defines a time period after which emergency accounts are automatically terminated.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001682	AC-2(2)	The information system automatically removes or disables emergency accounts after an organization-defined time period for each type of account.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000017	AC-2(3)	The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after an organization-defined time period.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-000217	AC-2(3)	The organization defines a time period after which inactive accounts are automatically disabled.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-000018	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account creation actions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001403	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account modification actions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-002130	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account enabling actions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001404	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account disabling actions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001405	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account removal actions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001683	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account creation actions.	Enclave Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001684	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account modification actions.	Enclave Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002132	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account enabling actions.	Enclave Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001685	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account disabling actions.	Enclave Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001686	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account removal actions.	Enclave Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-002146	AC-2(12)(a)	The organization defines atypical usage for which the information system accounts are to be monitored.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001368	AC-4	The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system based on organization-defined information flow control policies.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001414	AC-4	The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems based on organization-defined information flow control policies.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001548	AC-4	The organization defines the information flow control policies for controlling the flow of information within the system.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001549	AC-4	The organization defines the information flow control policies for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001550	AC-4	The organization defines approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001551	AC-4	The organization defines approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.2.1 Information Flow Enforcement In MOD...
CCI-001558	AC-6(1)	The organization defines the security functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) for which access must be explicitly authorized.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002221	AC-6(1)	The organization defines the security-relevant information for which access must be explicitly authorized.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-002222	AC-6(1)	The organization explicitly authorizes access to organization-defined security functions.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-002223	AC-6(1)	The organization explicitly authorizes access to organization-defined security-relevant information.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-000039	AC-6(2)	The organization requires that users of information system accounts or roles, with access to organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information, use non-privileged accounts, or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-001419	AC-6(2)	The organization defines the security functions or security-relevant information to which users of information system accounts, or roles, have access.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-002234	AC-6(9)	The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.	Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-002235	AC-6(10)	The information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.	Designer Impractical	3.3.1 User Accounts 3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-000054	AC-10	The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each organization-defined account and/or account type to an organization-defined number of sessions.	DoD-Defined Designer	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000055	AC-10	The organization defines the maximum number of concurrent sessions to be allowed for each organization-defined account and/or account type.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-002252	AC-10	The organization defines the accounts for which the information system will limit the number of concurrent sessions.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer	3.2.3 Wireless and Wired Broadcast Commun... 3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-000059	AC-11(a)	The organization defines the time period of inactivity after which the information system initiates a session lock.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-000058	AC-11(a)	The information system provides the capability for users to directly initiate session lock mechanisms.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-000056	AC-11(b)	The information system retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-000060	AC-11(1)	The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-002360	AC-12	The organization defines the conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect to be employed by the information system when automatically terminating a user session.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-002361	AC-12	The information system automatically terminates a user session after organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-001443	AC-18(1)	The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of users and/or devices.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001444	AC-18(1)	The information system protects wireless access to the system using encryption.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001449	AC-18(3)	The organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internally embedded within information system	Designer	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
		components prior to issuance and deployment.		
CCI-002338	AC-20(3)	The organization restricts or prohibits the use of non-organizationally owned information systems, system components, or devices to process, store, or transmit organizational information.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002054	AT-3(4)	The organization defines indicators of malicious code to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational information systems.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001488	AU-3(1)	The organization defines additional, more detailed information to be included in the audit records.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000135	AU-3(1)	The information system generates audit records containing the organization-defined additional, more detailed information that is to be included in the audit records.	Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001855	AU-5(1)	The information system provides a warning to organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations within organization-defined time period when allocated audit record storage volume reaches organization-defined percentage of repository maximum audit record storage capacity.	Designer	3.5.4.1 Audit Log Storage Notification In M...
CCI-001852	AU-5(1)	The organization defines the personnel, roles and/or locations to receive a warning when allocated audit record storage volume reaches a defined percentage of maximum audit records storage capacity.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-000154	AU-6(4)	The information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records from multiple components within the system.	Designer	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001875	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports on-demand audit review and analysis.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001876	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports on-demand reporting requirements.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001877	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001878	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports on-demand audit review and analysis.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001879	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports on-demand reporting requirements.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001880	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001881	AU-7(b)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that does not alter original content or time ordering of audit records.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001882	AU-7(b)	The information system provides a report generation capability that does not alter original content or time ordering of audit records.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-000158	AU-7(1)	The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on organization-defined audit fields within audit records.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001891	AU-8(1)	The information system compares internal information system clocks on an organization-defined frequency with an organization-defined authoritative time source.	Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps
CCI-001892	AU-8(1)	The organization defines the time difference which, when exceeded, will require the information system to synchronize the internal information system clocks to the organization-defined authoritative time source.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps
CCI-002046	AU-8(1)	The information system synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than the organization-defined time period.	Designer	3.5.2 Audit Time Stamps
CCI-001899	AU-10	The organization defines the action to be covered by non-repudiation.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...



<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000166	AU-10	The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual) falsely denying having performed organization-defined actions to be covered by non-repudiation.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001577	AU-12(1)	The organization defines the information system components from which audit records are to be compiled into the system-wide audit trail.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-000174	AU-12(1)	The information system compiles audit records from organization-defined information system components into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time-correlated to within organization defined level of tolerance for relationship between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail.	Designer	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-000173	AU-12(1)	The organization defines the level of tolerance for relationship between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail that will be used for correlation.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.3.4 Audit Reduction and Report Generati...
CCI-001914	AU-12(3)	The information system provides the capability for organization-defined individuals or roles to change the auditing to be performed on organization-defined information system components based on organization-defined selectable event criteria within organization-defined time thresholds.	Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-002047	AU-12(3)	The organization defines the information system components on which the auditing that is to be performed can be changed by organization-defined individuals or roles.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001919	AU-14(b)	The information system provides the capability for authorized users to select a user session to capture/record or view/hear.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001464	AU-14(1)	The information system initiates session audits at system start-up.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001462	AU-14(2)	The information system provides the capability for authorized users to capture/record and log content related to a user session.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-001920	AU-14(3)	The information system provides the capability for authorized users to remotely view/hear all content related to an established user session in real time.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000298	CM-2(1)(c)	The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system as an integral part of information system component installations.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001737	CM-2(7)a	The organization defines the information systems, system components, or devices that are to have organization-defined configurations applied when located in areas of significant risk.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001738	CM-2(7)a	The organization defines the security configurations to be implemented on information systems, system components, or devices when they are located in areas of significant risk.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001813	CM-5(1)	The information system enforces access restrictions.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-001814	CM-5(1)	The Information system supports auditing of the enforcement actions.	Designer Non-Designer	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-000349	CM-5(2)	The organization reviews information system changes per organization defined frequency to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002059	CM-6(1)	The organization defines the information system components for which the organization will employ automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001592	CM-7(2)	The organization defines the rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage on the information system.	Designer	---
CCI-001763	CM-7(2)	The organization defines the policies regarding software program usage and restrictions.	Designer Non-Designer	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001764	CM-7(2)	The information system prevents program execution in accordance with organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions, and/or rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage.	Designer	---
CCI-000388	CM-7(3)	The organization ensures compliance with organization-defined registration requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.3 Network Communication Report
CCI-001772	CM-7(5)a	The organization defines the software programs authorized to execute on the information system.	Designer	---
CCI-001773	CM-7(5)a	The organization identifies the organization-defined software programs authorized to execute on the information system.	Designer	---
CCI-001774	CM-7(5)b	The organization employs an deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system.	Designer	---
CCI-000411	CM-8(2)	The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date inventory of information system components.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-000412	CM-8(2)	The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain a complete inventory of information system components.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001812	CM-11(2)	The information system prohibits user installation of software without explicit privileged status.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.1 User Accounts
CCI-002828	CP-2(8)	The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions.	Designer	---
CCI-000553	CP-10(2)	The information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.	Designer	---
CCI-000766	IA-2(2)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non-privileged accounts.	Enclave Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000767	IA-2(3)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged accounts.	Enclave Designer Impractical	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-000768	IA-2(4)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged accounts.	Designer Impractical	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-001942	IA-2(9)	The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to non-privileged accounts.	Designer Impractical	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-001967	IA-3(1)	The information system authenticates organization-defined devices and/or types of devices before establishing a local, remote and/or network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.	Designer Impractical	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-001959	IA-3(1)	The organization defines the specific devices and/or type of devices the information system is to authenticate before establishing a connection.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-000185	IA-5(2)(a)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information.	Enclave Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000186	IA-5(2)(b)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-000187	IA-5(2)(c)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication, maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-001991	IA-5(2)(d)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication, implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case of inability to access revocation information via the network.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-001996	IA-5(4)	The organization defines the requirements required by the automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001997	IA-5(4)	The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong to satisfy organization-defined requirements.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002007	IA-5(13)	The information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after an organization defined time period.	Designer Non-Designer	3.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICAT...
CCI-000865	MA-3	The organization approves information system maintenance tools.	Designer Non-Designer	3.9 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE TOOL SOFTWARE
CCI-000928	PE-3(1)	The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to the physical access controls for the facility at organization-defined physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-002926	PE-3(1)	The organization defines the physical spaces containing one or more components of the information system that require physical access authorizations and controls at the facility.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-000936	PE-4	The organization controls physical access to organization-defined information system distribution and transmission lines within organizational facilities using organization-defined security safeguards.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-002930	PE-4	The organization defines information system distribution and transmission lines within organizational facilities to control physical access using organization-defined security safeguards.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-002931	PE-4	The organization defines security safeguards to control physical access to organization-defined information system distribution and transmission lines within organizational facilities.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-000937	PE-5	The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.	Designer Non-Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-000952	PE-9	The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system from damage and destruction.	Designer Non-Designer	3.10 DEVICE POWER

Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems				
CCI #	800-53 Control Text Indicator	CCI Definition	Responsibility	UFGS Reference
CCI-002955	PE-11	The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate an orderly shutdown of the information system and/or transition of the information system to long-term alternate power in the event of a primary power source loss.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.10 DEVICE POWER
CCI-000961	PE-11(1)	The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.	Enclave Designer	3.10 DEVICE POWER
CCI-003075	PL-8(a)(3)	The organization's information security architecture for the information system describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external services.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 1.9.3 Network Communication Report 1.9.6 Cybersecurity Riser Diagram
CCI-003072	PL-8(a)	The organization develops an information security architecture for the information system.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 1.9.3 Network Communication Report 1.9.6 Cybersecurity Riser Diagram
CCI-003073	PL-8(a)(1)	The organization's information security architecture for the information system describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information.	Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 1.9.3 Network Communication Report 1.9.6 Cybersecurity Riser Diagram
CCI-003081	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates organization-defined security safeguards to organization-defined locations.	Designer Non-Designer	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-003082	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates organization-defined security safeguards to organization-defined architectural layers.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-003083	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization defines the security safeguards to be allocated to organization-defined locations.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-003084	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization defines the security safeguards to be allocated to organization-defined architectural layers.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-003085	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization defines the locations to which it allocates organization-defined security safeguards in the security architecture.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-003086	PL-8(1)(a)	The organization defines the architectural layers to which it allocates organization-defined security safeguards in the security architecture.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-003087	PL-8(1)(b)	The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001062	RA-5(1)	The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.	Enclave Designer	2.3 DATABASE AND WEB SERVER SOFTWARE FO... 3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001067	RA-5(5)	The information system implements privileged access authorization to organization-identified information system components for selected organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities.	Enclave Designer	2.3 DATABASE AND WEB SERVER SOFTWARE FO... 3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-001645	RA-5(5)	The organization identifies the information system components to which privileged access is authorized for selected organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	2.3 DATABASE AND WEB SERVER SOFTWARE FO... 3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002906	RA-5(5)	The organization defines the vulnerability scanning activities in which the information system implements privileged access authorization to organization-identified information system components.	Enclave Designer	2.3 DATABASE AND WEB SERVER SOFTWARE FO... 3.11 VULNERABILITY SCANNING
CCI-000623	SA-4(1)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security controls to be employed.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003101	SA-4(2)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design information for the security controls to be employed that includes security-relevant external system interfaces, high-level design, low-level design, source code, hardware schematics and/or organization-defined design/information at organization-defined level of detail.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003102	SA-4(2)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes security-relevant external system interfaces, high-level design, low-level design, source code and/or hardware schematics organization-defined implementation information at organization-defined level of detail.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003103	SA-4(2)	The organization defines the design information that the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service is required to provide for the security controls to be employed.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003104	SA-4(2)	The organization defines the implementation information that the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service is required to provide	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---



<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
		for the security controls to be employed.		
CCI-003105	SA-4(2)	The organization defines the level of detail the design information of the security controls is required to be provided by the developer of the information system, system component, or information system services.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003106	SA-4(2)	The organization defines the level of detail the implementation information of the security controls is required to be provided by the developer of the information system, system component, or information system services.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003114	SA-4(9)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003155	SA-10(a)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform configuration management during system, component or service design, development, implementation and/or operation.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003156	SA-10(b)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to document the integrity of changes to organization-defined configuration items under configuration management.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003157	SA-10(b)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to manage the integrity of changes to organization-defined configuration items under configuration management.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003158	SA-10(b)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to control the	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
		integrity of changes to organization-defined configuration items under configuration management.		
CCI-003159	SA-10(b)	The organization defines the configuration items under configuration management that require the integrity of changes to be documented, managed and controlled.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000692	SA-10(c)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-000694	SA-10(d)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to document approved changes to the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003160	SA-10(d)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to document the potential security impacts of approved changes to the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003161	SA-10(e)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to track security flaws within the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003162	SA-10(e)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to track flaw resolution within the system, component, or service.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003163	SA-10(e)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to report security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service findings to organization-defined personnel.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-003171	SA-11(a)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to create a security assessment plan.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003172	SA-11(a)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement a security assessment plan.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003173	SA-11(b)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform unit, integration, system, and/or regression testing/evaluation at organization-defined depth and coverage.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003174	SA-11(b)	The organization defines the depth and coverage to perform unit, integration, system, and/or regression testing/evaluation.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003175	SA-11(c)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003176	SA-11(c)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce the results of the security testing/evaluation.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003177	SA-11(d)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to implement a verifiable flaw remediation process.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003178	SA-11(e)	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.14 CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY TESTIN...
CCI-003233	SA-15	The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process.	Designer Impractical	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-003234	SA-15(a)(1)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process explicitly addresses security requirements.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003235	SA-15(a)(2)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process identifies the standards used in the development process.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003236	SA-15(a)(2)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process identifies the tools used in the development process.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003237	SA-15(a)(3)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003238	SA-15(a)(4)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process documents changes to the process and/or tools used in development.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003239	SA-15(a)(4)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process manages changes to the process and/or tools used in development.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-003240	SA-15(a)(4)	The documented information system, system component, or information system service development process ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001082	SC-2	The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.2 Denial of Service Protection<TAI OP...
CCI-001094	SC-5(1)	The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch organization-defined denial of service attacks against other information systems.	Enclave Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001095	SC-5(2)	The information system manages excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding types of denial of service attacks.	Designer	3.2.5 IP Control Networks
CCI-002388	SC-5(3)(a)	The organization defines a list of monitoring tools to be employed to detect indicators of denial of service attacks against the information system.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002390	SC-5(3)(b)	The organization defines the information system resources to be monitored to determine if sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial of service attacks.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001109	SC-7(5)	The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).	Enclave Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact... 3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002400	SC-7(9)(b)	The information system audits the identity of internal users associated with denied outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information systems.	Designer Impractical	3.5.1 Audit Events, Content of Audit Reco...
CCI-002398	SC-7(9)(a)	The information system detects outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information systems.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002399	SC-7(9)(a)	The information system denies outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information systems.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002403	SC-7(11)	The information system only allows incoming communications from organization-defined authorized sources routed to organization-defined authorized destinations.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 3.7.5 Process

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
				Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002401	SC-7(11)	The organization defines the authorized sources from which the information system will allow incoming communications.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched...
CCI-002402	SC-7(11)	The organization defines the authorized destinations for routing inbound communications.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched...
CCI-002404	SC-7(12)	The organization defines the host-based boundary protection mechanisms that are to be implemented at organization-defined information system components.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002405	SC-7(12)	The organization defines the information system components at which organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms will be implemented.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002406	SC-7(12)	The organization implements organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms at organization-defined information system components.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-001120	SC-7(13)	The organization defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components to be isolated.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-001126	SC-7(18)	The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary protection device.	Designer Impractical	1.9.2 Cybersecurity Interconnection Sched... 3.7.5 Process Isolation and Boundary Prot...
CCI-002418	SC-8	The information system protects the confidentiality and/or integrity of transmitted information.	Designer	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection 3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-002419	SC-8(1)	The organization defines the alternative physical safeguards to be employed when cryptographic mechanisms are not implemented to protect information during transmission.	DoD-Defined Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002421	SC-8(1)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information and/or detect changes to information during transmission unless otherwise protected by organization-defined alternative physical safeguards.	Designer	3.3.6 Physical Security in MODERATE Impact...
CCI-002420	SC-8(2)	The information system maintains the confidentiality and/or integrity of information during preparation for transmission.	Designer	---
CCI-002422	SC-8(2)	The information system maintains the confidentiality and/or integrity of information during reception.	Designer	---
CCI-001133	SC-10	The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after an organization-defined time period of inactivity.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-001134	SC-10	The organization defines the time period of inactivity after which the information system terminates a network connection associated with a communications session.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.3.4 Session Lock and Session Terminatio...
CCI-002449	SC-13	The organization defines the cryptographic uses, and type of cryptography required for each use, to be implemented by the information system.	DoD-Defined Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-002450	SC-13	The information system implements organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each use in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-001160	SC-18(a)	The organization defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001161	SC-18(b)	The organization establishes usage restrictions for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001162	SC-18(b)	The organization establishes implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001163	SC-18(c)	The organizations authorizes the use of mobile code within the information system.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-001164	SC-18(c)	The organization monitors the use of mobile code within the information system.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001165	SC-18(c)	The organization controls the use of mobile code within the information system.	Enclave Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001166	SC-18(1)	The information system identifies organization-defined unacceptable mobile code.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001662	SC-18(1)	The information system takes organization-defined corrective action when organization-defined unacceptable mobile code is identified.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-002457	SC-18(1)	The organization defines the corrective actions to be taken when organization-defined unacceptable mobile code is identified.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-002458	SC-18(1)	The organization defines what constitutes unacceptable mobile code for its information systems.	Enclave Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001169	SC-18(3)	The information system prevents the download of organization-defined unacceptable mobile code.	Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001695	SC-18(3)	The information system prevents the execution of organization-defined unacceptable mobile code.	Designer Non-Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-001170	SC-18(4)	The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in organization-defined software applications.	Designer	3.7.3 Mobile Code In MODERATE Impact Syst...
CCI-002460	SC-18(4)	The information system enforces organization-defined actions prior to executing the code.	Designer	---
CCI-001184	SC-23	The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.2.7 Device Identification and Authentic...
CCI-001185	SC-23(1)	The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session termination.	Designer	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-001188	SC-23(3)	The information system generates unique session identifiers for each session with organization-defined randomness requirements.	Designer	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection
CCI-001664	SC-23(3)	The information system recognizes only session identifiers that are system-generated.	Designer	3.2.6 Cryptographic Protection



<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002470	SC-23(5)	The information system only allows the use of organization-defined certificate authorities for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.	Designer	3.2.7 Device Identification and Authentic...
CCI-001190	SC-24	The information system fails to an organization-defined known-state for organization-defined types of failures.	Designer	---
CCI-001191	SC-24	The organization defines the known states the information system should fail to in the event of a organization-defined system failure.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001192	SC-24	The organization defines types of failures for which the information system should fail to an organization-defined known state.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001193	SC-24	The organization defines system state information that should be preserved in the event of a system failure.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001665	SC-24	The information system preserves organization-defined system state information in the event of a system failure.	Designer Impractical	---
CCI-001199	SC-28	The information system protects the confidentiality and/or integrity of organization-defined information at rest.	Enclave Designer Impractical	3.7.4 Protection of Information at Rest I...
CCI-002472	SC-28	The organization defines the information at rest that is to be protected by the information system.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	3.7.4 Protection of Information at Rest I...
CCI-002475	SC-28(1)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized modification of organization-defined information at rest on organization-defined information system components.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.7.4 Protection of Information at Rest I...
CCI-002476	SC-28(1)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of organization-defined information at rest on organization-defined information system components.	DoD-Defined Designer Impractical	3.7.4 Protection of Information at Rest I...
CCI-002686	SI-4(23)	The organization defines the information system components at which organization-defined host-based monitoring mechanisms are to be implemented.	DoD-Defined Designer Non-Designer	---

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCI for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002703	SI-7	The organization defines the software, firmware, and information which will be subjected to integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002705	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the software on which integrity checks will be performed.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002706	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the firmware on which integrity checks will be performed.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002707	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the information on which integrity checks will be performed.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002710	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined software at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002711	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined firmware at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002712	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined information at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.	Enclave Designer	---
CCI-002723	SI-7(8)	The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provides the capability to audit the event.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-002724	SI-7(8)	The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, initiates one or more of following actions: generates an audit record; alerts current user; alerts organization-defined personnel or roles; and/or organization-defined other actions.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	---
CCI-002737	SI-7(14)(a)	The organization prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.	Designer Non-Designer Impractical	1.10 SOFTWARE LICENSING

<b>Table G-5 Additional Designer CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>				
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>UFGS Reference</b>
CCI-002744	SI-10	The organization defines the inputs the information system is to conduct validity checks.	DoD-Defined Designer	---
CCI-001310	SI-10	The information system checks the validity of organization-defined inputs.	Designer Non-Designer	---
CCI-002754	SI-10(3)	The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.	Designer Impractical	3.8 SAFE MODE AND FAIL SAFE OPERATION
CCI-001312	SI-11(a)	The information system generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.	Designer	---

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002247	AC-8(a)	The organization defines the use notification message or banner the information system displays to users before granting access to the system.
CCI-000048	AC-8(a)	The information system displays an organization-defined system use notification message or banner before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.
CCI-002243	AC-8(a)(1)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that users are accessing a U.S. Government information system.
CCI-002244	AC-8(a)(2)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit.
CCI-002245	AC-8(a)(3)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties.
CCI-002246	AC-8(a)(4)	The organization-defined information system use notification message or banner is to state that use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording.
CCI-000050	AC-8(b)	The information system retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access.
CCI-002248	AC-8(c)(1)	The organization defines the conditions of use which are to be displayed to users of the information system before granting further access.
CCI-000063	AC-17(a)	The organization defines allowed methods of remote access to the information system.
CCI-002310	AC-17(a)	The organization establishes and documents usage restrictions for each type of remote access allowed.
CCI-002311	AC-17(a)	The organization establishes and documents configuration/connection requirements for each type of remote access allowed.
CCI-002312	AC-17(a)	The organization establishes and documents implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed.
CCI-000065	AC-17(b)	The organization authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections
CCI-000082	AC-19(a)	The organization establishes usage restrictions for organization controlled mobile devices.
CCI-002325	AC-19(a)	The organization establishes configuration requirements for organization controlled mobile devices.
CCI-002326	AC-19(a)	The organization establishes connection requirements for organization controlled mobile devices.
CCI-000083	AC-19(a)	The organization establishes implementation guidance for organization controlled mobile devices.
CCI-000084	AC-19(b)	The organization authorizes connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000093	AC-20(a)	The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information systems, allowing authorized individuals to access the information system from the external information systems.
CCI-000098	AC-21(a)	The organization facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for organization-defined information circumstances where user discretion is required.
CCI-001470	AC-21(a)	The organization defines information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required.
CCI-001471	AC-21(b)	The organization employs organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes required to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.
CCI-001472	AC-21(b)	The organization defines the automated mechanisms or manual processes required to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.
CCI-000139	AU-5(a)	The information system alerts designated organization-defined personnel or roles in the event of an audit processing failure.
CCI-000140	AU-5(b)	The information system takes organization defined actions upon audit failure (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records).
CCI-001490	AU-5(b)	The organization defines actions to be taken by the information system upon audit failure (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records).
CCI-000162	AU-9	The information system protects audit information from unauthorized access.
CCI-000163	AU-9	The information system protects audit information from unauthorized modification.
CCI-000164	AU-9	The information system protects audit information from unauthorized deletion.
CCI-001493	AU-9	The information system protects audit tools from unauthorized access.
CCI-001494	AU-9	The information system protects audit tools from unauthorized modification.
CCI-001495	AU-9	The information system protects audit tools from unauthorized deletion.
CCI-000257	CA-3(a)	The organization authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements.
CCI-000259	CA-3(b)	The organization documents, for each interconnection, the security requirements.
CCI-000260	CA-3(b)	The organization documents, for each interconnection, the nature of the information communicated.
CCI-000258	CA-3(b)	The organization documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics.
CCI-001732	CM-10(c)	The organization controls the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.
CCI-001733	CM-10(c)	The organization documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000535	CP-9(a)	The organization conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system per organization-defined frequency that is consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives.
CCI-000537	CP-9(b)	The organization conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system per organization-defined frequency that is consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives.
CCI-000539	CP-9(c)	The organization conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related documentation per organization-defined frequency that is consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives.
CCI-000540	CP-9(d)	The organization protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage locations.
CCI-000550	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a disruption.
CCI-000551	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a compromise.
CCI-000552	CP-10	The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state after a failure.
CCI-001933	IA-1(a)	The organization defines the personnel or roles to be recipients of the identification and authentication policy and the procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls.
CCI-001934	IA-1(a)	The organization documents procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls.
CCI-000756	IA-1(a)(1)	The organization develops and documents an identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance.
CCI-000757	IA-1(a)(1)	The organization disseminates to organization defined personnel or roles an identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance.
CCI-001932	IA-1(a)(1)	The organization documents an identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance.
CCI-000760	IA-1(a)(2)	The organization develops and documents procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls.
CCI-000761	IA-1(a)(2)	The organization disseminates to organization-defined personnel or roles procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls.
CCI-000758	IA-1(b)(1)	The organization reviews and updates identification and authentication policy in accordance with the organization defined frequency.
CCI-000759	IA-1(b)(1)	The organization defines a frequency for reviewing and updating the identification and authentication policy.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000762	IA-1(b)(2)	The organization reviews and updates identification and authentication procedures in accordance with the organization defined frequency.
CCI-000763	IA-1(b)(2)	The organization defines a frequency for reviewing and updating the identification and authentication procedures.
CCI-000764	IA-2	The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of organizational users).
CCI-000765	IA-2(1)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged accounts.
CCI-001953	IA-2(12)	The information system accepts Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.
CCI-001954	IA-2(12)	The information system electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.
CCI-000777	IA-3	The organization defines a list of specific and/or types of devices for which identification and authentication is required before establishing a connection to the information system.
CCI-000778	IA-3	The information system uniquely identifies an organization defined list of specific and/or types of devices before establishing a local, remote, or network connection.
CCI-001958	IA-3	The information system authenticates an organization defined list of specific and/or types of devices before establishing a local, remote, or network connection.
CCI-001970	IA-4(a)	The organization defines the personnel or roles that authorize the assignment of individual, group, role, and device identifiers.
CCI-001971	IA-4(a)	The organization manages information system identifiers by receiving authorization from organization-defined personnel or roles to assign an individual, group, role or device identifier.
CCI-001972	IA-4(b)	The organization manages information system identifiers by selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device.
CCI-001973	IA-4(c)	The organization manages information system identifiers by assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device.
CCI-001974	IA-4(d)	The organization defines the time period for which the reuse of identifiers is prohibited.
CCI-001975	IA-4(d)	The organization manages information system identifiers by preventing reuse of identifiers for an organization-defined time period.
CCI-000794	IA-4(e)	The organization defines a time period of inactivity after which the identifier is disabled.
CCI-000795	IA-4(e)	The organization manages information system identifiers by disabling the identifier after an organization defined time period of inactivity.
CCI-001990	IA-5(j)	The organization manages information system authenticators by changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.
CCI-000192	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of upper case characters used.
CCI-000193	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of lower case characters used.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000194	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of numeric characters used.
CCI-000205	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces minimum password length.
CCI-001619	IA-5(1)(a)	The information system enforces password complexity by the minimum number of special characters used.
CCI-000195	IA-5(1)(b)	The information system, for password-based authentication, when new passwords are created, enforces that at least an organization-defined number of characters are changed.
CCI-000196	IA-5(1)(c)	The information system, for password-based authentication, stores only cryptographically-protected passwords.
CCI-000197	IA-5(1)(c)	The information system, for password-based authentication, transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords.
CCI-000199	IA-5(1)(d)	The information system enforces maximum password lifetime restrictions.
CCI-001618	IA-5(1)(e)	The organization defines the number of generations for which password reuse is prohibited.
CCI-000200	IA-5(1)(e)	The information system prohibits password reuse for the organization defined number of generations.
CCI-002041	IA-5(1)(f)	The information system allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.
CCI-002002	IA-5(11)	The organization defines the token quality requirements to be employed by the information system mechanisms for token-based authentication.
CCI-002003	IA-5(11)	The information system, for token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy organization-defined token quality requirements.
CCI-000206	IA-6	The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.
CCI-000803	IA-7	The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.
CCI-000804	IA-8	The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users).
CCI-002009	IA-8(1)	The information system accepts Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies.
CCI-002010	IA-8(1)	The information system electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies.
CCI-002011	IA-8(2)	The information system accepts FICAM-approved third-party credentials.
CCI-002013	IA-8(3)	The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in organization-defined information systems to accept third-party credentials.
CCI-002014	IA-8(4)	The information system conforms to FICAM-issued profiles.
CCI-002566	MP-1(a)(1)	The organization defines personnel or roles to whom a documented media protection policy and procedures will be disseminated.



<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000995	MP-1(a)(1)	The organization develops and documents a media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance.
CCI-000996	MP-1(a)(1)	The organization disseminates to organization-defined personnel or roles a media protection policy.
CCI-000999	MP-1(a)(2)	The organization develops and documents procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls.
CCI-001000	MP-1(a)(2)	The organization disseminates to organization-defined personnel or roles procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls.
CCI-000998	MP-1(b)(1)	The organization defines a frequency for reviewing and updating the current media protection policy.
CCI-000997	MP-1(b)(1)	The organization reviews and updates the current media protection policy in accordance with organization-defined frequency.
CCI-001002	MP-1(b)(2)	The organization defines a frequency for reviewing and updating the current media protection procedures.
CCI-001001	MP-1(b)(2)	The organization reviews and updates the current media protection procedures in accordance with organization-defined frequency.
CCI-001003	MP-2	The organization restricts access to organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media to organization-defined personnel or roles.
CCI-001004	MP-2	The organization defines types of digital and/or non-digital media for which the organization restricts access.
CCI-001005	MP-2	The organization defines personnel or roles to restrict access to organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media.
CCI-001028	MP-6(a)	The organization sanitizes organization-defined information system media prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using organization-defined sanitization techniques and procedures in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies.
CCI-002578	MP-6(a)	The organization defines information system media to sanitize prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using organization-defined sanitization techniques and procedures in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies.
CCI-002579	MP-6(a)	The organization defines the sanitization techniques and procedures in accordance with applicable federal and organization standards and policies to be used to sanitize organization-defined information system media prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse.
CCI-002580	MP-6(b)	The organization employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information.
CCI-002581	MP-7	The organization defines the types of information system media to restrict or prohibit on organization-defined information systems or system components using organization-defined security safeguards.
CCI-002582	MP-7	The organization defines the information systems or system components to restrict or prohibit the use of organization-defined types of information system media using organization-defined security safeguards.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCI for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002583	MP-7	The organization defines the security safeguards to use for restricting or prohibiting the use of organization-defined types of information system media on organization-defined information systems or system components.
CCI-002584	MP-7	The organization restricts or prohibits the use of organization-defined types of information system media on organization-defined information systems or system components using organization-defined security safeguards.
CCI-000965	PE-13	The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.
CCI-000971	PE-14(a)	The organization maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system resides at organization-defined acceptable levels.
CCI-000972	PE-14(a)	The organization defines acceptable temperature and humidity levels to be maintained within the facility where the information system resides.
CCI-000973	PE-14(b)	The organization monitors temperature and humidity levels in accordance with organization-defined frequency.
CCI-000974	PE-14(b)	The organization defines a frequency for monitoring temperature and humidity levels.
CCI-000977	PE-15	The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible.
CCI-000978	PE-15	The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are working properly.
CCI-000979	PE-15	Key personnel have knowledge of the master water shutoff or isolation valves.
CCI-000981	PE-16	The organization authorizes organization-defined types of information system components entering and exiting the facility.
CCI-000982	PE-16	The organization monitors organization-defined types of information system components entering and exiting the facility.
CCI-000983	PE-16	The organization controls organization-defined types of information system components entering and exiting the facility.
CCI-000984	PE-16	The organization maintains records of information system components entering and exiting the facility.
CCI-002974	PE-16	The organization defines types of information system components to authorize, monitor, and control entering and exiting the facility and to maintain records.
CCI-003051	PL-2(a)(2)	The organization's security plan for the information system explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system.
CCI-001055	RA-5(a)	The organization defines a frequency for scanning for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications.
CCI-001054	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications on an organization-defined frequency.
CCI-001056	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-001641	RA-5(a)	The organization defines the process for conducting random vulnerability scans on the information system and hosted applications.
CCI-001643	RA-5(a)	The organization scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications in accordance with the organization-defined process for random scans.
CCI-001057	RA-5(b)	The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations; formatting checklists and test procedures; and measuring vulnerability impact.
CCI-001058	RA-5(c)	The organization analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments.
CCI-001059	RA-5(d)	The organization remediates legitimate vulnerabilities in organization-defined response times in accordance with an organizational assessment risk.
CCI-003116	SA-4(10)	The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational information systems.
CCI-003137	SA-9(a)	The organization defines security controls that providers of external information system services employ in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.
CCI-000669	SA-9(a)	The organization requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational information security requirements.
CCI-000670	SA-9(a)	The organization requires that providers of external information system services employ organization-defined security controls in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.
CCI-000671	SA-9(b)	The organization defines government oversight with regard to external information system services.
CCI-000672	SA-9(b)	The organization documents government oversight with regard to external information system services.
CCI-000673	SA-9(b)	The organization defines user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services.
CCI-000674	SA-9(b)	The organization documents user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services.
CCI-003138	SA-9(c)	The organization employs organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.
CCI-003139	SA-9(c)	The organization defines processes, methods, and techniques to employ to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.
CCI-001093	SC-5	The organization defines the types of denial of service attacks (or provides references to sources of current denial of service attacks) that can be addressed by the information system.
CCI-002386	SC-5	The organization defines the security safeguards to be employed to protect the information system against, or limit the effects of, denial of service attacks.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002385	SC-5	The information system protects against or limits the effects of organization-defined types of denial of service attacks by employing organization-defined security safeguards.
CCI-001097	SC-7(a)	The information system monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system.
CCI-001098	SC-7(c)	The information system connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security architecture.
CCI-002428	SC-12	The organization defines the requirements for cryptographic key generation to be employed within the information system.
CCI-002429	SC-12	The organization defines the requirements for cryptographic key distribution to be employed within the information system.
CCI-002430	SC-12	The organization defines the requirements for cryptographic key storage to be employed within the information system.
CCI-002431	SC-12	The organization defines the requirements for cryptographic key access to be employed within the information system.
CCI-002432	SC-12	The organization defines the requirements for cryptographic key destruction to be employed within the information system.
CCI-001150	SC-15(a)	The information system prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices excluding the organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed.
CCI-001151	SC-15(a)	The organization defines exceptions to the prohibiting of collaborative computing devices where remote activation is to be allowed.
CCI-001152	SC-15(b)	The information system provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at collaborative computing devices.
CCI-002465	SC-21	The information system requests data origin authentication verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.
CCI-002466	SC-21	The information system requests data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.
CCI-002467	SC-21	The information system performs data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.
CCI-002468	SC-21	The information system performs data origin verification authentication on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from authoritative sources.
CCI-002544	SC-41	The organization defines the information systems or information system components on which organization-defined connection ports or input/output devices are to be physically disabled or removed.
CCI-002545	SC-41	The organization defines the connection ports or input/output devices that are to be physically disabled or removed from organization-defined information systems or information system components.
CCI-001228	SI-2(b)	The organization tests software updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness before installation.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-001229	SI-2(b)	The organization tests software updates related to flaw remediation for potential side effects before installation.
CCI-002602	SI-2(b)	The organization tests firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness before installation.
CCI-002603	SI-2(b)	The organization tests firmware updates related to flaw remediation for potential side effects before installation.
CCI-001227	SI-2(a)	The organization corrects information system flaws.
CCI-002619	SI-3(a)	The organization employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry points to detect malicious code.
CCI-002621	SI-3(a)	The organization employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry points to eradicate malicious code.
CCI-002620	SI-3(a)	The organization employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system exit points to detect malicious code.
CCI-002622	SI-3(a)	The organization employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system exit points to eradicate malicious code.
CCI-001241	SI-3(c)(1)	The organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to perform periodic scans of the information system on an organization-defined frequency.
CCI-002624	SI-3(c)(1)	The organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to perform real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry/exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational security policy.
CCI-001242	SI-3(c)(1)	The organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to perform real-time scans of files from external sources at endpoints as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational security policy.
CCI-001244	SI-3(c)(2)	The organization defines one or more actions to perform in response to malicious code detection, such as blocking malicious code, quarantining malicious code, or sending alert to administrator.
CCI-001243	SI-3(c)(2)	The organization configures malicious code protection mechanisms to perform organization-defined action(s) in response to malicious code detection.
CCI-001253	SI-4(a)(1)	The organization defines the objectives of monitoring for attacks and indicators of potential attacks on the information system.
CCI-002641	SI-4(a)(1)	The organization monitors the information system to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with organization-defined monitoring objectives.
CCI-002642	SI-4(a)(2)	The organization monitors the information system to detect unauthorized local connections.
CCI-002643	SI-4(a)(2)	The organization monitors the information system to detect unauthorized network connections.
CCI-002644	SI-4(a)(2)	The organization monitors the information system to detect unauthorized remote connections.
CCI-002645	SI-4(b)	The organization defines the techniques and methods to be used to identify unauthorized use of the information system.
CCI-002646	SI-4(b)	The organization identifies unauthorized use of the information system through organization-defined techniques and methods.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-001256	SI-4(c)	The organization deploys monitoring devices at ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization.
CCI-002647	SI-4(d)	The organization protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access.
CCI-002648	SI-4(d)	The organization protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized modification.
CCI-002649	SI-4(d)	The organization protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized deletion.
CCI-001257	SI-4(e)	The organization heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.
CCI-001258	SI-4(f)	The organization obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations.
CCI-002650	SI-4(g)	The organization defines the information system monitoring information that is to be provided the organization-defined personnel or roles.
CCI-002651	SI-4(g)	The organization defines the personnel or roles that are to be provided organization-defined information system monitoring information.
CCI-002652	SI-4(g)	The organization defines the frequency at which the organization will provide the organization-defined information system monitoring information to organization-defined personnel or roles
CCI-002654	SI-4(g)	The organization provides organization-defined information system monitoring information to organization-defined personnel or roles as needed or per organization-defined frequency.
CCI-002692	SI-5(a)	The organization defines the external organizations from which it receives information system security alerts, advisories and directives.
CCI-001285	SI-5(a)	The organization receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from organization-defined external organizations on an ongoing basis.
CCI-001286	SI-5(b)	The organization generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary.
CCI-002693	SI-5(c)	The organization defines the elements within the organization to whom the organization will disseminate security alerts, advisories and directives.
CCI-001288	SI-5(c)	The organization defines the personnel or roles to whom the organization will disseminate security alerts, advisories and directives.
CCI-001287	SI-5(c)	The organization disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to organization-defined personnel or roles, organization-defined elements within the organization, and/or organization-defined external organizations.
CCI-001289	SI-5(d)	The organization implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.
CCI-000080	PM-3(a)	The organization ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to this requirement.

<b>Table G-6 Platform Enclave CCIs for LOW and MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000081	PM-3(b)	The organization employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required.
CCI-000141	PM-3(c)	The organization ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned.
CCI-002991	PM-4(a)(1)	The organization implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program and associated organizational information systems are developed.
CCI-000142	PM-4(a)(1)	The organization implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program and the associated organizational information systems are maintained.
CCI-000170	PM-4(a)(2)	The organization implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program and associated organizational information systems document the remedial information security actions to adequately respond to risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
CCI-002992	PM-4(a)(3)	The organization implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program and associated organizational information systems are reported in accordance with OMB FISMA reporting requirements.
CCI-000236	PM-11(b)	The organization determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes and revises the processes as necessary, until an achievable set of protection needs are obtained.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000015	AC-2(1)	The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the information system account management functions.
CCI-001361	AC-2(2)	The organization defines a time period after which temporary accounts are automatically terminated.
CCI-001365	AC-2(2)	The organization defines a time period after which emergency accounts are automatically terminated.
CCI-001682	AC-2(2)	The information system automatically removes or disables emergency accounts after an organization-defined time period for each type of account.
CCI-000016	AC-2(2)	The information system automatically removes or disables temporary accounts after an organization-defined time period for each type of account.
CCI-000017	AC-2(3)	The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after an organization-defined time period.
CCI-000018	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account creation actions.
CCI-001403	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account modification actions.
CCI-002130	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account enabling actions.
CCI-001404	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account disabling actions.
CCI-001405	AC-2(4)	The information system automatically audits account removal actions.
CCI-001683	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account creation actions.
CCI-001684	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account modification actions.
CCI-002132	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account enabling actions.
CCI-001685	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account disabling actions.
CCI-001686	AC-2(4)	The information system notifies organization-defined personnel or roles for account removal actions.
CCI-001368	AC-4	The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system based on organization-defined information flow control policies.
CCI-001414	AC-4	The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems based on organization-defined information flow control policies.
CCI-001548	AC-4	The organization defines the information flow control policies for controlling the flow of information within the system.
CCI-001549	AC-4	The organization defines the information flow control policies for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems.
CCI-001550	AC-4	The organization defines approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system.
CCI-001551	AC-4	The organization defines approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems.



<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002220	AC-5(c)	The organization defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.
CCI-000225	AC-6	The organization employs the concept of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (and processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.
CCI-002231	AC-6(7)(b)	The organization reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission/business needs.
CCI-000059	AC-11(a)	The organization defines the time period of inactivity after which the information system initiates a session lock.
CCI-000058	AC-11(a)	The information system provides the capability for users to directly initiate session lock mechanisms.
CCI-000056	AC-11(b)	The information system retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.
CCI-000060	AC-11(1)	The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.
CCI-002360	AC-12	The organization defines the conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect to be employed by the information system when automatically terminating a user session.
CCI-002361	AC-12	The information system automatically terminates a user session after organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect.
CCI-000067	AC-17(1)	The information system monitors remote access methods.
CCI-002314	AC-17(1)	The information system controls remote access methods.
CCI-000068	AC-17(2)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access sessions.
CCI-001453	AC-17(2)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of remote access sessions.
CCI-001561	AC-17(3)	The organization defines managed access control points for remote access to the information system.
CCI-002315	AC-17(3)	The organization defines the number of managed network access control points through which the information system routes all remote access.
CCI-000069	AC-17(3)	The information system routes all remote accesses through organization-defined number managed network access control points.
CCI-000070	AC-17(4)(a)	The organization authorizes the execution of privileged commands via remote access only for organization-defined needs.
CCI-002316	AC-17(4)(a)	The organization authorizes the access to security-relevant information via remote access only for organization-defined needs.
CCI-002317	AC-17(4)(a)	The organization defines the operational needs when the execution of privileged commands via remote access is to be authorized.
CCI-002318	AC-17(4)(a)	The organization defines the operational needs when access to security-relevant information via remote access is to be authorized.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002319	AC-17(4)(b)	The organization documents in the security plan for the information system the rationale for authorization of the execution of privilege commands via remote access.
CCI-002320	AC-17(4)(b)	The organization documents in the security plan for the information system the rationale for authorization of access to security-relevant information via remote access.
CCI-002321	AC-17(9)	The organization defines the time period within which it disconnects or disables remote access to the information system.
CCI-002322	AC-17(9)	The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to the information system within the organization-defined time period.
CCI-002329	AC-19(5)	The organization defines the mobile devices that are to employ full-device or container encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the information on device.
CCI-002330	AC-19(5)	The organization employs full-device encryption or container encryption to protect the confidentiality of information on organization-defined mobile devices.
CCI-002333	AC-20(1)(a)	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access the information system only when the organization verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization's information security policy and security plan.
CCI-002334	AC-20(1)(a)	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to process organization-controlled information only when the organization verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization's information security policy and security plan.
CCI-002335	AC-20(1)(a)	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to store organization-controlled information only when the organization verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization's information security policy and security plan.
CCI-002336	AC-20(1)(a)	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to transmit organization-controlled information only when the organization verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified in the organization's information security policy and security plan.
CCI-002337	AC-20(1)(b)	The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only when the organization retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external information system.
CCI-000097	AC-20(2)	The organization restricts or prohibits the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-001875	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports on-demand audit review and analysis.
CCI-001876	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports on-demand reporting requirements.
CCI-001877	AU-7(a)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that supports after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.
CCI-001878	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports on-demand audit review and analysis.
CCI-001879	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports on-demand reporting requirements.
CCI-001880	AU-7(a)	The information system provides a report generation capability that supports after-the-fact investigations of security incidents.
CCI-001881	AU-7(b)	The information system provides an audit reduction capability that does not alter original content or time ordering of audit records.
CCI-001882	AU-7(b)	The information system provides a report generation capability that does not alter original content or time ordering of audit records.
CCI-000158	AU-7(1)	The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on organization-defined audit fields within audit records.
CCI-002081	CA-3(5)	The organization defines the information systems that employ either allow-all, deny-by-exception or deny-all, permit by exception policy for allowing connection to external information systems.
CCI-002082	CA-3(5)	The organization selects either allow-all, deny-by exception or deny-all, permit by exception policy for allowing organization-defined information systems to connect to external information systems.
CCI-002080	CA-3(5)	The organization employs either an allow-all, deny-by exception or deny-all, permit by exception policy for allowing organization-defined information systems to connect to external information systems.
CCI-000338	CM-5	The organization defines physical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000339	CM-5	The organization documents physical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000340	CM-5	The organization approves physical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000341	CM-5	The organization enforces physical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000342	CM-5	The organization defines logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000343	CM-5	The organization documents logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000344	CM-5	The organization approves logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
CCI-000345	CM-5	The organization enforces logical access restrictions associated with changes to the information system.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000419	CM-8(5)	The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information system are not duplicated in other information system inventories.
CCI-000505	CP-6(a)	The organization establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and retrieval of information system backup information.
CCI-002836	CP-6(b)	The organization ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.
CCI-000507	CP-6(1)	The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
CCI-000509	CP-6(3)	The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster.
CCI-001604	CP-6(3)	The organization outlines explicit mitigation actions for organization identified accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster.
CCI-000510	CP-7(a)	The organization defines the time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives for essential missions/business functions to permit the transfer and resumption of organization-defined information system operations at an alternate processing site when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.
CCI-000513	CP-7(a)	The organization establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential missions within organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.
CCI-002839	CP-7(a)	The organization defines information system operations that are permitted to transfer and resume at an alternate processing sites for essential missions/business functions when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable.
CCI-000515	CP-7(b)	The organization ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption.
CCI-000521	CP-7(c)	The organization ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.
CCI-000516	CP-7(1)	The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
CCI-000517	CP-7(2)	The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster.
CCI-001606	CP-7(2)	The organization outlines explicit mitigation actions for organization identified potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-000518	CP-7(3)	The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with the organizational availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).
CCI-000522	CP-8	The organization defines the time period to permit the resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential missions when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.
CCI-000524	CP-8	The organization establishes alternate telecommunication services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of organization-defined information system operations for essential missions within organization-defined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.
CCI-002840	CP-8	The organization defines the information system operations to be resumed for essential missions within the organization-defined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.
CCI-000526	CP-8(1)(a)	The organization develops primary telecommunications service agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with the organizations availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).
CCI-000527	CP-8(1)(a)	The organization develops alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priority-of-service provisions in accordance with the organizations availability requirements (including recovery time objectives).
CCI-000528	CP-8(1)(b)	The organization requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.
CCI-000529	CP-8(1)(b)	The organization requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for national security emergency preparedness in the event that the alternate telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.
CCI-000530	CP-8(2)	The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.
CCI-000541	CP-9(1)	The organization defines the frequency to test backup information to verify media reliability and information integrity.
CCI-000542	CP-9(1)	The organization tests backup information per organization-defined frequency to verify media reliability and information integrity.
CCI-000766	IA-2(2)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to non-privileged accounts.
CCI-000767	IA-2(3)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged accounts.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-001947	IA-2(11)	The organization defines the strength of mechanism requirements for the device that is separate from the system gaining access and is to provide one factor of a multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged accounts.
CCI-001950	IA-2(11)	The organization defines the strength of mechanism requirements for the device that is separate from the system gaining access and is to provide one factor of a multifactor authentication for remote access to non-privileged accounts.
CCI-001948	IA-2(11)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access.
CCI-001952	IA-2(11)	The device used in the information system implementation of multifactor authentication for remote access to non-privileged accounts meets organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements.
CCI-001951	IA-2(11)	The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access.
CCI-001949	IA-2(11)	The device used in the information system implementation of multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged accounts meets organization-defined strength of mechanism requirements.
CCI-000185	IA-5(2)(a)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information.
CCI-000186	IA-5(2)(b)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key.
CCI-000187	IA-5(2)(c)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication, maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group.
CCI-001991	IA-5(2)(d)	The information system, for PKI-based authentication, implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case of inability to access revocation information via the network.
CCI-001992	IA-5(3)	The organization defines the personnel or roles responsible for authorizing the organization's registration authority accountable for the authenticator registration process.
CCI-001993	IA-5(3)	The organization defines the registration authority accountable for the authenticator registration process.
CCI-001994	IA-5(3)	The organization defines the types of and/or specific authenticators that are subject to the authenticator registration process.
CCI-001995	IA-5(3)	The organization requires that the registration process, to receive organization-defined types of and/or specific authenticators, be conducted in person, or by a trusted third-party, before organization-defined registration authority with authorization by organization-defined personnel or roles.
CCI-002890	MA-4(6)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-003123	MA-4(6)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.
CCI-002891	MA-4(7)	The information system implements remote disconnect verification at the termination of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions.
CCI-001010	MP-3(a)	The organization marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information.
CCI-001011	MP-3(b)	The organization exempts organization-defined types of information system media from marking as long as the media remain within organization-defined controlled areas.
CCI-001012	MP-3(b)	The organization defines types of information system media to exempt from marking as long as the media remain within organization-defined controlled areas.
CCI-001013	MP-3(b)	The organization defines controlled areas where organization-defined types of information system media are exempt from being marked.
CCI-001014	MP-4(a)	The organization physically controls and securely stores organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media within organization-defined controlled areas.
CCI-001015	MP-4(a)	The organization defines types of digital and/or non-digital media to physically control and securely store within organization-defined controlled areas.
CCI-001016	MP-4(a)	The organization defines controlled areas where organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media are physically controlled and securely stored.
CCI-001018	MP-4(b)	The organization protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.
CCI-001020	MP-5(a)	The organization protects and controls organization-defined types of information system media during transport outside of controlled areas using organization-defined security safeguards.
CCI-001021	MP-5(a)	The organization defines types of information system media protected and controlled during transport outside of controlled areas.
CCI-001022	MP-5(a)	The organization defines security safeguards to be used to protect and control organization-defined types of information system media during transport outside of controlled areas.
CCI-001023	MP-5(b)	The organization maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas.
CCI-001025	MP-5(c)	The organization documents activities associated with the transport of information system media.
CCI-001024	MP-5(d)	The organization restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized personnel.
CCI-001027	MP-5(4)	The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002585	MP-7(1)	The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organization information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.
CCI-000956	PE-10(a)	The organization provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations.
CCI-000957	PE-10(b)	The organization places emergency shutoff switches or devices in an organization-defined location by information system or system component to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel.
CCI-000958	PE-10(b)	The organization defines a location for emergency shutoff switches or devices by information system or system component.
CCI-000959	PE-10(c)	The organization protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.
CCI-002955	PE-11	The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate an orderly shutdown of the information system and/or transition of the information system to long-term alternate power in the event of a primary power source loss.
CCI-000961	PE-11(1)	The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.
CCI-001062	RA-5(1)	The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.
CCI-001063	RA-5(2)	The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned on an organization-defined frequency, prior to a new scan and/or when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported.
CCI-001067	RA-5(5)	The information system implements privileged access authorization to organization-identified information system components for selected organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities.
CCI-001645	RA-5(5)	The organization identifies the information system components to which privileged access is authorized for selected organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities.
CCI-002906	RA-5(5)	The organization defines the vulnerability scanning activities in which the information system implements privileged access authorization to organization-identified information system components.
CCI-000634	SA-4(7)(a)	The organization limits the use of commercially provided information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products to those products that have been successfully evaluated against a National Information Assurance partnership (NIAP)-approved Protection Profile for a specific technology type, if such a profile exists.
CCI-000635	SA-4(7)(b)	The organization requires, if no NIAP-approved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but a commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality to enforce its security policy, that the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated.



<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-003143	SA-9(2)	The organization requires providers of organization-defined external information system services to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.
CCI-003144	SA-9(2)	The organization defines the external information system services for which the providers are required to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.
CCI-001082	SC-2	The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.
CCI-001090	SC-4	The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.
CCI-001094	SC-5(1)	The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch organization-defined denial of service attacks against other information systems.
CCI-001101	SC-7(3)	The organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.
CCI-001102	SC-7(4)(a)	The organization implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-001103	SC-7(4)(b)	The organization establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-002396	SC-7(4)(c)	The organization protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across each interface for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-001105	SC-7(4)(d)	The organization documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need and duration of that need for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-001108	SC-7(4)(e)	The organization removes traffic flow policy exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-001106	SC-7(4)(e)	The organization reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy on an organization-defined frequency for each external telecommunication service.
CCI-001109	SC-7(5)	The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).
CCI-002397	SC-7(7)	The information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communicating via some other connection to resources in external networks.
CCI-001113	SC-7(8)	The organization defines the internal communications traffic to be routed to external networks.
CCI-001114	SC-7(8)	The organization defines the external networks to which the organization-defined internal communications traffic should be routed.
CCI-001112	SC-7(8)	The information system routes organization-defined internal communications traffic to organization-defined external networks through authenticated proxy servers at managed interfaces.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002398	SC-7(9)(a)	The information system detects outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information systems.
CCI-002399	SC-7(9)(a)	The information system denies outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information systems.
CCI-002403	SC-7(11)	The information system only allows incoming communications from organization-defined authorized sources routed to organization-defined authorized destinations.
CCI-002401	SC-7(11)	The organization defines the authorized sources from which the information system will allow incoming communications.
CCI-002402	SC-7(11)	The organization defines the authorized destinations for routing inbound communications.
CCI-002404	SC-7(12)	The organization defines the host-based boundary protection mechanisms that are to be implemented at organization-defined information system components.
CCI-002405	SC-7(12)	The organization defines the information system components at which organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms will be implemented.
CCI-002406	SC-7(12)	The organization implements organization-defined host-based boundary protection mechanisms at organization-defined information system components.
CCI-001120	SC-7(13)	The organization defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components to be isolated.
CCI-001119	SC-7(13)	The organization isolates organization-defined information security tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.
CCI-001121	SC-7(14)	The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at organization-defined managed interfaces.
CCI-001122	SC-7(14)	The organization defines the managed interfaces where boundary protections against unauthorized physical connections are to be implemented.
CCI-002407	SC-7(14)	The organization defines the managed interfaces at which the organization protects against unauthorized physical connections.
CCI-001133	SC-10	The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after an organization-defined time period of inactivity.
CCI-002449	SC-13	The organization defines the cryptographic uses, and type of cryptography required for each use, to be implemented by the information system.
CCI-002450	SC-13	The information system implements organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each use in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.
CCI-001159	SC-17	The organization issues public key certificates under an organization-defined certificate policy or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002456	SC-17	The organization defines the certificate policy employed to issue public key certificates.
CCI-001160	SC-18(a)	The organization defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.
CCI-001161	SC-18(b)	The organization establishes usage restrictions for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.
CCI-001162	SC-18(b)	The organization establishes implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies.
CCI-001163	SC-18(c)	The organizations authorizes the use of mobile code within the information system.
CCI-001164	SC-18(c)	The organization monitors the use of mobile code within the information system.
CCI-001165	SC-18(c)	The organization controls the use of mobile code within the information system.
CCI-001166	SC-18(1)	The information system identifies organization-defined unacceptable mobile code.
CCI-001662	SC-18(1)	The information system takes organization-defined corrective action when organization-defined unacceptable mobile code is identified.
CCI-002457	SC-18(1)	The organization defines the corrective actions to be taken when organization-defined unacceptable mobile code is identified.
CCI-002458	SC-18(1)	The organization defines what constitutes unacceptable mobile code for its information systems.
CCI-001184	SC-23	The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.
CCI-001199	SC-28	The information system protects the confidentiality and/or integrity of organization-defined information at rest.
CCI-001234	SI-2(2)	The organization defines a frequency for employing automated mechanisms to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.
CCI-001233	SI-2(2)	The organization employs automated mechanisms on an organization-defined frequency to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.
CCI-001246	SI-3(1)	The organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.
CCI-001247	SI-3(2)	The information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.
CCI-002655	SI-4(1)	The organization connects individual intrusion detection tools into an information system-wide intrusion detection system.
CCI-002656	SI-4(1)	The organization configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information system-wide intrusion detection system.
CCI-001260	SI-4(2)	The organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.
CCI-002659	SI-4(4)	The organization defines the frequency on which it will monitor inbound communications for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002660	SI-4(4)	The organization defines the frequency on which it will monitor outbound communications for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.
CCI-002661	SI-4(4)	The information system monitors inbound communications traffic per organization-defined frequency for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.
CCI-002662	SI-4(4)	The information system monitors outbound communications traffic per organization-defined frequency for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.
CCI-001264	SI-4(5)	The organization defines indicators of compromise or potential compromise to the security of the information system which will result in information system alerts being provided to organization-defined personnel or roles.
CCI-002663	SI-4(5)	The organization defines the personnel or roles to receive information system alerts when organization-defined indicators of compromise or potential compromise occur.
CCI-002664	SI-4(5)	The information system alerts organization-defined personnel or roles when organization-defined compromise indicators reflect the occurrence of a compromise or a potential compromise.
CCI-001273	SI-4(11)	The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the information system to discover anomalies.
CCI-001671	SI-4(11)	The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at selected organization-defined interior points within the system (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems) to discover anomalies.
CCI-001673	SI-4(14)	The organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.
CCI-001282	SI-4(15)	The organization employs an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications traffic as the traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks.
CCI-002683	SI-4(22)	The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by the organization-defined authorization or approval processes.
CCI-002684	SI-4(22)	The information system audits and/or alerts organization-defined personnel when unauthorized network services are detected.
CCI-002685	SI-4(23)	The organization defines the host-based monitoring mechanisms to be implemented at organization-defined information system components.
CCI-002687	SI-4(23)	The organization implements organization-defined host-based monitoring mechanisms at organization-defined information system components.
CCI-002703	SI-7	The organization defines the software, firmware, and information which will be subjected to integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes.
CCI-002704	SI-7	The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to organization-defined software, firmware, and information.
CCI-002705	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the software on which integrity checks will be performed.

<b>Table G-7 Additional Platform Enclave CCIs for MODERATE Impact Control Systems</b>		
<b>CCI #</b>	<b>800-53 Control Text Indicator</b>	<b>CCI Definition</b>
CCI-002706	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the firmware on which integrity checks will be performed.
CCI-002707	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the information on which integrity checks will be performed.
CCI-002710	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined software at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.
CCI-002711	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined firmware at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.
CCI-002712	SI-7(1)	The information system performs an integrity check of organization-defined information at startup, at organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events, or on organization-defined frequency.
CCI-002708	SI-7(1)	The organization defines the transitional state or security-relevant events when the information system will perform integrity checks on software, firmware and information.
CCI-002719	SI-7(7)	The organization defines the unauthorized security-relevant changes to the information system that are to be incorporated into the organizational incident response capability.
CCI-002720	SI-7(7)	The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized organization-defined security-relevant changes to the information system into the organizational incident response capability.
CCI-002823	SI-16	The organization defines the security safeguards to be implemented to protect the information system's memory from unauthorized code execution.
CCI-002824	SI-16	The information system implements organization-defined security safeguards to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.

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## APPENDIX H GLOSSARY

### H-1 ACRONYMS

#### H-1.1 General Acronyms

<u>Acronym</u>	<u>Term</u>
ACL	Access Control List
AO	Authorizing Official
BAS	Building Automation System
BCS	Building Control System
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CNSSI	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
CCI	Control Correlation Identifier
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
CS	Control System
DoD	Department of Defense
ESS	Electronic Security System
FCN	Field Control Network
FCS	Field Control System
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act
FPOC	Field Point of Connection
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
ICS	Industrial Control System
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
ISSM	Information System Security Manager
ISSO	Information System Security Officer
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
MOA	Memorandum Of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System

<b><u>Acronym</u></b>	<b><u>Term</u></b>
PIT	Platform Information Technology
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
SO	System Owner
UCS	Utility Control System
UFC	Unified Facilities Criteria
UFGS	Unified Facilities Guide Specification
UMCS	Utility Monitoring and Control System
UPS	Uninterruptible Power Supply
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

### **H-1.2 Security Control Family Acronyms**

<b><u>Acronym</u></b>	<b><u>Term</u></b>
AC	Access Control
AT	Awareness and Training
AU	Audit and Accountability
CA	Security Assessment and Authorization
CM	Configuration Management
CP	Contingency Planning
IA	Identification and Authorization
IR	Incident Response
MA	Maintenance
MP	Media Protection
PE	Physical and Environmental Protection
PL	Planning
PM	Program Management
PS	Personnel Security
RA	Risk Assessment
SA	System and Services Acquisition
SC	System and Communications Protection
SI	System and Information Integrity



## H-2 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Note that UFGS 25 05 11, “Cybersecurity for Facility-Related Control Systems” also has definitions that complement those provided here.

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Authorizing Official (CNSSI No. 4009)	A senior (federal) official or executive with the authority to formally assume responsibility for operating an information system at an acceptable level of risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Within the DoD, they are presumed to be SES or flag-level officers.
Building Automation System (BAS)	The system consisting of a UMCS Front End, connected Building Control Systems which control building electrical and mechanical systems, and user interfaces for building control supervision. The BAS is a subsystem of the Utility Monitoring and Control System. This term is being phased out in favor of UMCS.
Building Control System (BCS)	A system that controls building electrical and mechanical systems such as HVAC (including central plants), lighting, vertical transport systems, and irrigation systems. Building Control Systems generally do not have a full-featured user interface; they may have “local display panels” but typically rely on the UMCS front end for full user interface functionality. BCS is a subsystem of the Utility Monitoring and Control System and is a class of Field Control System.
Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV)	An ESS that allows video assessment of alarm conditions via remote monitoring and recording of video events. Video monitoring may also be incorporated into other systems which are not CCTV.
Control Correlation Identifier (CCI)	The Control Correlation Identifier (CCI) provides a standard identifier and description for each of the singular, actionable statements that comprise a security control.

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Control System (CS)	<p>Control systems are a combination of special purpose controlling devices (controllers), control components (e.g. electrical, mechanical or pneumatic sensors and actuators), and generally (but not always) network infrastructure (which may contain standard IT components) that act together upon underlying mechanical and/or electrical equipment to achieve an objective. A control system (CS) typically consists of sensors and actuators connected to networked digital controllers, includes a user interface, and is used to control and monitor equipment.</p> <p>Some control systems are “monitor only” (they do not exercise control) but are still considered control systems.</p>
Controller	<p>An electronic device – usually having internal programming logic and digital and analog input/output capability – which performs control functions.</p>
Distributed Control System	<p>This term describes a system architecture (not system functionality) and appears in some reference material (such as a NIST publications) but is not used by this UFC. (It’s included here due to use in some reference material.)</p>
Electronic Security System (ESS)	<p>The integrated electronic system that encompasses interior and exterior (physical) intrusion detection systems (IDS), CCTV systems for assessment of alarm conditions, access control systems, data transmission media, and alarm reporting systems for monitoring, control, and display.</p>
Engineering Tool Software	<p>Software that is used to perform device or network management for a control system, including network configuration, controller configuration and controller programming.</p>
Facility-Related Control System	<p>A control system which controls equipment and infrastructure that is part of a DoD building, structure, or linear structure.</p>
Field Control System (FCS)	<p>A Building Control System, Utility Control System, Electronic Security System, etc. within the Facility and "downstream" of the FPOC.</p>
Field Control Network (FCN)	<p>The network used by the Building Control System, Utility Control System, etc., within a facility "downstream" of the FPOC. This includes IP, Ethernet, RS-485, TP/FT-10 and other network infrastructure that support control system(s) in a given facility.</p>

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Field Point of Connection (FPOC)	The FPOC is the point of connection between the Level 4 control system IP network and the Level 2 field control IP network. Note the Level 2 IP network here may consist entirely of a single patch cable from the FPOC to a Level 1-to-Level 2 device. The hardware which provides the connection at this location is an IT device such as a switch, IP router, or firewall.
[UMCS, ESS, etc.] Front End	The portion of the control system consisting primarily of IT equipment, such as computers and related equipment, intended to perform operational functions and run monitoring and control/engineering tool application software. The front end does not directly control physical systems; it interacts with them only through field control systems (FCS). The front end is a component of the [UMCS, ESS, etc.] infrastructure (see definition).
Impact	<p>The effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals due to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability in the control system. Impact is categorized as one of three levels:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• LOW: limited adverse effect</li><li>• MODERATE: serious adverse effect</li><li>• HIGH: severe or catastrophic adverse effect</li></ul> <p>The impact level of a system is generally written in ALL CAPS for clarity. Further discussion of Impact level is in APPENDIX D</p>
Incident (FIPS PUB 200)	An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies
Industrial Control System (ICS)	One type of control system. Most specifically a control system which controls an industrial (manufacturing) process. Sometimes also used to refer to other types of control systems, particularly utility control systems such as electrical, gas, or water distribution systems.

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Information System (CNSSI No. 4009)	<p>A discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information.</p> <p>Note: Information systems also include specialized systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control systems.</p>
Information Technology (IT)	<p>Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by the executive agency.</p>
[UMCS, ESS, ...] Infrastructure	<p>The portion of a control system (such as a UMCS or ESS) which includes all components that are not part of a field control system. These components include the FPOC, the Platform Enclave, and the front end (i.e., its architecture Levels 3, 4 and 5)</p>
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [Physical/ESS]	<p>A system consisting of interior and exterior sensors, surveillance devices, and associated communication subsystems that collectively detect an intrusion of a specified site, facility, or perimeter and annunciate an alarm.</p>
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [Cyber]	<p>A device or software application that monitors network or system activities for malicious activities or policy violations and produces reports to management.</p>
Least Privilege (CNSSI No. 4009)	<p>The principle that a security architecture should be designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function.</p>
Mobile Code (NIST SP 800-53r4)	<p>Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed on a local information system without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.</p>
Mobile Code Technology (NIST SP 800-53r4)	<p>Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the production and use of mobile code (e.g., Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript). Note that use of Mobile Code Technology does not necessarily imply the use of Mobile Code.</p>

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Network	A network is a group of two or more devices that can communicate using a network protocol. Network protocols must provide a method for addressing devices on the network; a communication method that does not provide an addressing scheme is not a networked form of communication. Devices that communicate using a method of communication that does not support device addressing are not using a network.
Non-Local Maintenance (NIST SP 800-53)	Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network; either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network.
Operational Architecture (OA)	Those components of a control system that represent the purely operational components of the system such as controllers, Front End software, and other devices which support operational functions. When the “Platform Enclave” approach to authorizing a control system is used, the “non-standard IT” portions of the control system are authorized as the Operational Architecture and the overall system has two authorizations: Platform Enclave and Operational Architecture.
[UMCS, ESS, ...] Platform Enclave	Those components of the control system that are standard IT components and can be secured in a standard manner independent of the type of control system. These components serve only the control system and include the IP network, network management and security devices (e.g., switches, routers), software, computers and/or other devices which provide management and security of the network.
Platform IT (PIT)	IT, both hardware and software, which is physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the mission performance of special purpose systems.
Remote Access (NIST SP 800-53)	Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). See definition of “User Interface, Remote” for critical distinction in use of terminology

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
Risk (NIST SP 800-53)	A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence. Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Risk Management (NIST SP 800-53)	The process of managing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of an information system, and includes: (i) the conduct of a risk assessment; (ii) the implementation of a risk mitigation strategy; and (iii) employment of techniques and procedures for the continuous monitoring of the security state of the information system.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)	This term has a variety of meanings depending on context and is therefore not used in this UFC.
System Owner (SO) (CNSSI No. 4009)	Person or organization having responsibility for the development, procurement, integration, modification, operation and maintenance, and/or final disposition of an information system.
User Interface	<p>A User Interface is something that allows a person to interact with the control system. For purposes of cybersecurity, a User Interface does not include simple analog and/or binary inputs such as HOA switches, dials, etc. (“Manual Local Input” in UFGS 25 05 11) or simple Card Readers. Proper addressing of User Interfaces is critical for cybersecurity.</p> <p>Note that User Interfaces are defined in a more exhaustive and prescriptive manner in UFGS 25 05 11 to enable specification of user interface requirements.</p>

**Term**

**Definition**

User Interface,  
Remote or Local

A Remote User Interface implements a Client/Server model where the physical hardware the user interacts with (Client) is physically distinct from the device being affected (Server). Most or all of the security and functionality characteristics of the user interface are defined by the Server, not the Client. A common example of a remote user interface is a web-based interface where the browser (client) is generally on different hardware than the web server (server). A Remote UI remains a Remote UI even if the user happens to be at a Client on the same hardware as the Server. What is important is that a) the Client may be on different hardware than the Server and b) the majority of the security and functional characteristics of the interface are defined at the Server.

A Local User Interface is a user interface where the physical hardware the user interacts with (keyboard, buttons, display, etc.) is physically part of the device being affected. All of the relevant characteristics of the user interface are embodied within a single device.

Note that this definition of "remote" is consistent with that generally used in the control industry but is not aligned with the NIST 800-53 definition of "Remote" or "Remote Access", which refers to "outside the system". The term "Remote" here better aligns with the NIST 800-53 definition of "Network" (remote from within the system) Access.

User Interface,  
Limited or Full

A Limited User Interface is a user interface that - by design - can only alter information local to the user interface. Note that the determination of "alter" includes only direct interactions, it explicitly excludes interactions that might occur as secondary effects. For example, an interface changing the flow setpoint in a pump controller is a direct interaction, the subsequent change in flow (as well as any subsequent downstream changes in valve position) are not direct interactions. For example, a variable speed drive has a Limited Local User Interface which allows the user to change properties within the drive but does not allow affecting things outside the drive.

A Full User Interface can alter information in devices outside the device with the user interface. For example, a typical Local Display Panel is a Full Local User Interface while a browser-based front end is a Full Remote User Interface.

<b><u>Term</u></b>	<b><u>Definition</u></b>
User Interface, Privileged	<p>A Privileged UI is a UI that has sufficient capabilities or functionality that it requires specific cybersecurity measures to be put in place to limit its unauthorized use. Ultimately, whether a specific user interface is considered a Privileged User Interface must be determined by usage. In general however, user interfaces that do not offer significant capabilities above and beyond those available at that location via other means (e.g., a disconnect switch, breaker, hand-off-auto switch, or direct physical attack) are not privileged.</p> <p>Note that UFGS 25 05 11 contains additional information and requirements on identifying when a UI is a Privileged UI to enable specification of UI requirements.</p>
Utility Control System (UCS)	<p>A type of field control system used for control of utility systems such as electrical distribution and generation, sanitary sewer collection and treatment, water generation and pumping, etc. Building controls are excluded from a UCS, however it is possible to have a Utility Control System and a Building Control System in the same facility, and for those systems to share components such as the FPOC. A UCS is a subsystem of a Utility Monitoring and Control System (UMCS) and is a class of Field Control System (FCS).</p>
Utility Monitoring and Control System (UMCS)	<p>The system consisting of one or more building control systems and/or utility control systems and the associated UMCS Infrastructure. In other words, it is the complete utility monitoring system – from the front end to the controllers. At the highest level the UMCS is composed of a UMCS Platform Enclave and UMCS Front End (jointly referred to as UMCS Infrastructure) and connected Field Control System(s). There are many different names for a UMCS – Energy Monitoring and Control System being a common one – but regardless of the name systems that perform this function are a type of UMCS.</p>
Vulnerability (NIST SP 800-53)	<p>Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.</p>



## APPENDIX I REFERENCES

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<https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm>

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